Evidence and all that

You have artificially constructed a theorem that explicitly refuses to give "evidence" any weight and then reach the unsurprising conclusion that if anyone holds a belief one way or another they cannot do so based on the evidence.

I.e., the conclusion is tautological from your premise that the answer can only be known after we die.

I believe in science. I believe in evidence. I reject your premise.

[BluffTHIS!]

Nice work. But these "trick questions" are all the rage in this forum.

[David Sklansky]

"Deism. Of late, sometimes known as Sklanskianity."

Deism and Sklanskyanity are very different. Sklanskyanity postualtes a god who will reward and punish.

[chezlaw]

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You have artificially constructed a theorem that explicitly refuses to give "evidence" any weight and then reach the unsurprising conclusion that if anyone holds a belief one way or another they cannot do so based on the evidence.

I.e., the conclusion is tautological from your premise that the answer can only be known after we die.

I believe in science. I believe in evidence. I reject your premise.

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The argument is in no way an attack on science, nor is there a trick. I would argue that the proposition E is a foundation stone for science.

What do you mean by you reject the premise. All I'm saying is that two theorems that predict the same evidence cannot be decided between on the basis of the evidence. this is true isn't it? so how could you reject it.

chez

[chezlaw]

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Nice work. But these "trick questions" are all the rage in this forum.

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This is not a trick question, why would you think it is? I'm sorry if people mistakenly think its about religon but it isn't. Its about theories that cannot be differentiated between on the basis of evidence.

chez

[maurile]

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I think meta-evidence is involved.

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That's actually a decent term for the principle underlying Occam's razor.

There's no direct evidence that any particular unfalsifiable theory is wrong. But there is some evidence that where two theories are equal in their explanatory power, the goofier one has a lesser chance of being correct than the simpler one. Not always, but more often than not.

This latter point is supported by observational experience. It is a sort of meta-evidence.

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As I pointed out before, this isn't true. there are no cases of examples where two theories don't produce different predictions about the world, yet one has been shown to be false.

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I wasn't clear. By "explanatory power" I mean that they explain things we already know.

I don't mean that the two theories make all the same predictions. For one to be false and the other to be true, obviously they have to make different predictions.

My assertion is that when two theories have the same explanatory power, the simpler one tends to make better predictions. Usually, but not always.

[chezlaw]

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I assumed this was a lead-in to some justification of Christianity. Guess I was wrong.

The simplest theory that makes the same prediction has a greater utility because it is easier to apply. It's basically the "condensed version." Any additional variables in T1 are functionally irrelevant. Those variables may as well not exist, and for practical purposes are not worth considering. All the relevant information is contained within T2 and considering anything beyond that is useless.

There's greater utility in T2 because there is no chance of God "getting in the way."

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How could the theories have greater utility or be easier to apply than each other if they don't say anything different about the world.

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Those variables may as well not exist, and for practical purposes are not worth considering.

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I couldn't agree more.

chez

[chezlaw]

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I think people tend to use some sort of indution/deduction combination to handle these sorts of situations.

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and I'm showing that either they don't, or its not on the basis of evidence.

chez

[chezlaw]

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I don't mean that the two theories make all the same predictions. For one to be false and the other to be true, obviously they have to make different predictions.

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That's exactly what I'm saying as well. So if two theories don't make different predictions then they cannot be decided between on the basis of evidence.

chez

[maurile]

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So if two theories don't make different predictions then they cannot be decided between on the basis of evidence.

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That is where meta-evidence comes in. [img]/images/graemlins/wink.gif[/img]

I guess it depends on why the two theories make the same predictions. If it's because the theories are identical, then one is as good as the other.

But if they are not identical, it's just that they differ only with respect to statements that are not testable, then one can still be right and the other wrong -- although it is impossible for us to determine empirically which (if either)is right and which is wrong.

In that case, I think the meta-evidentiary principle is relevant.