What is it to have knowledge?

[EnderIII]

My problem with Nozick:

Condition (4) of Nozick seems potentially problematic in that it is too stringent of a restriction. I am thinking of cases in which condition (4) is not satisfied, but I still want to maintain that X knows something.

This will happen in cases where P is still true at the nearest possible world, but X no longer believes that P. An example will hopefully illuminate what I mean by this.

P is the proposition that “Emily cooked eggs this morning”.

In the actual world this is true (satisfies condition (1).

Sam believes that P. (satisfies condition (2).

If P weren’t true, then Sam would not believe that P. (satisfies condition (3).

When Emily was getting out of bed this morning, Sam groggily asked her what she was doing to which she replied, “ I’m going to make some eggs”. She then proceeded to cook eggs and Sam got out of bed in time to eat half of the eggs with her.

n the nearest possible world that Emily did not cook eggs this morning, she decided that a few minutes more of sleep were better than making breakfast and had cereal instead of eggs. So Sam has no reason to believe that P, if Emily did not actually cook eggs this morning. So the counterfactual necessary for condition (3) holds true.

But, in some cases the counterfactual:

If P were true, then Sam would believe that P.

Might be false, but I still want to maintain that Sam knows P.

In the nearest possible world at which P is still true, instead of groggily asking Emily what she is doing, Sam does not wake up. Emily then gets the idea that she will surprise Sam with breakfast in bed. So she cooks eggs, making P true, but because she is so excited about surprising Sam, she clumsily spills the eggs on the floor. She cleans up the mess so there is no evidence of eggs having been made, so she won’t be embarrassed. Sam now does not believe that P, even though P is true. This example shows that condition (4) is false for this case.

It seems to me to be too strict and limiting to have a definition of knowledge that precludes us from saying that Sam knows P, because condition (4) fails in this manner. I think I want a proper account of knowledge to include that Sam knows that P. There also is an issue of accessibility, in that we might not know when X knows P because we do not have proper information about the nearest possible world at which P is true. Not knowing when X knows may be problematic.

[chezlaw]

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In the nearest possible world at which P is still true, instead of groggily asking Emily what she is doing, Sam does not wake up. Emily then gets the idea that she will surprise Sam with breakfast in bed. So she cooks eggs, making P true, but because she is so excited about surprising Sam, she clumsily spills the eggs on the floor. She cleans up the mess so there is no evidence of eggs having been made, so she won’t be embarrassed. Sam now does not believe that P, even though P is true. This example shows that condition (4) is false for this case.

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I think I see your point but your nearest possible world seems a very long way away. Aren't there a lot of much closer worlds in which Sam still believes P?

I think Nozicks idea gives a feel for the robustness of a belief. The more the connection between the truth of P and belief in P correctly responds to small changes in the world, the 'better' the belief. This seems to grab hold of something important but I don't know if it can be made precise or amounts to knowledge.

chez

[Piers]

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They can't both know the time. Only one time is the correct time so only one person can know the time. Look at the requirements again for justified true belief.

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What I am saying is that I do not like the OP definition of knowledge.

When someone says, “I know that A is true” They do not mean ‘true belief in the sense the OP uses the word. They are referring to the state of their mind, not making a deep and profound statement about the nature of the universe. Their assertion of knowledge has only indirect relation on the truth of A.

We are not discussing anything magic here, just fitting definition to terms.

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1. S must believe P (It makes no sense to say: "I know it's raining but I don't believe it"

2. P must be true (I think no further explanation is needed here)

3. S must be justified in believe P (Otherwise the clock case would be knowledge, or any wild belief that we have that HAPPENS to be true would also be knowledge)

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For a strong definition of justified, it is impossible for 3 to apply to anyone.

No one can be completely sure his or her belief exactly corresponds to reality. Hence it is necessary to weaken 3 in some fashion.

For instance you might say that it is only possible to know the time by reference to a timepiece that has been given an accreditation of accuracy from some governing body.

But doing things like this makes 3 subjective. The definition of ‘true belief’ is incomplete in the sense that you need a further assumption as to what level of justification is required for true belief.

If you wish to disallow two people to simultaneously have mutually contradictory true beliefs, you need to be very careful how you define ‘justified’. To repeat the alternative to this is to have a definition of ‘true belief’ that can never be applied to a human.

Another point. When I hear ‘true belief’ used in casual conversation, it is usually in the phrase:

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I truly believed A was true.

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They are usually referring to something they beloved was true but currently do not believe is true.

[EnderIII]

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I think Nozicks idea gives a feel for the robustness of a belief. The more the connection between the truth of P and belief in P correctly responds to small changes in the world, the 'better' the belief. This seems to grab hold of something important but I don't know if it can be made precise or amounts to knowledge.


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Very nicely put, I believe I concur with this.

I think Chez summed this one up pretty succinctly by characterizing knowledge as 'the aim of beliefs, that can never be reached'.

Just to expand on that. We approach knowledge and truth by judging the extent to which our beliefs match the outside world, or by predictive value. This isn't just the mantra of epistemologists, it's also the scientific principle. We predict a solar eclipse and one happens at the right time to the second, when the previous one happened decades ago. We can't strictly speaking rule out a fluke, but the chances of a fluke seem so astronomical (no pun intended) that we put faith in the beliefs and understandings we used to calculate that eclipse. Then we do it again, and again, and everytime increase our faith that we've discovered a truth. But no matter how many times we do this, the possibility that we were just lucky still exists, with decreasing odds, so true knowledge can never be verified. IMO that's how knowledge works, and why its at the same time tangible/real and unattainable.

Edit: Should say also that I'd apply the same principle to past events. Only in those circumstances it's memory/perception that are the variables.

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]

They can't both know the time. Only one time is the correct time so only one person can know the time. Look at the requirements again for justified true belief.

[/ QUOTE ]

What I am saying is that I do not like the OP definition of knowledge.

When someone says, “I know that A is true” They do not mean ‘true belief in the sense the OP uses the word. They are referring to the state of their mind, not making a deep and profound statement about the nature of the universe. Their assertion of knowledge has only indirect relation on the truth of A.

We are not discussing anything magic here, just fitting definition to terms.

[ QUOTE ]
1. S must believe P (It makes no sense to say: "I know it's raining but I don't believe it"

2. P must be true (I think no further explanation is needed here)

3. S must be justified in believe P (Otherwise the clock case would be knowledge, or any wild belief that we have that HAPPENS to be true would also be knowledge)

[/ QUOTE ]

For a strong definition of justified, it is impossible for 3 to apply to anyone.

No one can be completely sure his or her belief exactly corresponds to reality. Hence it is necessary to weaken 3 in some fashion.

For instance you might say that it is only possible to know the time by reference to a timepiece that has been given an accreditation of accuracy from some governing body.

But doing things like this makes 3 subjective. The definition of ‘true belief’ is incomplete in the sense that you need a further assumption as to what level of justification is required for true belief.

If you wish to disallow two people to simultaneously have mutually contradictory true beliefs, you need to be very careful how you define ‘justified’. To repeat the alternative to this is to have a definition of ‘true belief’ that can never be applied to a human.

Another point. When I hear ‘true belief’ used in casual conversation, it is usually in the phrase:

[ QUOTE ]
I truly believed A was true.

[/ QUOTE ]

They are usually referring to something they beloved was true but currently do not believe is true.

[/ QUOTE ]

The question was not, "When does someone think they know that p," which is what you seem to be describing, but rather, "When does someone know that p." It can't just be a state of mind to have knowledge, for otherwise anyone can know anything as long as they really think they do, so to speak. We can't put scientific knowledge for example on a par with this subjective state of mind you are referring to, for otherwise scientific knowledge has no special justificatory status--it's as subjective as me knowing that the moon is made of cheese (which is possible by your account).

We're also not asking what someone means when they say "I know that p," because that's not the same question as what was originally asked, i.e., what conditions have to be satisfied for someone to actually know that p. People may mean all different sorts of things when they say "I know that p," so obviously that wouldn't get at what the conditions are for having genuine knowledge are either. If knowledge really were just being in a certain subjective state of mind, then when a scientist (or anyone else, for that matter) claimed to know that the moon was made of cheese no one would dispute it--after all, he would only be reporting some subjective state of mind. But since we *know* in fact that the moon is not made of cheese when someone claims to know that it is we point out that they are wrong.

[Piers]

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The question was not, "When does someone think they know that p," which is what you seem to be describing, but rather, "When does someone know that p."

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I am saying the two are the same. Someone knows p when they think they know p.

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It can't just be a state of mind to have knowledge, for otherwise anyone can know anything as long as they really think they do, so to speak

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I am saying that precisely that. Someone knows something when they really think they do.

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We can't put scientific knowledge for example on a par with this subjective state of mind you are referring to, for otherwise scientific knowledge has no special justificatory status--it's as subjective as me knowing that the moon is made of cheese (which is possible by your account).


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On the contrary I am saying precisely that. Knowledge is entirely subjective.

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If knowledge really were just being in a certain subjective state of mind, then when a scientist (or anyone else, for that matter) claimed to know that the moon was made of cheese no one would dispute it--after all, he would only be reporting some subjective state of mind.

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If someone knew that the moon was made of blue cheese, I would not dispute that they knew the moon was made of blue cheese, however I would dispute the statement that the mood was made of blue cheese.

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But since we *know* in fact that the moon is not made of cheese when someone claims to know that it is we point out that they are wrong.

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You can point out that they are wrong, however that does not change the fact that they know the moon is made of blue cheese and you know that it is not.

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what conditions have to be satisfied for someone to actually know that p

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Someone knows p if they think they know p.

The problem I think is that you appear to believe that at some level understanding of reality is accessible.

While I consider that understanding reality is inaccessible fantasy, and all have is what we can observe and our reactions to that.

Back to your definition of true belief.

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1. S must believe
2. P must be true
3. S must be justified in believe P

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2 is unconfirmable and 3 is meaningless without explaining what justified means.

You're very confused.

[Piers]

Sorry for a momment I got you mixed up with the OP.

[bearly]

since serious thinkers have spent a lifetime writing on what you have covered in a couple paragraphs, perhaps you could do some reading rather than "help" the rest of us out. i can supply a long list of essential readings on the subject----i would not presume to discuss these subjects w/ you if you are a leading thinker in the field of theory of knowledge----nor would i if you don't have an extensive background in the subject...................b