Implications of Collusive Entanglement in O8
 

I am bored as hell at work. I decided re-read another of Sredni's old threads, this one on Collusive Entanglement. Thanks to the depths of my boredom, I followed Sredni's rabbit-hole deeper and clicked on his link to another post at RGP by Tom Weideman, which I've copied below. If you have 10 minutes, read through it, and if you're still interested, feel free to help me think over the questions at the bottom.

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1. Tom Weideman Dec 12 2002, 6:30 pm
Subject: A big tournament advantage: Stupidity

I know the subject line sounds like sour grapes, but actually I'm being
quite serious, as you will see. Now obviously being a smart player helps
with tournament success in many ways. I'm not trying to tell you that the
only way to win tournaments is to be stupid - far from it - smarter players
will win in the long run. But what I will show you is that there are quite
common situations where your opponents knowing you aren't too bright can
greatly work to your advantage. Because of these advantages the "long run"
required for smarter players to assure a win can become even longer. Some
of these ideas apply to ring games as well, but even the concepts that apply
to both venues have a greater effect in tournaments. It's even possible
that a player can be stupid enough to take advantage of it, and at the same
time stumble upon a correct strategy for everything else (this is most often
true of "naturally aggressive" players), making him/her a winning tournament
player.


Situation #1: High low split
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Suppose you are involved in a three-way hand in a tournament game involving
high-low split (either Omaha-8 or Stud-8). You figure that you and another
player have low draws, while the third player has a high hand. In such
situations, if the pot is not too big, it is frequently correct to throw
away your low draw if the opponent plays his, since you only stand to get
half the pot if you get there (or in some cases, 1/4 of it), you (typically)
have at best a 30-35% chance of getting there, and even if you get there,
you have to beat the other low draw's hand (which you'll do something like
half the time you both get there). Now obviously much of this depends upon
how smooth you are drawing, the dead cards out, how rough your opponent is
likely to draw, and so on, but nevertheless it can be a pretty bad spot at
times. Tournament situations (with % payouts) make this even worse, because
when two opponents get involved, you gain tournament equity by just
watching. Getting involved discards this equity, which means you
essentially have to pay an even greater price than you would in a cash game.


Okay, now here's where stupidity comes in. In such a situation, it is
typically a game of chicken. If both players are smart, then the first
player can get involved, locking out the second person (and hoping that the
second person doesn't "up the ante" of the chicken game by raising and
starting a whipsaw with the high hand). But if one of the two low draws has
no clue about what I describe above (and the other low draw knows he has no
clue), then the smarter of the two players has to just concede and fold.
It's like playing chicken against someone who is trying to commit suicide.


Situation #2: Super satellites
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There are 9 players left in a super satellite, and 8 players get seats. You
are sitting two spots to the right of an idiot, and both of you have
medium-sized stacks. There is one short stack to your right, who can't
cover his blinds the next round. You have the button.


Now at a table full of smart players, no one gets involved against anyone
but the short stack, and even then people would rather have someone else try
to bust him. When this is the case, play is usually quite trivial: Everyone
folds to some late position player (usually the button, because people in
earlier positions typically worry that someone behind them with aces who has
them out-chipped will decide to go for it), who stacks off and takes the
blinds. He has to do this to keep pace, because when it is his turn with
the blinds, he has to surrender them. If he doesn't take his share and the
short stack survives a round or two, then HE becomes the short stack. First
one to get his money in wins the dead money.


But when you have the button, Mr. IQ-of-a-belt-buckle is in the big blind,
and he doesn't like to surrender his blind so easily. Once again, you are
forced to back off and not try to steal, especially if he has you
outchipped, and this greatly helps his cause and hurts yours.


General Comments
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The general idea here is that in poker there are frequently situations where
"mutually-assured destruction" situations arise. These take place in cash
games as well as in tournaments, but the effects are amplified in
tournaments because of the tournament equity premium one has to pay to be
the "third man in". When a smart player is aware that he and a stupid
player are in the roles of the mutually-assured destructees, he is at a huge
disadvantage. If the idiot also happens to be loose and aggressive, the
problem is made that much worse, as the damage can be greater. The smart
player may then find himself having to play very tight and passively to
avoid these sorts of situations. This reduces his chances of moving up the
pay scale, but increases his chances of cashing overall such that his ev is
still higher than the dummy who is more likely to win it all but is much
less likely to cash.


Now of course the best of both worlds would be a person who is actually
intelligent but has fostered a persona of being dim-witted. I think this
would be hard to do, because eventually his actions will give him away, but
it might be possible to pull off for awhile. (Edit: my emphasis -- WM)

Finally, I'd like to reiterate that these advantages associated with idiocy
are not sufficient to turn this person into a winning tournament player, but
if this person is already aggressive (a very important quality), fearless,
and has a little bit of card sense, this added edge can close the gap with
the strong players quite a bit, making overall tournament ev for good
players not as high as one might think.


Tom Weideman



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OK, how can this concept apply to cash O8 games. I'm thinking, of course, primarily of PLO8, but I think the result ought to apply roughly equally to pot-limit or limit. We'll see...

Also, let's use Tom's two-nut-lows vs. one high example. I think it might help to make a modification to his example, namely that the two nut-lows are already made lows, counterfeit protection is not an issue, and neither low has an opportunity to catch up to the third hand for the high. In some ways, this would be a convenient change to make, to avoid the obvious "it depends" objections, but I don't really think it's necessary. Anyhow, if you find yourself considering specific hand examples, that's the wrong direction here--try to come at this from a general strategical sense, or just make the above modification to the example and re-start your thinking.


1) Does this concept apply well (perhaps not equally, but at least significantly) to O8 cash games, considering that there is no "bonus" equity in folding to move up the tourney pay scale?

2) Is it possible to create and maintain an image of being an idiot such that you benefit in this situation over the long-term?

3) Conversely, is it a disadvantage to have a tight, rational image so that a perceptive opponent can make you fold your nut low in this spot?


My initial hunch is (1) yes (and especially so in PL), (2) yes, and (3) yes, but with varying degrees of certainty. But I'm really curious what other people think.

Re: Implications of Collusive Entanglement in O8
 

[ QUOTE ]
1) Does this concept apply well (perhaps not equally, but at least significantly) to O8 cash games, considering that there is no "bonus" equity in folding to move up the tourney pay scale?

2) Is it possible to create and maintain an image of being an idiot such that you benefit in this situation over the long-term?

3) Conversely, is it a disadvantage to have a tight, rational image so that a perceptive opponent can make you fold your nut low in this spot?


[/ QUOTE ]

1. Yes. Bad/aggressive players can destroy a game, at least in the short term. A player with a nut high (or less if he's really good) can punish the lows. A good player going low with the fool has to lay his hand down when he's likely to get quartered and the fool will push.

2. Play Poker Quit Work and Sleep Till Noon by John Fox has an entire section devoted to plays that are designed accomplish this. The book is old, out of print, exclusively five card draw, and boring. But, this is where I first learned about high variance/0 EV plays. An example from the book, if I remember correctly, would be to raise before the draw with aces and stand pat. It defies logic and people think you're nuts.

Of course, poker tracker doesn't lie. If I have 2,000 hands on someone and they are averaging 20+ BB per 100, they get my attention as being a potent player. There might be situations in live play where you can make many high variance / 0 EV plays to this end, however.

3. No question.

My two cents.

Re: Implications of Collusive Entanglement in O8
 

I remember reading this post a while back. The first person I thought of (both then and now) was Terry Myers. I have never seen someone play so badly, and indicate so plainly that he has no understanding of the game, yet get so far, so often. From all indications at the series this year, he is still doing the same thing. Either he is the best actor I've ever met, or he is the real deal.

This was the strangest tourney I've ever played against Terry, but definitely not the last, lol.

Felicia [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]
www.felicialee.net

Re: Implications of Collusive Entanglement in O8
 

The situation you describe is a perfect example of the famous "Prisoner's dilemma" from game theory. It's a paradox because each player with the naked low is correct to play his low aggressively in order to fold the other low hand, but if both players play this way "correctly" then the least desirable result occurs.

Re: Implications of Collusive Entanglement in O8
 

Funny that you post this, as one of the next article-ettes I was going to write for my site is on Game Theory and its applications to poker. He is basically describing the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ In fact, in one of the hands I posted ~2 weeks ago (nut low with set on monotone board on turn) forced me to fold on the river for precisely Tom’s reason.

1. Yes, I think it’s very relevant. It’s probably most relevant in O8 when you have a low hand with 2 others in. And for high when you have a straight vs. anther straight and a low, but that happens a lot less often.

It also comes comes up in more subtle ways very frequently in cash games via semibluffing and shortstacked-ness. The value of a semi-bluff is that sometimes you’ll win when they fold, and sometimes you’ll win when you’re called but outdraw your opponent. It's the combination of those two ways to win that make semi-bluffing correct. But when your opponent has committed a large percent of his stack, then he has committed himself, and thus you no longer can realistically hope to win via them folding. Then your semi-bluff doesn’t have enough odds and you must fold.

2. Yes, I think LAGish players who push smaller EV edges can be seen by some opponents as bad players, and can result in getting some folds. But it may also result in others calling you down in other situations giving you less fold equity. So I’m not sure on balance how big this whole effect is.

3. Yes, but even weaker yes. It depends on whether you’d prefer your opponents to call or fold when you bet. Which depends on your playing style.

4. And yes, I’m blowing off work too.

Re: Implications of Collusive Entanglement in O8
 

[ QUOTE ]
The situation you describe is a perfect example of the famous "Prisoner's dilemma" from game theory. It's a paradox because each player with the naked low is correct to play his low aggressively in order to fold the other low hand, but if both players play this way "correctly" then the least desirable result occurs.

[/ QUOTE ]

Actually I think it’s the opposite of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

In the prisoner’s dilemma, if you opponent chooses one action (confess), then you are best off choosing that as well.

In the tragedy of the commons, if your opponent chooses one action (over-using a scarce resource), then you are best off choosing the opposite action (not completely using up the scarce resource).

The difference is that your opponents choice is known in the tragedy, but is not known in prisoners

--Greg

Re: Implications of Collusive Entanglement in O8
 

Number 2 is the one I'm really after, 1 and 3 are both pretty clearly yes IMO.

So, what's the sort of strategy one could use to appear to be an idiot and benefit from it, and keep that image over the long term...

I think the answer may be:

1) you must play against people who are not idiots (they must have the ability to recognize you for the fool you are projecting)

2) assuming 1 holds, never fold a nut low in a three-way pot, assuming stacks are roughly equal.

Unfortunately, it seems to me also that the only way to defeat this strategy (that is, prevent it from working--not necessarily turn the greatest profit) is, as the other nut low, to never fold even when the other nut low is staying in the hand (as a fool). So, perhaps we need a number three:

3) your opponent must NOT realize that you are projecting the fool image and/or must not understand that the only way to "defeat" it is to not fold nut low. That is, your opponent must not pull the trigger on mutually assured destruction.


this is starting to make my head hurt. but one last thing.



suppose you find yourself in the situation that 1 and 2 are satisfied, but not 3. Over a series of hands, you both keep getting quartered. Is it correct to blink first or not? I think that at some point, blinking first is the right play, but it benefits the opponent more than it does you.

ahhh. poke holes in all this. I know it doesn't safely hold water

Re: Implications of Collusive Entanglement in O8
 

[ QUOTE ]
Actually I think it’s the opposite of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

In the prisoner’s dilemma, if you opponent chooses one action (confess), then you are best off choosing that as well.

[/ QUOTE ]

No. In the prisoner's dilemma, you are best off if you defect (confess) and the other guy keeps silent -- then you go free, and he gets an extra-harsh sentence. Second best outcome is if you both keep silent -- then you both get light sentences. Third best outcome is if you both confess -- then you both get moderate sentences. The worst outcome (for you) is if you keep silent while he confesses.

I'd say this almost matches the situation in O/8 where two lows are up against a high. Obviously it's great for you if you push hard and the other low drops out. Failing that, you'd like to be able to just check/call down the high. If you and the other low both decide to push, that's bad -- bad enough, that, unlike in the prisoner's dilemma, you are better off folding in the face of a determined raiser.

Of course, that brings up the other difference between this situation and the prisoner's dilemma, which is that in the P.D., the two "players" aren't allowed to communicate before committing to a strategy. You can't push the other guy out of the pot if he can't see your bets.


[ QUOTE ]
In the tragedy of the commons, if your opponent chooses one action (over-using a scarce resource), then you are best off choosing the opposite action (not completely using up the scarce resource).

[/ QUOTE ]

Again, no. The essence of the Tragedy is that there's no incentive for anyone to conserve -- the resource is free for the taking, and if you don't use it, somebody else will. Not a good analogy to the situation we're talking about.

-- M. Ruff

Re: Implications of Collusive Entanglement in O8
 

[ QUOTE ]
No. In the prisoner's dilemma, you are best off if you defect (confess) and the other guy keeps silent -- then you go free, and he gets an extra-harsh sentence. Second best outcome is if you both keep silent -- then you both get light sentences. Third best outcome is if you both confess -- then you both get moderate sentences. The worst outcome (for you) is if you keep silent while he confesses.

[/ QUOTE ]

You misunderstand my point. I said: If you know your opponent will chose one action (confess), then you are best off choosing that as well. I was not rank ordering desirable outcomes; I was noting which option is best in scenarios where you’ve assumed a given selection will be made by your opponent.


[ QUOTE ]
Of course, that brings up the other difference between this situation and the prisoner's dilemma, which is that in the P.D., the two "players" aren't allowed to communicate before committing to a strategy. You can't push the other guy out of the pot if he can't see your bets.

[/ QUOTE ]

This fact was the entire reason I mentioned another game theory model – committing yourself to a given course of action so that your opponent recognizes your commitment comes up all the time in poker, but is not central to PD given simultaneous decisions. But it is an aspect of the Tragedy. And why I think there are aspects of both the PD and ToTC that are relevant to poker, but that neither model is completely accurate nor irrevelant

[ QUOTE ]
Quote:
________________________________________

In the tragedy of the commons, if your opponent chooses one action (over-using a scarce resource), then you are best off choosing the opposite action (not completely using up the scarce resource).
________________________________________


Again, no. The essence of the Tragedy is that there's no incentive for anyone to conserve -- the resource is free for the taking, and if you don't use it, somebody else will. Not a good analogy to the situation we're talking about.

[/ QUOTE ]

There are numerous examples in Tragedy literature where the common good is a finite resource such as biodiversity or fishing and where one side has the typical incentive to overuse, whereas the other side has a resulting incentive to scale back usage to avoid having the resource disappear entirely.

It may not be the central issue in the Tragedy, but the principle of having one side commit to a course of action and thus force different behavior on the other party is important to the Tragedy and the key point that I was making. So I may have overstated its benefit as an analogy, but it obviously has aspects to it which are highly relevant to O8 poker.

The reason I mention the Tragedy as more similar to O8 3-way situations is that it is more closely linked with commitment and with one party being aware of the other’s action before deciding on its own choice, neither of which are the core issues in PD.

--Greg

Re: Implications of Collusive Entanglement in O8
 

[ QUOTE ]
Number 2 is the one I'm really after, 1 and 3 are both pretty clearly yes IMO.

So, what's the sort of strategy one could use to appear to be an idiot and benefit from it, and keep that image over the long term...

[/ QUOTE ]

I can speak to live games about this; I don't know about online. The best way to appear idiotic over the long term is to proclaim yourself an expert.