#11
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Re: Game Theory Problem
My guess (in white): <font color="white">$50.01</font>
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#12
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Re: Game Theory Problem
Looks like a zero to me as well. Unless I'm messing up something major here (and I am pretty tired), company A's profit is an integral from 0 to X of (1.5Y-X) dY , where X is company A's offer. This integral calculates to -0.25 X^2, which has a maximum value of 0 and never really becomes positive anyway. Unless company A can offer a complex number as a share price they can't make any profit here.
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#13
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Answer
EDIT: Nevermind read it wrong pay no attention
Company B's EV is $50 per share if it's worth the spectrum of 0-100 if no price is more likely then any other. Company A's EV after take over is $75 per share with the spectrum of 0-150. B will accept A's offer if it's more then their current price. Therefore A will offer the smallest amount over 50 they can and wind up with a profit of slightly under $25/share. I have no idea how people got 0, as i assume we're talking about expected not guarenteed profit. If there is some risk aversion in either company that will effect the outcome, but i don't see that in the problem. |
#14
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Re: Answer
[ QUOTE ]
Therefore A will offer the smallest amount over 50 they can and wind up with a profit of slightly under $25/share. [/ QUOTE ] I'm not so sure about this. If A offers $50.01 (just assume cents are discrete for now) -- then for all we are concerned, the only relevant values of the straight cash $EV of B are between 1 and 50, because A is not going to get to buy B unless its price is below $50. Obviously then the $EV of B to B is $25, and then the $EV of B to A is ($25)(1.5) after the acquisition. Therefore A is paying $50 for ($25 * 1.5) = $37.50 of EV, so they are making a decision that has an EV of -$12.50... ... i think. i'm rushing out, might have missed something dumb |
#15
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Re: Answer
... so basically i think 0 is the answer as well
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#16
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Re: Game Theory Problem
Just intuitively 0 is the right answer. Say you offer $50. You make a profit only when the value of the company is $33.3. But you lose whenever it is less. So you lose twice as often as you gain. I don't think that analysis is perfect, but if you say drop the price to $25 same thing happens. Is that what the winner's curse is called?
-SmileyEH |
#17
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Re: Game Theory Problem
A strange game. The only winning move is not to play. How about a nice game of chess?
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#18
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Re: Game Theory Problem
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ] [ QUOTE ] Assume Company A wants to maximize profits, how much should they offer per share? [/ QUOTE ] I think the answer is 0. [/ QUOTE ] That is what I came up with too, but that seems like it would make it a kind of pointless question. Maybe it is though. [/ QUOTE ] This is a very famous problem. As I said above it's known as the winner's curse. The problem is that in a common value auction (where you've bidding on the value of something to the public not to you personally, basically like you're buying stuff for business reasons) bidders often don't take into account that if they win the auction they must have estimated the value of the good to be higher than others thought. This leads to a "curse" because that probably means that the winner overbid and will lose money on the transaction. This often happens in actual auctions for oil fields and that kind of thing. So the basic principle at work here is that you need to consider what your offer being accepted means. In this case it's only bad news for you. The problem seems (and should be) easy for people here because we're accustomed to making EV decisions often and taking the greater picture into account. Just wait until class, you'll see that most people [censored] it up and would lose money. |
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