What is it to have knowledge?

What is it to have knowledge? When does belief become truth? What are the requirements to say that someone knows such and such? They seem like simple questions but they really aren't. Often times we'll say something like "I know that I'll get a raise at work" or "I'll know that the cowboys will win tomorrow" but do we really?

Here's an intereting case. Let's say you want to know the time. You look at your watch, and the watch reads 3:15. In reality, it really is 3:15. But... the watch is broken. It's been stuck on 3:15 for days, you just don't know. Can we say that you knew it was 3:15. Sure the watch said 3:15 so you believed it to be 3:15 and it was 3:15, but the watch wa broken. I think most people would contend that you didn't know the time.

The clock case is a good example of the traditional view of justified true belief (jtb). It goes like this
For S to know P
1. S must believe P (It makes no sense to say: "I know it's raining but I don't believe it"

2. P must be true (I think no further explanation is needed here)

3. S must be justified in believe P (Otherwise the clock case would be knowledge, or any wild belief that we have that HAPPENS to be true would also be knowledge)

There are many problems with jtb that many philosphers have shown and tried to solve. I personsally think that justification is a vague term. Many philosophers believe that a 4th requierment is needed. What do you SMP'ers think?

If anyone likes, I can further discuss some problems and solutions some philosophers have presented regarding jtb.

[purnell]

I don't have a solution, I just accept that actually knowing anything is beyond my abilities. It's fun to pretend, though. [img]/images/graemlins/laugh.gif[/img]

[peritonlogon]

There is an entire field of philosophy called epistemology that addresses this question.

One thing that I will actually add though, is that the latter portions of modernity stopped putting the question in terms of knowledge and started putting it in terms of "understanding." And not to quote any, but some of your examples simply employed different uses of the word "know" in different gramatical forms and, in light of this, would be simply considered semantic differences.

[Piers]

[ QUOTE ]
What are the requirements to say that someone knows such and such? They seem like simple questions but they really aren't. Often times we'll say something like "I know that I'll get a raise at work" or "I'll know that the cowboys will win tomorrow" but do we really?


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I would say that ‘knowing’ in this sense is an emotional reaction to available evidence plus over factors. At a certain point a mental trigger flicks inside you and you ‘know’ something is true.

This is a tool to streamline thinking along paths where what you ‘know’ to be true, is assumed to be true. A trick the mind plays to reduce unnecessary processing. A useful mechanism that nevertheless has an obvious flaw.

[ QUOTE ]
Here's an intereting case. Let's say you want to know the time. You look at your watch, and the watch reads 3:15. In reality, it really is 3:15. But... the watch is broken. It's been stuck on 3:15 for days, you just don't know. Can we say that you knew it was 3:15. Sure the watch said 3:15 so you believed it to be 3:15 and it was 3:15, but the watch wa broken. I think most people would contend that you didn't know the time.

[/ QUOTE ]

If you believe the watch is accurate, then it is possible you will know the time is 3:15 after looking at the watch. The actual time has only an indirect effect on this process.

Equally if the watch showed an incorrect but plausible time, say 3:12, you might know the time is 3:12 after looking at the watch. Just this time you would be wrong in this instance.


[ QUOTE ]
The clock case is a good example of the traditional view of justified true belief (jtb). It goes like this
For S to know P
1. S must believe P (It makes no sense to say: "I know it's raining but I don't believe it"

2. P must be true (I think no further explanation is needed here)

3. S must be justified in believe P (Otherwise the clock case would be knowledge, or any wild belief that we have that HAPPENS to be true would also be knowledge)

[/ QUOTE ]

So what with this equating ‘knowing’ with ‘true belief’?

I think it is clear that humans can never satisfy all 1,2 and 3. If knowing was a synonym of true belief as defined here, then the verb ‘to know’ would be practically unusable.

Equating knowledge with true belief--think about the difference between someone who believes it is 3:12 when it is actually 3:15, and someone who justifiably believes it is 3:15 when it actually 3:15. According to what you are saying they can both *know* what time it is. Do you see how odd it is to think they can both know the correct time when only one of them is actually right?

[ QUOTE ]
Equating knowledge with true belief--think about the difference between someone who believes it is 3:12 when it is actually 3:15, and someone who justifiably believes it is 3:15 when it actually 3:15. According to what you are saying they can both *know* what time it is. Do you see how odd it is to think they can both know the correct time when only one of them is actually right?

[/ QUOTE ]

They can't both know the time. Only one time is the correct time so only one person can know the time. Look at the requirements again for justified true belief.

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Equating knowledge with true belief--think about the difference between someone who believes it is 3:12 when it is actually 3:15, and someone who justifiably believes it is 3:15 when it actually 3:15. According to what you are saying they can both *know* what time it is. Do you see how odd it is to think they can both know the correct time when only one of them is actually right?

[/ QUOTE ]

They can't both know the time. Only one time is the correct time so only one person can know the time. Look at the requirements again for justified true belief.

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That was my reply to Piers. I was making the same point you are, since he was asking why knowledge was tied to true belief.

[Piers]

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They can't both know the time. Only one time is the correct time so only one person can know the time. Look at the requirements again for justified true belief.

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What I am saying is that I do not like the OP definition of knowledge.

When someone says, “I know that A is true” They do not mean ‘true belief in the sense the OP uses the word. They are referring to the state of their mind, not making a deep and profound statement about the nature of the universe. Their assertion of knowledge has only indirect relation on the truth of A.

We are not discussing anything magic here, just fitting definition to terms.

[ QUOTE ]
1. S must believe P (It makes no sense to say: "I know it's raining but I don't believe it"

2. P must be true (I think no further explanation is needed here)

3. S must be justified in believe P (Otherwise the clock case would be knowledge, or any wild belief that we have that HAPPENS to be true would also be knowledge)

[/ QUOTE ]

For a strong definition of justified, it is impossible for 3 to apply to anyone.

No one can be completely sure his or her belief exactly corresponds to reality. Hence it is necessary to weaken 3 in some fashion.

For instance you might say that it is only possible to know the time by reference to a timepiece that has been given an accreditation of accuracy from some governing body.

But doing things like this makes 3 subjective. The definition of ‘true belief’ is incomplete in the sense that you need a further assumption as to what level of justification is required for true belief.

If you wish to disallow two people to simultaneously have mutually contradictory true beliefs, you need to be very careful how you define ‘justified’. To repeat the alternative to this is to have a definition of ‘true belief’ that can never be applied to a human.

Another point. When I hear ‘true belief’ used in casual conversation, it is usually in the phrase:

[ QUOTE ]
I truly believed A was true.

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They are usually referring to something they beloved was true but currently do not believe is true.

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]

They can't both know the time. Only one time is the correct time so only one person can know the time. Look at the requirements again for justified true belief.

[/ QUOTE ]

What I am saying is that I do not like the OP definition of knowledge.

When someone says, “I know that A is true” They do not mean ‘true belief in the sense the OP uses the word. They are referring to the state of their mind, not making a deep and profound statement about the nature of the universe. Their assertion of knowledge has only indirect relation on the truth of A.

We are not discussing anything magic here, just fitting definition to terms.

[ QUOTE ]
1. S must believe P (It makes no sense to say: "I know it's raining but I don't believe it"

2. P must be true (I think no further explanation is needed here)

3. S must be justified in believe P (Otherwise the clock case would be knowledge, or any wild belief that we have that HAPPENS to be true would also be knowledge)

[/ QUOTE ]

For a strong definition of justified, it is impossible for 3 to apply to anyone.

No one can be completely sure his or her belief exactly corresponds to reality. Hence it is necessary to weaken 3 in some fashion.

For instance you might say that it is only possible to know the time by reference to a timepiece that has been given an accreditation of accuracy from some governing body.

But doing things like this makes 3 subjective. The definition of ‘true belief’ is incomplete in the sense that you need a further assumption as to what level of justification is required for true belief.

If you wish to disallow two people to simultaneously have mutually contradictory true beliefs, you need to be very careful how you define ‘justified’. To repeat the alternative to this is to have a definition of ‘true belief’ that can never be applied to a human.

Another point. When I hear ‘true belief’ used in casual conversation, it is usually in the phrase:

[ QUOTE ]
I truly believed A was true.

[/ QUOTE ]

They are usually referring to something they beloved was true but currently do not believe is true.

[/ QUOTE ]

The question was not, "When does someone think they know that p," which is what you seem to be describing, but rather, "When does someone know that p." It can't just be a state of mind to have knowledge, for otherwise anyone can know anything as long as they really think they do, so to speak. We can't put scientific knowledge for example on a par with this subjective state of mind you are referring to, for otherwise scientific knowledge has no special justificatory status--it's as subjective as me knowing that the moon is made of cheese (which is possible by your account).

We're also not asking what someone means when they say "I know that p," because that's not the same question as what was originally asked, i.e., what conditions have to be satisfied for someone to actually know that p. People may mean all different sorts of things when they say "I know that p," so obviously that wouldn't get at what the conditions are for having genuine knowledge are either. If knowledge really were just being in a certain subjective state of mind, then when a scientist (or anyone else, for that matter) claimed to know that the moon was made of cheese no one would dispute it--after all, he would only be reporting some subjective state of mind. But since we *know* in fact that the moon is not made of cheese when someone claims to know that it is we point out that they are wrong.

[Piers]

[ QUOTE ]
Equating knowledge with true belief--think about the difference between someone who believes it is 3:12 when it is actually 3:15, and someone who justifiably believes it is 3:15 when it actually 3:15. According to what you are saying they can both *know* what time it is. Do you see how odd it is to think they can both know the correct time when only one of them is actually right?

[/ QUOTE ]

I don’t equate knowledge with true belief. Or rather I think to do so is to get an unhelpful definition of knowledge.

Two people look at their watches. One sees 3:12 one sees 3:15. One person knows its is 3:12 and the other one knows it is 3:15. The both have identical reasons for establish their belief. Why should the real time have any bearing on their state of knowing?

I think your definition of knowledge, which you equate with true belief, is too strong for every day use.