The Euthyphro Dilemma

Okay, the Euthyphro dilemma: pretty simple. "Is the Good good because it is loved by God, or does God love the Good because it is good?" Dilemma:

1) If there is a reason God loves, or approves of, not needlessly torturing innocent babies, there must be a reason for it. But that reason must lay outside of God. So God is not the justificaition for morality.

2) If there is no reason God loves that, then God could have equally loved needlessly torturing innocent babies (since there is no external reason to pick either one). That makes morality arbitrary.

So there is either a reason God approves of morality (in which case that reason lays outside God) or there is no reason (in which case morality is arbitrary). In either case, God is not the ultimate justification of morality (in 2 he is, in a way: be moral or I'll kill you because I stronger than you; that's a reason to be moral, but not a good justification). Put a slightly different way: either the reason God approves of morality lay outside him (then he'd be justified in approving morality but not be its source) or not (then God's choice of what is moral is just an arbitrary whim).

Now, I've heard this rejoinder: But, God is the form of the good. Or rather: God's nature is good. That's just the way he is. So, God himself is the reason but that is a good justification, since that is his nature.

There are two ways to interpret this:

1) God is literally the good. As in, good = God; everytime I use the word 'God', I can sub in the word 'good' for it. Unfortuntealy, this makes it incapable of calling God good. When I say "God is good" under this interpretation, I'm merely saying "God is God." More directly, when I say "God's actions are good," I am merely saying "God's actions are God's actions" (or worse: "God's actions are God"). This is merely a definition or tautology, and a meaningless one at that. Most Christian philosophers reject this interpretation.

2) God's form (or nature, which is the only sense I can make of the word 'form') is the form of the good. Now, this just runs smack into the problem I discussed at the end: what is it about God's form that makes it the form of the good? "Would God's nature [form] be good no matter what God would have been like (arbitrary), or does God's nature possess all the good-making properties (justified)?"

I think that God IS good (as in "the good"). Meaning he is inseparable from all that is good. The nature of God and the nature of piety arent merely identical, but one in the same. Ofcourse I believe that there is no good outside of God, and any attempt to separate the two will fail. Though i've stated my position, i dont feel i've explained adequately enough. Do you have any retort or what could be made clearer here?