Hachem's patience

I'd like to thank CardPlayer.com for offering an amazing week-long poker entertainment with real-time updates, chip counts, pictures, etc., and best of all, the audio broadcast of the final table by some of the best poker players in the world. The following review could not have written without their coverage. (but I'll take all the blame for any mistakes found in my review [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]) You can access all the numbered hands (of course, only what's shown) played during the final table at:

http://www.cardplayer.com/poker-tour...mp;screen=logs


I was listening to the CardPlayer's live broadcast (what, like over 15 hours?) and ran through the final table blog from the very first hand to the last one on Saturday morning, and it's amazing how Hachem survived earlier with a short stack to fight another hand, and it really did pay off later. Hachem was relatively active from the beginning, but it was more like not to be blinded away than to accumulate chips, and his patience made possible one of the most amazing comebacks I've ever seen in a poker tournament. Of course, there are other contributing factors (lack of ~, which I really don't like to discuss), but my first impression was that this is a totally different final table from last year's, where the biggest stack (Raymer) was pushing all along to win it all.


Certainly, Matusow, and after he got unlucky and went down, Black were my (and probably most pros') favorites, and both of them were dominating the table with their amazing read and skill, and in Black's case, with his big stack at some point (e.g. Hand 24: Matusow's amazing bluff with 85s on the turn Kc-10d-9h-Ah when two other players (one of them none other than Black) were being afraid of betting into a potentially dangerous flop; Hand 63: Black's 5-million reraise on the flop to Kanter - that's the first time I've ever heard "5 million raise" in a tournament - did he make a stand here against a pesky (re)raiser?; Hand 125 when Black confidently calls Dannenmann's all-in bluff with T9o(top pair), etc.)


Here are some examples I noted about how Hachem patiently waited and waited until the moment was right:

Hand 55 preflop: Hachem puts about one-third of his chip stack to reraise Dannenmann who immediately goes all in (Dannenmannian move, see below), and Hachem folds.

Hand 62: he puts another million on the turn against Black (who then reraises all-in), and Hachem backs down again.

On both hands, he could easily have got impatient and shoved in all his chips or got himself pot-committed at some point blaming his short stack. He did neither and wisely preserved it.

By the break after Hand 63 (where Black reraised 5 million against Kanter), Hachem was walking on a very thin ice only with a little over 2 million in chips.

Hand 69: he seizes the first chance to double up through Lazar's first blow-up (AQs vs. K9s all spades; on the next hand, Lazar does it again with QTo apparently on tilt and pretty much eliminates himself)

Several times (Hands 56, 75, 80, 105, 110, 130, 135, 145) he gave away blinds and antes from the small blind (folded around to him) to Black's BB when Black was a bigger stack, probably because he was afraid Black could put him all in at any time he limps in with a weak holding. According to the textbook instruction, not contesting BB when folded around to your SB is a big mistake (pot odds are too good to ignore, and basically you're giving up one round of play) which could be costly over the long run, but who knows, Hachem is making "tactical mistakes"?


Black took a huge hit from Kanter when the latter flopped a set (and eventually made kings full on Hand 93) and became unable to push around with his stack anymore. He obviously slowed down on the next dozens of hands until he faced Dannenmann.

Throughout the tournament, the only distinctive move Dennenmann made was to reraise or go all-in pre-flop or on the flop instead of value-betting. My guess is he was trying to compensate for his lack of skill in playing a hand against a more skilled player throughout the flop. He was probably aware of his weakness, and it turned out to be quite an effective move. who knew this move would claim two best players' tournament life when he got lucky (and ugly at the same time)? (Matusow was eliminated on Hand 28 on Dennenmann's semi-bluff, Black was crippled and eventually busted by him as well)

When he bluffed and sucked out on Black (again, Dennenmannian all-in move with a second pair vs. Black's top pair on Hand 125) and eventually eliminated him (Hand 149: AKo vs. Black's pocket 10s), this strategy worked perfectly. On his last hand, Black might have considered (instead of going all-in) to call Dannenmann's 2-million raise and to let him in the flop to "confirm" to Dannenmann that he hits nothing and folds. Black could still have kept over 5 million intact even if a scary flop had hit and folded his 10s, but could a pro compromise his play to accommodate a less-skilled player?


Two hands before that critical hand, Hachem was getting short-stacked again and went all-in with pocket 7s against Dannenmann's AJo. 7s held up and so far, this looked like any other coin-flip situation and Hachem only survived one. He doesn't know how many he is up against. Sure enough, this was the beginning.

When Black was out, Dannenmann had a commanding chip lead (about 5:1) over Hachem and Kanter (both about 5 million), and slightly over Barch (20 million). At this point, Dannenmann should have felt comfortable with his chip stack and protected it by playing aggressively as Raymer did so well last year, but over the next fifty hands or so, a very strange thing happened. He gradually gave away the chip lead to Hachem (who was a significant underdog at this point in terms of chip count and presumably chip count only) without (possibly even avoiding) any major confrontations. But before that happened, Hachem had had to make one critical decision.

On Hand 179, he finally makes a stand with marginal Q7 of diamonds against Kanter, who had lavishly raised and reraised almost every pot to prevent limpers or punish a smallish raise. Certainly, when Hachem made this move, he must have expected Kanter to lay his hand down and back out a bit. He certainly didn't expect Kanter to look up and call. The problem was Kanter had a hand, indeed a very good hand for a short table, pocket 9s. Hachem was in trouble ( over 2-to-1 underdog) but luckily flops a queen.

Either way, it turned out for the best to Hachem. Besides a huge boost to his chip stack, he showed Kanter and other players that he can stand up with a marginal hand. After this hand, Hachem never looked back: he kept accumulating chips, winning pot after pot, many of them uncontested. At that point, I had this presentiment that this could be it, considering how the other two players were doing.


Kanter's blind aggression was not a profitable move at all throughout the final table. He bluffed away a huge chunk of his stack on Hand 132 with a pair of K (5 kicker) against Barch's K7 two pair. This play almost made me to forget about his earlier Raymer suck-out. Did he really believe that his all-in (which took like 5 minutes - sure tell) drive Barch out of the pot? He doesn't understand what his bet can and cannot do at that point and just make-believes that re-reraising (especially all-in) could automatically turn your hand super-strong.

Tex was playing too solid and tight (or probably cold decked throughout the final table?). An example is Hand 156, where he was a little hesitant with AQo about short-stacked Kanter's all-in. (he got unlucky when Kanter flopped a set of 7 with A7o, but that's a moot point) When Tex finally made a move with A6o (Hand 226), he couldn't have picked a worse spot because he was up against two pocket pairs of Dannenmann(77) and Hachem(JJ) in a three-handed table! Before that, Tex lost millions by betting into a pre-made straight on the river (Hand 214) with a pair and probably was getting frustrated.


And that last hand heads-up was a typical amatuerish all-in with a pair of ace with a trey kicker against a made straight. Dennenmann's play was too obvious even to an amateur like me: first preflop raise with ace-x from the button. When Hachem called with one of the worst starting hands (73o, and indeed dominated as it turned out later, but in heads-up domination is not that bad) and flopped a second-best straight, he was waiting to trap. When Dennenmann called his 1.7 million raise, Hachem could easily put Dennenmann on ace-small (making a pair or some kind of a straight draw. And Voila, when the ace of spades shows up on the turn and Dennenmann reraises 5 million, confirming Hachem's earlier read, the only thing remaining for him was to put Dennenmann all-in. How could he go all-in with that hand without a moment of hesitation? Too tired? But Dennenmann played real well a few hands before, Hand 228, extracting over 4 million from Hachem. Hachem's trap couldn't have worked better although I doubt their heads-up could have turned out otherwise if it were not for that particular hand.

Dennenmann finished in the 2nd, probably to his satisfaction, but I have this strange feeling that he was not a real factor at all from the beginning at the final table. Yes, he outlasted all the other players but one, and he even kept a chip lead for a while and went up the money ladder during that process, but he might well have functioned as some kind of decoy for Hachem to bust two best players in the table whether he was aware of it or not. (you can check this out with how the major money flow occurred throughout the final table, first from Matusow and Black to Dennenmann, and then gradually to Hachem) With hindsight, I think the real confrontation behind the scene (although it has never materialized up front) might well have been between extremely persevering Hachem and two more accomplished pros. Of course, you can ignore all my ramblings and interpret all moves as if everything eventually comes down to the question "who gets most lucky?" All in all, at least from what's shown, hasn't Hachem won at one coin-flip and one 2:1 dog situations just to survive? (if he had lost the latter, people would think it was just bad timing) You may find Hachem's play lacking excitements or flair, but to a poker connoisseur, it is full of inner logic and beauty - if the prize money didn't matter at all. Probably, patience as well as aggression makes a virtue of necessity in poker.

[Rick Nebiolo]

Sorry about the post title - couldn't help it [img]/images/graemlins/grin.gif[/img]

You listen for fifteen hours and that's all you could write. Nice first post.

~ Rick

[SunOfaJack]

Nice post...

R u west coast, I am in EST and went to sleep around 5:30AM EST, since with Black and Tex being out, it seemed like the players with alot of moves were out, I was definitely cheering for Black after Matasow got eliminated....once I woke up in afternoon 4PM, I was kinda stunned to see Hachem and won, since he was short-medium stack for first 140 hands or so.

Kudos for Cardplayers audio, Phil Helmuth was impressive, he was reading the players really well.

Pokerchamps tableview was cool too, too bad it was frozen for a while for middle of final table for 40 hands or so.

[duma]

i remember during one of the breaks Hachem went over to Hellmuth and asked him for advice. Phil told him u are doing the right thing just your timing was off. that was pretty amazing to me some people in that situation would think they dont need any help because they are the final 9 in the world but Hachem seemed at that point a very humble guy. once Hachem was able to get some hands it was able to work out for him. i think we got a very good ambassador for the game for the year to come. the guy is humble and respectful and im sure he will carry Greg's torch well.

Congrats Joe Hachem

[billyjex]

getting the odds on those hands, it is hard for me to say whether or not they were good "patient" laydowns without seeing his hole cards. but it obviously got the job done for him.

and also, tex's bust hand was not a bad move. it was a typical squeeze play. the button raised three handed, which means two cards. the SB just called, not showing much strength. there was plenty of money in the pot and tex had plenty of folding equity against a button open raiser and a cautious SB. he would never put the SB on JJ because 99% of players would reraise in that situation.

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and also, tex's bust hand was not a bad move. it was a typical squeeze play. the button raised three handed, which means two cards. the SB just called, not showing much strength. there was plenty of money in the pot and tex had plenty of folding equity against a button open raiser and a cautious SB. he would never put the SB on JJ because 99% of players would reraise in that situation.

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Hi. Thank you for your response. The squeeze play you mentioned can only work when the original raiser seems week and capable of laying his hand down facing a big raise. I don't know whether Barch had any kind of tell from Dennenmann, but he is going nowhere with pocket 7s. About Hachem's call (instead of reraise) with JJ (this is a monster in a three-handed table), I think it is a perfectly legitimate strategy, even though you hate overcards showing up on the flop. If this play was made at a 5-6 handed table, Hachem must have reraised.


Moreover, there is a previous situation here because of which Barch shouldn't make this type of play.

On Hand 220 (6 hands before), Hachem raises from SB to 0.6 million, Barch reraises from BB to 2 million, and Hachem reraises all in. Reraising from BB indicates tremendous strength, but Barch eventually folded his cards meaning he overplayed his hand here. How did the other players remember Barch's play? That he could reraise less than a pristine hand and lay it down. Indeed, in his interview with CardPlayer.com, Barch regretted not making this play a hand earlier when Dannenmann was playing 4-2 against Hachem's J-2. Bad timing indeed [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img].

[joeboe2001]

So how do we get Hachem to start posting on 2+2? Does Mason have to send him an invitation???

[BreakEvenPlayer]

nice post Jude.

[Zinzan]

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Dennenmann's play was too obvious even to an amateur like me: first preflop raise with ace-x from the button. When Hachem called with one of the worst starting hands (73o, and indeed dominated as it turned out later, but in heads-up domination is not that bad)

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Ummmm...

-Z

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Dennenmann's play was too obvious even to an amateur like me: first preflop raise with ace-x from the button. When Hachem called with one of the worst starting hands (73o, and indeed dominated as it turned out later, but in heads-up domination is not that bad)

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Ummmm...

-Z

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Are you wondering about my last comment? I got that from Harrington (Harrington on Hold'em Vol.II, p.372) Of course, domination in heads-up can go bad when you flop a top pair with a weaker kicker (e.g. Q4 vs. QT when the flop is Q-7-2, but not Q4 vs. K4 on the same flop), which could be costly, but it happens less frequently (there are only two queens left in the deck before the flop). In most cases, pot odds support playing even a dominated hand (ignoring position) because you are only about 2.5-to-1 underdog, whereas limping in from SB (or calling from BB the minimum raise of SB) offers about 3-to-1 pot odds. It's a correct play even if you knew that your hand is dominated.