Kind of redundant post, but more specific question on "thought".

[chezlaw]

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No one knows how our neurobiological processes produce consciousness. It's a complete mystery.

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It amazes me that a “scientist” is “allowed” to make statements such as these. But, if a believer would, he often would be considered “silly”.

I do not disagree with you at all in your statement.

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I sometimes think this is the 'rational gap' between the religous and the rest.

The religous believe the irreligous think they can understand everything without resort to god. This is not true but it is also not a rational reason to believe in god.

chez

[splittter]

Dennet's book, "Conciousness Explained" (http://tinyurl.com/c342p), is an attempt to situate conciousness in a place open to science-like investigation and explanation. It's a very interesting read. He's an academic philosopher, but his books are intended for general readers.

His basic idea is that conciousness is not a single type of 'thing' that happens, and does not, of itself, play the role of a decider in mental processes. Rather, it's the result of many different, unconnected, mental processes, each of which has reached a level of complexity which provides specific evolutionary advantages.

Basically the idea that conciousness is an epi-phenomena of the brian, but being more specific about how and why that occurs.

[chezlaw]

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Dennet's book, "Conciousness Explained" (http://tinyurl.com/c342p), is an attempt to situate conciousness in a place open to science-like investigation and explanation. It's a very interesting read. He's an academic philosopher, but his books are intended for general readers.

His basic idea is that conciousness is not a single type of 'thing' that happens, and does not, of itself, play the role of a decider in mental processes. Rather, it's the result of many different, unconnected, mental processes, each of which has reached a level of complexity which provides specific evolutionary advantages.

Basically the idea that conciousness is an epi-phenomena of the brian, but being more specific about how and why that occurs.

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His on my reading list. Am I correct in thinking:

He is not explaining how these conscious phenomena are caused.
He is not claiming they are necessary.

chez

[splittter]

Now you're asking [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]

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His on my reading list. Am I correct in thinking:

He is not explaining how these conscious phenomena are caused.
He is not claiming they are necessary.


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On the first point I'm not quite sure. He basically sketches his ideas about how seperate feedback mechanisms in the brain, of increasing complexity would be driven by an evolutionary process. For him the existence of said feedback mechanisms is enough to explain conciousness, as for Dennet conciousness is the extent to which the Brain takes account of its own state and responds to it.

What I think you're asking about is the status of the private, *felt* nature of conciousness, and what is it that causes that experience. Dennet doesn't think that the experience of conciousness is itself important to its functioning. Note, though that's different to saying that conciousness itself is not important to the functioning of the brain (which is the traditional epi-phenomena position, and which he he doesn't hold).

So, what I'm saying is he explains what causes conciousness, but does not explain what causes us to *feel* it. Reason being he doesn't think that we can have reliable statements about what it is to *feel* concious. Again, without going into massive detail, he thinks there would be no possible way to distinguish between someone who genuinely *felt* his conciousness and a 'zombie' (as the literature terms it) who says he does, but actually doesn't.

As for whether it is necessary. The mechanisms he posits for the brain, which constitute conciousness, he thinks are necessary for the evolutionary advantages we have. The private felt nature of conciousness he doesn't think is necessary because, as I said above, he thinks there is no logical way to distinguish between a person who has it and one who doesn't.

Hope that helps. Also, as it is years since I read him, if anyone can summarise his position better/correct errors feel free.

[chezlaw]

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Now you're asking [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]

[ QUOTE ]

His on my reading list. Am I correct in thinking:

He is not explaining how these conscious phenomena are caused.
He is not claiming they are necessary.


[/ QUOTE ]

On the first point I'm not quite sure. He basically sketches his ideas about how seperate feedback mechanisms in the brain, of increasing complexity would be driven by an evolutionary process. For him the existence of said feedback mechanisms is enough to explain conciousness, as for Dennet conciousness is the extent to which the Brain takes account of its own state and responds to it.

What I think you're asking about is the status of the private, *felt* nature of conciousness, and what is it that causes that experience. Dennet doesn't think that the experience of conciousness is itself important to its functioning. Note, though that's different to saying that conciousness itself is not important to the functioning of the brain (which is the traditional epi-phenomena position, and which he he doesn't hold).

So, what I'm saying is he explains what causes conciousness, but does not explain what causes us to *feel* it. Reason being he doesn't think that we can have reliable statements about what it is to *feel* concious. Again, without going into massive detail, he thinks there would be no possible way to distinguish between someone who genuinely *felt* his conciousness and a 'zombie' (as the literature terms it) who says he does, but actually doesn't.

As for whether it is necessary. The mechanisms he posits for the brain, which constitute conciousness, he thinks are necessary for the evolutionary advantages we have. The private felt nature of conciousness he doesn't think is necessary because, as I said above, he thinks there is no logical way to distinguish between a person who has it and one who doesn't.

Hope that helps. Also, as it is years since I read him, if anyone can summarise his position better/correct errors feel free.

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Its the *feel* that is the problem I think we are referring to here. Dennet's dealing with the 'easy' bit [img]/images/graemlins/tongue.gif[/img]

chez

[splittter]

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Its the *feel* that is the problem I think we are referring to here. Dennet's dealing with the 'easy' bit [img]/images/graemlins/tongue.gif[/img]

chez

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I understand what you're saying, and, to be honest I don't necessarily disagree with you. But, Dennet's book doesn't ignore the hard bit ... he argues that nothing profitable can be said of conciousness in just those terms, and that they're irrelevant when discussing the development, benefits and causes of conciousness.

I'd say his response to you would be: be careful that in focusing on the *felt* problem you don't artificially divide up what you're trying to investigate in a way which begs the question. In asking about purely the *felt* nature of conciousness you set yourself up to fail to be able to adequately explain it.

Not that I'm his biggest fan or anything, but I do think he has something there.

[chezlaw]

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Its the *feel* that is the problem I think we are referring to here. Dennet's dealing with the 'easy' bit [img]/images/graemlins/tongue.gif[/img]

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

I understand what you're saying, and, to be honest I don't necessarily disagree with you. But, Dennet's book doesn't ignore the hard bit ... he argues that nothing profitable can be said of conciousness in just those terms, and that they're irrelevant when discussing the development, benefits and causes of conciousness.

I'd say his response to you would be: be careful that in focusing on the *felt* problem you don't artificially divide up what you're trying to investigate in a way which begs the question. In asking about purely the *felt* nature of conciousness you set yourself up to fail to be able to adequately explain it.

Not that I'm his biggest fan or anything, but I do think he has something there.

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I dont think I'm in disagreement with Dennet's view. From what you said it sounds like we agree that there is no understanding as to why we are not zombies.

Despite that we know that we are not zombies because we know we experience *feelings*. That leaves *feelings* as real but inexplicable by science which is what RJT was asking about.

Where we go from there I have no idea.

chez

[RJT]

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[ QUOTE ]
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No one knows how our neurobiological processes produce consciousness. It's a complete mystery.

[/ QUOTE ]

It amazes me that a “scientist” is “allowed” to make statements such as these. But, if a believer would, he often would be considered “silly”.

I do not disagree with you at all in your statement.

[/ QUOTE ]

I sometimes think this is the 'rational gap' between the religous and the rest.

The religous believe the irreligous think they can understand everything without resort to god. This is not true but it is also not a rational reason to believe in god.

chez

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I know chez. I was just saying if a believer calls things a mystery non-believers often think that answer is silly.

I wasn't saying therefore it must be from God. I was thinking that it was nice to hear "science" folk talk like this, too.

[theweatherman]

What empirical evidence exists to support the theory that we think?? our sense prove nothing and deliver no evidence towards the cause. As far as I can tell I am sure that I think based soley on rational, self evident truths.

[RJT]

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This is the ultimate unanswered question in neuroscience. It's called the binding principle.
No one knows how our neurobiological processes produce consciousness. It's a complete mystery.

There's an incredible amount that is understood in neuroscience, but consciousness and how it arises is a mystery in many ways.
Take a neuroanatomy course and you'll be shocked what they've figured out (and sometimes how they figured it out).

Thought tends to be classified as an emergent property of our neurobiological processes.

Basically when you move up a level of organization, you have new rules that govern the behavior of that larger system not based strictly on the rules of the less complex lower system.

You could take as levels of organization:

quark, atom, molecule, organelle, cell, tissue, organ, organ system, organism.

Beyond the concept of emergent property, it's just this funky, ephemeral, largely unclassifiable event. It's completely different from any other occurance in the
world of which we're aware. Computers crunch numbers and follow orders (sometimes in strangely efficient ways), but what they do and what the brain does are two completely different things. No computer has come close to passing the Turing Test.

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Let me be clear when I say what follows. I am not saying therefore God.

When I read this whole post, I couldn’t help but think this is how I think when I think of God. I could insert the word God in a few places here and it would not be much different how I would try to explain God.

I do think after reading this that the more science learns about “thought”, the more believers will better understand their God. Perhaps too, science will better understand what believers think (feel?) when they think of God. This is not to say science will come to believe, too. But better understanding (of believers) might make the non-believer not think the believer is totally foolish. He would of course still think the believer wrong, but at least he might better know the believer.