Can we have knowledge of the future?

[Bork]

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I dont think thats what skeptics claim. Induction can support beliefs, one question is can it support knowledge. Even if you allow that induction can support knowledge then thats not enough to make knowledge possible.


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I dont understand what you mean by this.

Im simply saying if you think induction cannot justify knowledge, then you are commited to saying we only know very few present tense things. People who used this rationale when answering no to the OP must also believe we cannot know anything about past events either. Any justification for a past event requires induction. I claim this a defect in the rationale.

Specific knowledge of the future negates free will if the event is specific enough and sufficiently removed from the present to be influenced by the choices of others. It's either fortune tellers or free will, you choose.

[Bork]

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If you accept only deductive reasoning as being justified, then we cannot have knowledge of the future.

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Tomorrow, nothing will exist which is both red all over, and green all over.

This is a conclusion I arrived at through deductive means.
I know it to be true. Its about the future.

So to answer the OP's question, ya we can have knowledge about the future.

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Your statement isn't about the future. It's about word definitions.

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No its a statement about a future state of affairs, ie the future. It requires some discussion of definitions to justify but thats not relevant to what it is about.

Take the statement: In the future pigs will fly.

Using your line of reasoning this statement is not about the future, its about definitions? (or maybe you would say pigs) It seems obvious to me its about both the future and pigs.

[maurile]

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If you accept only deductive reasoning as being justified, then we cannot have knowledge of the future.

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Tomorrow, nothing will exist which is both red all over, and green all over.

This is a conclusion I arrived at through deductive means.
I know it to be true. Its about the future.

So to answer the OP's question, ya we can have knowledge about the future.

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Your statement isn't about the future. It's about word definitions.

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No its a statement about a future state of affairs, ie the future. It requires some discussion of definitions to justify but thats not relevant to what it is about.

Take the statement: In the future pigs will fly.

Using your line of reasoning this statement is not about the future, its about definitions? (or maybe you would say pigs) It seems obvious to me its about both the future and pigs.

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"Pigs will fly" is about the future because that phrase says something about the world.

"Nothing will be both red all over and green all over" is more like "in the future, two plus two will still equal four." That's not a statement about the world. It's true just because of what the words "two," "plus," "equals," and "four" mean.

Similarly, no objects will be both red all over and green all over simply because of what "red all over" and "green all over" mean. You don't have to know anything about the world to know that the statement will be true. You just have to know some word definitions.

[chezlaw]

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I dont think thats what skeptics claim. Induction can support beliefs, one question is can it support knowledge. Even if you allow that induction can support knowledge then thats not enough to make knowledge possible.


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I dont understand what you mean by this.

Im simply saying if you think induction cannot justify knowledge, then you are commited to saying we only know very few present tense things. People who used this rationale when answering no to the OP must also believe we cannot know anything about past events either. Any justification for a past event requires induction. I claim this a defect in the rationale.

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There's much debate about whether/why induction suuports rational beliefs. I don't think I've ever heard an argument that shows that induction supports knowledge in the sense meant by skeptics.

Of course your right about past events, skeptics clearly don't believe you can have knowledge of past events (nor present ones for that matter).

You claim there's a defect in the rational, fire away.

chez

[Bork]

I guess I wasnt clear. The defect is simply that if you claim that it is impossible to justify knowledge through induction, which I am guessing all the 'no' answer people are doing then they are commited to saying that we know almost nothing. They dont know that Bush is president, they don't know that that the earth isnt resting on a turtles back, they dont know that dinosaurs existed, or JFK existed, etc. If you define knowledge in that sort of cartesian (must be proven deductively to be true) sense then you are going to know almost nill. Even when you think you have proven something deductively doubts will still creep in about error of inference or memory and with them inductive reasoning creeps in. Induction is not something that can be dismissed if we want to have knowledge beyond things like I am having a monitor like sensation right now, or the a priori necessary truths that were mentioned earlier.

[Bork]

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Similarly, no objects will be both red all over and green all over simply because of what "red all over" and "green all over" mean. You don't have to know anything about the world to know that the statement will be true. You just have to know some word definitions.

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I understand they require different truth makers. One requires some events to take place in the future, and another can be said to rely on definitions and logic to be a certain way in the future.

My statement being a necessary truth is not relevant to whether it is about the future. It is a claim that a necessary truth will obtain in the future. It is obviously true and of dubious utility but attacking it on the grounds of whether its about the future is misguided.

Tomorrow, two plus two will equal four.
Tomorrow, the sun will rise.

Both are statements about the way things will be in the world tomorrow. The first happens to be the way things will be in all possible worlds but that does not mean it's tense doesnt modify it to include content about the future in the same way the tense modifies the second.

[chezlaw]

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I guess I wasnt clear. The defect is simply that if you claim that it is impossible to justify knowledge through induction, which I am guessing all the 'no' answer people are doing then they are commited to saying that we know almost nothing. They dont know that Bush is president, they don't know that that the earth isnt resting on a turtles back, they dont know that dinosaurs existed, or JFK existed, etc. If you define knowledge in that sort of cartesian (must be proven deductively to be true) sense then you are going to know almost nill. Even when you think you have proven something deductively doubts will still creep in about error of inference or memory and with them inductive reasoning creeps in. Induction is not something that can be dismissed if we want to have knowledge beyond things like I am having a monitor like sensation right now, or the a priori necessary truths that were mentioned earlier.

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It sounds like you basically agree with the skeptics but wish to you the word knowledge to means something weaker and attainable. Us skeptics have no problem with that but we would like our word back.

I think what you say about deduction isn't quite correct. Skeptics are saying there is a problem in knowing anything about the world even in principle. If there was in principle a method for gaining knowledge then the fact that you might make a mistake when putting it into practice is a very minor issue.

chez

[Bork]

Yep chez, thats right. The only reason I bring it up is i suspect many of the people who said no probably think they know they have hands or that they know what they ate for lunch this afternoon.

If they dont think those things, and really are through and through consistent skeptics, fine; but I suspect many are just inconsistently rejecting induction when it pertains to future events but not present or past events.

[peritonlogon]

The statement was that no logical form makes it so, not just tautology. The fact of the matter is that, as I said, this statement is simply a specific example of the logical rule of non-contradiction. Simply to state that things won't be contradictory in the future isn't really a deduction a of the future, only a deduction of logic. I'd write a proof, but I don't think it's worth my time.