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#21
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[ QUOTE ]
(or for that matter make the crying call because it -does- pay off one in twelve or whatever, that time it does pay off we look like a genius) [/ QUOTE ] This is over the hills and far away but I still don't get it with the calling-at-the-same-rate-that-the-guy-bluffs as being some achievement or something. How does that make money exactly? The way I see it is, If, in a particular river situation, I think my opponent will bluff one time in ten, then my goal is to call the one time I have him beat, and fold the other nine. Tommy |
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#22
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Great concert story, taking me back.
Here's a so's-you-know: ""I've got a woman I want to ball all day......" Is actually, "I got a woman, [she] wants to ball a day." (or "she wanna" and other random forms.) It's the same gal who won't be true. yeah no yeah no yeah no No wonder he asked Hey what can I do? This time Robert wasn't orgasming during the song, as your version might suggest. But he was complaining about orgasms so it still counted. |
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#23
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supplanting, so to speak
Heh. Pretty sweet, yourself. |
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#24
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To make this clear as possible let's have a remaining player make a raise for sure. This allows the AA to reraise, taking Phat Mack's price away. See?
Of course, this happens all the time. And then you have some more information: the remaining player is a fool, or he has made a remarkable read and believes that he can get Cousin to lay KK down. Valuable things to know, but they may kill the play against Cousin for the forseeable future. When the smooth-call play is made against Cousin, it may bring in a string of callers who know exactly what's going on, it may provoke a play-foiling raise, but it may bring in players who are, regretably for their bankrolls, nothing more than calling stations. So the collusive entanglement of the unwitting can fall either way. (To digress a bit from the theory, there are set plays and observations that can be made when joining a new table. One is to smooth-call the rock and observe the results, another is to re-raise the maniac and again observe the results. Very enlightening. A few years ago, ray zee made a post something like, "here's the secret to poker. look left before you bet." Many readers may have thought he was jesting.) To take your example, in short-handed limit there are a lot of collusive entaglements that seem to baffle me. If I keep thinking about certain games, a couple of years later, when falling asleep or driving or falling asleep driving, I'll have one of those 'Aha!' moments and suddenly realize a useful strategy that could have been employed. Then it is certain that I will never encounter a similar situation again. My theory of short-handed play is to get lucky or leave. This all (sorta) relates to Tom's RGP post. I believe that if you analyze the idiotic plays of idiotic players, you may not find intentional brilliance, but you may well find "found" brilliance, and brilliance that may be intentionally replicated for our own benefit. To risk correction from Mr. Angelo, "It's been a long time since I walked in the moonlight." IV: My favorite. |
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#25
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[ QUOTE ]
Using simulations and thought experiments as well as empirical data, it has become quite clear to me that there are sometimes situation in shorthanded *limit* play where if certain combinations of patterns continue to play out, it is difficult if not impossible to beat over the long run. In spite of the fact the opponents seem to have flawed strategies. [/ QUOTE ] Full games can also expand into this realm. But this is nothing new, right? This is why the most important thing about poker is not to play. Much speech leads inevitably to silence. Better to hold fast to the void. - Lao Tzu The Myriad Creatures |
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#26
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"Using simulations and thought experiments as well as empirical data, it has become quite clear to me that there are sometimes situation in shorthanded *limit* play where if certain combinations of patterns continue to play out, it is difficult if not impossible to beat over the long run. In spite of the fact the opponents seem to have flawed strategies."
This is either way over my head, or wrong, or applies only online. Tommy |
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#27
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Great post Sredni!
I remember your Shania post and feel that the concept it discussed was explored more fully in John Vorhaus' book 'Killer Poker'. Along those same lines, anyone playing with an exploitable strategy can be dominated and controlled profitably. Even when the exploitable strategies are combined to make them more difficult to beat, a new approach may be necessary, but that does not make it impossible to win. (Unless real collusion is going on, because the situation you describe with Cousin will repeat itself far too often for you to showdown enough winners.) In Cousin's case, why can't this situation be exploited by folding and letting the maniac outdraw him? Cousin will play his blinds far too tightly anyway and we can get the chips from Cousin's stack when the maniac(s) get lucky. Why would you want to enter a pot, knowing that you are taking the worst of it, without being able to improve your image to the degree that you will be able to influence Cousin's play? I understand that you are giving up equity PF to get a huge pot if you hit, but that might not happen either. If Cousin misses the flop completely, he may go into check-call, or even check-fold on a scary board leaving you with 3-4BB profit for all of your failed starts against him and maniac. If Cousin plays well post flop, you will still lose money even without the maniac present. I'm just rambling now, sorry. I think it's past my bedtime. Thanks again for another great post. Dov |
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#28
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[ QUOTE ]
This is either way over my head, or wrong, or applies only online. [/ QUOTE ] None of the above [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img] Thanks for posting, brief and to the point. Was hoping the Led Zep lines would draw you out of your lair. I'll try to show the general case logically. How about we see if we can agree on something? In a four player game (you and three opponents), the three somewhat skillful opponents are allowed to collude against you. You agree to this for experimentation purposes. Do you think you can make money in this game? And if the answer is "it depends on the skill level of the opponents". Would you agree that there would come a skill level where against three opponents that: you could have a positive expectation when they were playing fairly (not colluding), but would not have a positive one when they were colluding? And if you agree to that then: Do you think that there is some probability that opponents strategies could inadvertantly mimic those collusion ones above? Especially when you consider that opponents who tend to be agressive are much more likely to produce "collusive entanglement" situations? Or have I missed your point? PS In the Phat Mack hand, while this is what I term collusive entanglement, even there, its beatable. AA would show a profit. PPS The situation that Monty described (three betting a maniac) is not really what I would consider to be collusive entanglement. SV. |
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#29
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I love this line, [ QUOTE ]
My theory of short-handed play is to get lucky or leave. [/ QUOTE ] Sredni thanks you for your contributions. Told ya I would get back to that Shania thread [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img] SV. |
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#30
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Zeno writes, 'Full games can also expand into this realm. But this is nothing new, right?"
I really don't think published conventional strategy addresses collusive entanglement completely. Though most good to great players intuitively and strategically know how to manipulate it to their advantage. [ QUOTE ] This is why the most important thing about poker is not to play. [/ QUOTE ] Which is more or less what I do more often than not. SV. |
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