Implications of Collusive Entanglement in O8

[GooperMC]

Granted I am only speaking from a low limit background but I have never worried about good players thinking that I am good, I only worry about bad playing thinking I am good.

At the PL25 tables I don't think that you will be able to fool another good player into thinking that you are bad however I am not sure that you really care. What you really want is the fish think you are also a fish so that they pay you off. Here is a fun example story.

I am sitting at the $25 tables with $85 in front of me (I went on a crazy run of cards on a very fishy table) and fish with a big stack started to chat with me. Because I had such a big stack in front of my he immediately thought that I was a good player, well I had to change that! I started giving him some of the worst advice in the world, advice that was so bad that even the fishies would think that it was bad. Then I would punctuate by using the current hand as an example and lie about what I was playing. For example things like ‘laying down top set here because a set is way behind a flush draw.” I never got a chance to bust the fish but all the chat was working, he was calling me more, attempting to “make plays” at me, etc.

Later when the table was breaking up another of the decent players at the table told me that he thought my “act” was entertaining. My point is that I didn’t really care that he realized I was messing around because I probably wasn’t going to take much money from him anyway. However because of the table image I was portraying I could have busted that fish.

[Matt Ruff]

[ QUOTE ]
You misunderstand my point. I said: If you know your opponent will chose one action (confess), then you are best off choosing that as well.

[/ QUOTE ]

But this is wrong. In the P.D., no matter what the other prisoner does, you are better off if you confess.


[ QUOTE ]
This fact was the entire reason I mentioned another game theory model – committing yourself to a given course of action so that your opponent recognizes your commitment comes up all the time in poker, but is not central to PD given simultaneous decisions.

[/ QUOTE ]

I agree the P.D. is not a great fit for the situation the OP is talking about, but I really don't think the Tragedy is either.

I think what you want is a decision matrix where the best payoff comes when you defect (raise) and the other guy cooperates (folds), the second best when you both cooperate (both check/call), the third best when you cooperate (fold) and the other guy defects (raises), and the worst is when you both defect (raising war). That's Chicken, isn't it?


[ QUOTE ]
There are numerous examples in Tragedy literature where the common good is a finite resource such as biodiversity or fishing and where one side has the typical incentive to overuse, whereas the other side has a resulting incentive to scale back usage to avoid having the resource disappear entirely.

[/ QUOTE ]

So in the case of two lows chasing the pot in 0/8, what's the finite resource?

-- M. Ruff

[gergery]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
You misunderstand my point. I said: If you know your opponent will chose one action (confess), then you are best off choosing that as well.

[/ QUOTE ]

But this is wrong.

[/ QUOTE ]

It's not wrong; it's factually correct. If you look at any PD matrix, if you are certain your opponent will confess then it is best for you to confess. Since you state this in another part of your post I'm not sure how you can argue with this.

[ QUOTE ]
In the P.D., no matter what the other prisoner does, you are better off if you confess.

[/ QUOTE ]

Only in non-repeated games.

But again, my original point was not to elaborate on the PD, but to note how it is different than the TotC

[ QUOTE ]
I think what you want is a decision matrix where the best payoff comes when you defect (raise) and the other guy cooperates (folds), the second best when you both cooperate (both check/call), the third best when you cooperate (fold) and the other guy defects (raises), and the worst is when you both defect (raising war). That's Chicken, isn't it?

[/ QUOTE ]

That is the exact payout matrix for TotC, and why I think it's highly relevant to O8.

Chicken appears to have a payout matrix similar to TotC except that its payouts are skewed differently (diastrous payouts for mutual defection), so it doesn't seem as relevant to O8 poker perhaps more so for tournament poker.

From the Journal of Environmental Psychology
"Essentially a commons problem occurs when a community of consumers consumes resources at a rate high enough to endanger the regenerating resource itself....and the consumers face the choice of restricting their own consumption for the good of the pool and the community, or continuing to consume at self-satisfying rates to face dire consequences at a later time."

So the whole point of a Tragedy problem is who can commit first and thus force a rational opponent out.

[ QUOTE ]
So in the case of two lows chasing the pot in 0/8, what's the finite resource?

[/ QUOTE ]

The money being added to the pot

To summarize, neither PD nor TotC are perfect comparison points for poker, but both have principles that are particularly relevant. In the original post Weideman made, the main theme he had was that players that appear stupid and are able to commit, forcing others away. That's TotC more than PD, imho.

--Greg

[Matt Ruff]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
You misunderstand my point. I said: If you know your opponent will chose one action (confess), then you are best off choosing that as well.

[/ QUOTE ]

But this is wrong.

[/ QUOTE ]

It's not wrong; it's factually correct. If you look at any PD matrix, if you are certain your opponent will confess then it is best for you to confess.

[/ QUOTE ]

In the immortal words of Abbott & Costello: "Third base."

I took your original statement to mean: "In the Prisoner's Dilemma, you are always better off mimicking your opponent's action." This is not true. In a non-iterated P.D., you are always better off confessing. Even in an iterated P.D., there are situations where you are best off doing the opposite of what you think your opponent will do (e.g., it’s correct to occasionally defect against a weak opponent who will not automatically retaliate).

It’s clear now that you know all this, though, so I suspect that what your original statement actually meant was: “In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, if your opponent confesses, you are better off confessing as well.” I think there still may be exceptions to this in an iterated P.D., but in general of course that's correct.


[ QUOTE ]
But again, my original point was not to elaborate on the PD, but to note how it is different than the TotC

[/ QUOTE ]

OK.


[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
So in the case of two lows chasing the pot in 0/8, what's the finite resource?

[/ QUOTE ]

The money being added to the pot

[/ QUOTE ]

OK, that’s what I thought, and the reason I objected to this initially is that in the TotC, there aren’t supposed to be any short-term incentives for conservation, something that is clearly not true of bets into a three-way O/8 pot when you expect to get quartered.

But I think I finally see what you’re getting at: against an opponent who is determined to defect every time, and who cannot be threatened or schooled out of that behavior, the TotC suggests you are better off cooperating, while the P.D. says you should defect right back at him. So at least in that case, the TotC is a better model of the O/8 scenario, because you’re better off folding than getting into a raising war with someone who won't learn from the experience.

And by the way, “I don’t give a darn!” is our shortstop.

-- M. Ruff

[gergery]

[ QUOTE ]
But I think I finally see what you’re getting at: against an opponent who is determined to defect every time, and who cannot be threatened or schooled out of that behavior, the TotC suggests you are better off cooperating, while the P.D. says you should defect right back at him. So at least in that case, the TotC is a better model of the O/8 scenario, because you’re better off folding than getting into a raising war with someone who won't learn from the experience.

[/ QUOTE ]

Exactly, and don’t I wish I’d just typed that out at the start of this.

That’s one of my favorite comedy routines by the way.

I take it you never played shortstop either? [img]/images/graemlins/tongue.gif[/img]

--Greg