Fundamental Question in the Philosophy of Religion

[bohemian]

Reading the debates on this forum, it becomes clear that the fundamental question is usually missed. I realize that not everyone has a grad degree in philosophy, but I hope this post will orient some of you in new directions.

Question: Suppose our belief system consists of a set of propositions. For every proposition P in this set, do we need a reason or evidence for believing that it is true?
Obviously, implications in the philosophy of religion will be huge depending on how we answer ("God exists" and "God does not exist" are examples of such propositions in this set).
This is a classical debate between Clifford (evidentialist) and James (pragmatist). Clifford states that "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." James refutes that. Among other things, it is easy to see that this is in fact impossible:
What is my evidence/reason for belief A? B.
What is my evidence/reason for belief B? C.
What is my evidence/reason for belief C? D.
etc.
In other words, the evidentialist requirement can never be met. We'd need an infinite sequence of reasons. It appears that there must be some sub-set of beliefs which are foundational (i.e. can/must be believed without appeal to any other beliefs or reasons, which provide a foundation/ground for all the other beliefs).
Question: Does (dis)belief in God belong in this set? Still open question in contemporary philosophy of religion. But it is hard to see how it would not.

Contrary to popular conceptions of philosophy, theism made a huge comeback in recent years (mostly thanks to reformed epistemology such as that of Alvin Plantinga). If you think otherwise, you are still living in the 70s. The days of Flew and Mackie are gone.

[maurile]

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It appears that there must be some sub-set of beliefs which are foundational (i.e. can/must be believed without appeal to any other beliefs or reasons, which provide a foundation/ground for all the other beliefs).

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True.

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Question: Does (dis)belief in God belong in this set?

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Of course not. Foundational beliefs are stuff like that solipsism is false, inductive reasoning is somewhat reliable, our senses somewhat accurately convey to us information about the real world, the world is more than five minutes old, etc.

Whether or not some particular object exists, even if that object is some god or another, is not foundational in the sense that more ordinary reasoning depends on it. "God exists" (or "doesn't exist") is no better candidate for belief without evidence than "Julius Caesar's father owned a male dog" or "The atom on the left will decay before the atom on the right."

[BZ_Zorro]

Using just logic to examine imprecise premises is like trying to rebuild an engine with a just pair of pliers. Plenty of clanging and cursing but you won't actually get anwhere.

The problem here is that no one has defined what god is. Does Oghnoidsf exist? Which set should it be in? A defintion is needed before this becomes meaningful. However , you can't define God because by definition it is indefinable. God is super natural, if it wasn't it wouldn't be God. Super natural entities exist outside of the realm of rational, logical and evidence based thinking.

That said, belief in any entity not readily observed by empirical experience or easily inferred should be in the set of things that require evidence. This is just common sense.

[drudman]

[ QUOTE ]
Reading the debates on this forum, it becomes clear that the fundamental question is usually missed. I realize that not everyone has a grad degree in philosophy, but I hope this post will orient some of you in new directions.

Question: Suppose our belief system consists of a set of propositions. For every proposition P in this set, do we need a reason or evidence for believing that it is true?
Obviously, implications in the philosophy of religion will be huge depending on how we answer ("God exists" and "God does not exist" are examples of such propositions in this set).
This is a classical debate between Clifford (evidentialist) and James (pragmatist). Clifford states that "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." James refutes that. Among other things, it is easy to see that this is in fact impossible:
What is my evidence/reason for belief A? B.
What is my evidence/reason for belief B? C.
What is my evidence/reason for belief C? D.
etc.
In other words, the evidentialist requirement can never be met. We'd need an infinite sequence of reasons. It appears that there must be some sub-set of beliefs which are foundational (i.e. can/must be believed without appeal to any other beliefs or reasons, which provide a foundation/ground for all the other beliefs).
Question: Does (dis)belief in God belong in this set? Still open question in contemporary philosophy of religion. But it is hard to see how it would not.

Contrary to popular conceptions of philosophy, theism made a huge comeback in recent years (mostly thanks to reformed epistemology such as that of Alvin Plantinga). If you think otherwise, you are still living in the 70s. The days of Flew and Mackie are gone.

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All propositions are either analytic or synthetic. Period.

"God exists"/"God does not exist" are not propositions at all.

[Bodhi]

I don't have a graduate degree in philosophy, but I disagree strongly with your conclusion:
[ QUOTE ]
In other words, the evidentialist requirement can never be met. We'd need an infinite sequence of reasons. It appears that there must be some sub-set of beliefs which are foundational (i.e. can/must be believed without appeal to any other beliefs or reasons, which provide a foundation/ground for all the other beliefs).

[/ QUOTE ]

But go ahead and tell me what these foundational beliefs are supposed to be, and how they stand alone without justification from a further chain of beliefs.

[Bodhi]

[ QUOTE ]
Quote:
It appears that there must be some sub-set of beliefs which are foundational (i.e. can/must be believed without appeal to any other beliefs or reasons, which provide a foundation/ground for all the other beliefs).


True.

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[img]/images/graemlins/confused.gif[/img]
Please explain your side of it.

[maurile]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Quote:
It appears that there must be some sub-set of beliefs which are foundational (i.e. can/must be believed without appeal to any other beliefs or reasons, which provide a foundation/ground for all the other beliefs).


True.

[/ QUOTE ]
[img]/images/graemlins/confused.gif[/img]
Please explain your side of it.

[/ QUOTE ]
Take the belief that the world didn't just pop into existence two and a half seconds ago, dinosaur fossils and all, with all your previous memories intact (faked, like the dinosaur fossils).

There's no evidence against the two-and-a-half-second-year-old-world idea.

But we take its falsity as a foundational belief. A sort of first principle.

Likewise, the idea that inductive reasoning can be relied on -- which is the foundation of all of science -- is in the same category. You can't deductively prove that induction works. You can only show it inductively, which makes any argument for it circular. So we don't accept it because of an argument; we just accept it as a first principle.

[Bodhi]

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Take the belief that the world didn't just pop into existence two and a half seconds ago, dinosaur fossils and all, with all your previous memories intact (faked, like the dinosaur fossils).

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You don't mean to say that avoiding radical skepticism is the main reason to suppose that there must be foundational beliefs, do you?

As I see it, my belief that the world is not fake, not created two seconds ago, is justified by other beliefs, e.g. that I'm not hallucinating; it's daylight out (standard observing conditions), I can see just fine, and I haven't noticed any objects popping in and out of existence, etc. In turn, these beliefs should be justified by other beliefs, with no end to the chain.

The idea of foundational beliefs may make sense working backwards philosophically, but for the story cognition and language I find it very problematic.

[maurile]

[ QUOTE ]
As I see it, my belief that the world is not fake, not created two seconds ago, is justified by other beliefs, e.g. that I'm not hallucinating; it's daylight out (standard observing conditions), I can see just fine, and I haven't noticed any objects popping in and out of existence, etc.

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All of those things are consistent with the two-second conjecture. Every observation you can possibly make is consistent with the two-second conjecture, which means there's no evidence against it. So your rejection of it is not justified by other (justified) beliefs.

[Bodhi]

This kind of radical skepticism is literal nonsense.