Condorcet Voting Method

In another thread, I mentioned the Condorcet method of voting. Has anyone ever looked into this? From what I've read, this seems to be the best preferential voting system out there. I know IRV is more popular, but Condorcet seems to have fewer problems and be more "fair".

Here's an example of how the Condorcet system would work:

Three candidates, (A,B,C), and 100 voters. Instead of just picking their "first choice" (like we do currently), we ask them to rank their choices. Here are the results:

30:A>B>C
10:A>C>B
05:B>A>C
20:B>C>A
10:C>A>B
25:C>B>A

(ie: 30 people like A first, B second, and C last)

Then, you set up pair-wise "virtual elections" to see which candidate would be undefeated when paired against the other candidates. In this case, the results would be:

If A & B run, there is a 50/50 tie.
If B & C run, B wins with 55% of the vote.
If A & C run, C wins with 55% of the vote.

So, B beats C, C beats A, and A ties with B (note, I could have actually made it so that A beats B but with less [than 55] votes, 51 for instance).

B is the only candidate that is undefeated. When paired with each of the other candidates, B never loses. In this case, B would win using the Condorcet system, but A would have won using our current system.

I like it. What do you all think?

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I like it. What do you all think?



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Your opinion, fellow voter, just doesn't matter when it comes to Washington figuring out how to run elections. Or finance them.

Any system which, in the opinion of the hoi polloi (me and you), might bring about sensible change in who gets in and who goes home (from DC), simply will not even get into a committee. Much less reach a vote. Sorry. It's just the way it works.

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[slickpoppa]

In our two party system I don't think this would make much of a difference.

I really doubt that there would ever be a situation where it would be important to rank my relative preference for the Constitution Party, the Reform Party, the Greens, the Free Soil Party, and the Legalize Marijuana Now Party.

[mrgold]

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I really doubt that there would ever be a situation where it would be important to rank my relative preference for the Constitution Party, the Reform Party, the Greens, the Free Soil Party, and the Legalize Marijuana Now Party.

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If this system were in use in 2000 i guarentee Gore would have won the election. All the Nader voters could have selected Gore with their second (or any choice above Bush) choice propelling him ahead of Bush in the head to head match up in Florida. This system is great because it would no longer punish people for voting for a 3rd party by harming their preferred major party. It would strike a serious blow against the "lesser of two evils" philosophy that I beleive is largely responsible for the simultaneous shittiness and predominance of the two major parties.

Well, duh. OP was talking about how Condorcet was superior to instant runoff. You really only need to indicate your top two choices.

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Well, duh. OP was talking about how Condorcet was superior to instant runoff. You really only need to indicate your top two choices.

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I was talking about both, I suppose. How a preferential system is better than our current system, and how Condorcet seems to be the better than IRV. You only need your top two choices, if there are only 3 parties (or if you only prefer 2 of the candidates). But, as someone else pointed out (in different words), a change in national voting methods would be pretty hard to do. So, if you're going to do it, I'd say do it right. And, that means, getting a system that will allow for growth -- to more then 3 parties if/when that time comes. Note: with Condorcet, you don't need to rank ALL candidates. Only the ones you wish to rank. All others will be considered equally worse than the ones you rank.

[jj_frap]

I like IRV/AV for head of state elections and MMPR (by a landslide) for legislative elections.

[Autocratic]

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In our two party system I don't think this would make much of a difference.

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That's not true, it would actually force several third parties into the spotlight if they were allowed on ballots.

Also, the Condorcet winner is not a voting method - the method is the Copeland method, the Condorcet winner is a candidate who wins all of its match ups under the Copeland method, and the Condorcet criterion for voting. I didn't look at your links so perhaps that was covered.

The major problem with the Copeland method is that it violates the Pareto condition, which states that if everyone prefers candidate X to Y, Y cannot win. Observe:

3 candidates, A, B, and C. Here is a chart of numbered preferences for several groups of people:

9 voters vote: ABC (A is the first choice, C the third).
10 voters vote: BAC
11 voters vote: CAB

Now, counting just first place votes (meaning by plurality), C wins, with 11 first place votes. Here is when you test the Condorcet criterion:

A vs B: A wins with 20 voters to 10 preferring it.
A vs C: A wins with 19 votes to 11.
B vs C: B wins with 19 to 11.

Here, A is the winner with the Copeland method, not C. Though it's accepted that no voting system is perfect.

The "Condorcet Method" is any voting system that uses the Condorcet criteria in determining the winner. The Copeland system is an implementation of that, but it's not a very good one, in my opinion. Copeland assigns points to wins & losses, and then tallys those points to get a final number. It makes it easier for the less-informed to understand, but there are better ways that avoid picking the wrong winner.

Also, Condorcet & Copeland meet the Pareto condition. In your example (which is just like mine), "A" wins, and is not less preferred to any other candidate.

The worst part about Condorcet, is that you can get results where no candidate wins all the pair-wise "elections". Observe:

10: A>B>C
8: B>C>A
3: C>A>B

Here, A beats B, B beats C, and C beats A. There are ways to determine the winner, though... by dropping the person that is the "weakest" win (in this case, C beats A with 11 votes, so is dropped).