Frequentists and Opponents of Bayes

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Bayes's theorem is a theorem, after all, so it has to be true, but it's so simplistic that it's essentially trivial. The interesting thing about Bayes's theorem is that it indicates we should update our expectations based on additional partial knowledge.

The question that concerns philosophers is how should we approach epistemology and philosophy of science? This problem really originates with Hume's problem of induction. The Bayesian response is to simply use probabilities to determine the likelihood of events, and update those probabilities. The obvious objection is that without knowledge of the priors (which Bayesians assume are just given, as if we are omnisicient), we have no idea how to update the posteriors.

Try http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ep...gy-bayesian/#5 for more. Just check out some of the references in the bibliography for further information.