ULTIMATE POKER CHALLENGE DAY 2 PART 2 by BLAIR RODMAN

[Blair]

We redrew at 14. The final two tables looked like this;



1 Luke Neeloy 75k

2 Patrick Antonius 80k

3Todd Gierhan 58k

4 Jim Nicoulin 105k

5 Layne Flack 165k

6 Amir Vahedi 107k

7 Me 320k



1 Chip Jett 115k

2 Philippe Rouas 70k

3 Bill Edler 190k

4 Andy Bloch 140k

5 Doug ‘Rico’ Carli 93k

6 Jason Cotray 58k

7 Thomas Koral 94k





I had a nice lead at this point, and Amir was back on my right, where he’d been throughout almost the whole tournament. With Layne to his right, I liked my position. We were moved to the TV table. I thought the TV pressure, combined with the fact that only 10 places were paid, would have the effect of severely tightening up Luke, Todd and Jim, who were inexperienced in this type of situation. I planned to stay aggressive and try to build my lead at their expense.



After Amir lost about 20k in a pot with Jim, we got involved. (Since Pokerwire reported on much of the action, I’ll use their transcripts and add my comments).



Amir Vahedi doubles through Blair Rodman
Amir Vahedi raised to 8k and Blair Rodman re-raised to 25k. Vahedi called and the flop came [Qd][7s][7h]. Vahedi checked to Rodman who pushed in and Vahedi called all in for 62.1k. The players turned up:

Amir Vahedi [Js][Qs]
Blair Rodman [10d][10h]

The turn and river came [Qh][9h] and Vahedi took the pot with a full house Q's over 7's to double up.



I really wasn’t sure what Amir could have called with pre-flop, rather than folding or re-raising all in. (I was a bit surprised he put that big of a percentage of his stack with QJ). When he called before the flop, I was wishing I’d raised a bit more. I’d have been happy to take it there. Once the flop came down, there was no way I could get away from it. His play of checking, my going all in, and his call were all pretty much automatic. No miracle ten for me, and Amir was back in the hunt. I really would have liked to see him take the long walk. He’s too dangerous to let hang around.



I lost almost 90k in that pot, and was down to about 220k. Soon after, this pot came up:



Blair Rodman knocks out Layne Flack
Layne Flack limped, Amir Vahedi limped, and Blair Rodman raised from the button. Flack was the only caller and the flop came [Ad][Jc][7h]. Flack got all in against Rodman on the flop and the players turned up:

Layne Flack [Kd][6d]
Blair Rodman [Ah][Js]

The turn and river came [3d][Ac] and Layne Flack was eliminated in 14th place.



Actually, there were 5 limpers for 3k in the pot, including the small blind. I made it 20k from the BB, figuring to take it there. I talked to Layne about the hand yesterday when I saw him at the Bellagio. He knew I didn’t have to have a big hand to make a play at that pot pre-flop, especially with a big stack. On the flop, he checked and I bet 25k into a 35k pot. He moved in for about 140k more. He figured I couldn’t call with a weak ace, which was probably true. He was unlucky that the flop hit me that hard. However, I think this is the time for a discussion of a related topic:



There’s a poker term I saw in a magazine the other day that I love. It’s a disease called ‘playing backwards’. Many inexperienced players are afflicted with this. It comes in many forms, but the basic characteristic is playing strong hands weakly, and vice versa. It’s related to the old adage about tells, where players act strong when weak, and weak when strong. Playing backwards can be deadly against good players.Think about it. If I’m playing behind you and I know that in many cases you’ll raise a pot, then check if you hit the flop looking for a check-raise, but you’ll bet if you miss, my strategy is to call or raise if you bet and take a free card you if you check, unless I’ve got a big hand. If you’ve bet the flop, I call and you check the turn, I can make a rather small play at the pot, which will often be successful.

In the hand above, had I checked on the flop, Layne would have been alerted to the fact that I might have a monster, and I doubt I could have gotten his whole stack. (Although in this case it might have happened anyway, because he picked up a flush draw on the turn.) He knew I didn’t have to have a big hand pre-flop, but I also knew that he knew. When the flop came, I did everything possible, both thru my demeanor and the size of my bet, to look like I was making a phony continuation bet.

There’s another example of playing backwards that’s related to pre-flop play and the Kill Phil strategy. When a tournament reaches the move-in stage, many players know to not let their stack dwindle, and will move in with a mid-strength hand rather than make a raise that is too easily called. However, these same players will make a smaller raise if they happen to pick up aces or kings. This seems to make sense—you want action with those hands. However, sharp players will pick up on this, will avoid your big hands, and strongly consider calling your all in’s with hands that don’t appear to justify it. As I described in my report from the last final event at the Plaza back in July, Andy Bloch made a call of a hefty-sized all in by Chau Giang, with A-J. Chau had moved in pre-flop several times at the final table, and Andy correctly sniffed it out and made a great call. The antidote to this is to go ahead and make the all in move with the whole range of hands that you’ll play, not just the weaker ones. We discuss this in Kill Phil when discussing the play of aces under the heading “The Most Deceptive Play of All”. In fact, I saw this happen yesterday at the Bellagio. A player, who had previously moved in several times, put in about 25k at the 600/1200 level. He got called by a surprisingly weak hand and showed aces. A lot of eyebrows went up at the table, but I thought it was a great play. If the Kill Phil strategies become more widely used in the future, players are going to make adjustments in their thinking about pre-flop play. Hopefully we’ll be able to keep you up to speed on our website.



I now had close to 400k. Amir knocked out Day 1 chip leader Patrick Antonius in 12th place with 88 vs AQ when he flopped quad 8’s. Amir now had about 250k. The tournament director moved Philippe Rouas, with about 46k, to Layne’s ex-seat.



Vahedi and Rodman chop
Blair Rodman raised to 10k from under the gun and Amir Vahedi called from the big blind. The flop came [Qd][10c][3c] and both players checked. The turn came [2c] and Vahedi bet. Rodman called and the river came [3h]. Vahedi bet 25k on the river and Rodman called saying he wanted to see Vahedi's hand. The players turned up:

Amir Vahedi [Ah][5s]
Blair Rodman [Ac][4c]

They laughed while the dealer chopped the pot.





This was a funny hand. We had played so many pots against each other that we’d about exhausted every play in our arsenals. I had Ac 4c. I could probably have won the pot with a bet on the flop, but Amir had a big stack, and I wanted a shot at it. If I made the flush and he had a hand, I could trap him badly, as he would not figure me to check there with a flush draw. And I didn’t want him to make a big re-raise that I couldn’t call. The turn gave me a wheel draw to go with the flush draw. He made a rather small bet on the turn. I called and prayed for a miracle that could bust him. When the 3 came on the river, he quickly bet 25k. I started to fold, but something stopped me. I tried to figure what he could be betting. His bet on the turn was too small to indicate a good hand that he wanted to protect against the possible draws on board. The river bet was 25k into about a 45k pot. Why would he make this bet? He could be trying to get a hand like tens or a weak queen paid off, but thought that if he had a hand like that he’d check and hope I’d bluff at it. I finally put him on a busted straight draw, some thing like J9 or KJ, or maybe a pure bluff. I didn’t give him an ace, because I thought that if he had an ace, he’d think it might be good in a showdown if I had a busted draw and wouldn’t need to bet. If I’d thought an ace was a possibility, a small raise would have been the right play. If I’d had a little more time to think it through, I might have come up with a small ace as a possibility. However, if he had that hand, I’d still get half, so it probably wouldn’t be worth risking making a raise. Perhaps the deciding factor in not folding was that he was talking to me. The more he talked, the more I felt he was bluffing.



This is getting long. I’ll finish Day 2 in another post.

Good read. Now its time to watch the victoria's secret fashion show.

[Blair]

I agree completely.

[IHateKeithSmart]

Wow, very nice reports Blair. Thanks for posting these.

[Exitonly]

[ QUOTE ]
Wow, very nice reports Blair. Thanks for posting these.

[/ QUOTE ]

[ilya]

So let's see....

--Cut&paste snippets from another website
--Book&website&personal plugs
--A few trivial strategy pointers imparted like they're some kind of sophisticated, proprietary secrets

uhhhh...yeah....great post.... [img]/images/graemlins/confused.gif[/img]

[Exitonly]

i noticed that stuff too, but i'm happy he posted them.

.. why wouldnt you like reading this?

[ansky451]

[ QUOTE ]
So let's see....

--Cut&paste snippets from another website
--Book&website&personal plugs
--A few trivial strategy pointers imparted like they're some kind of sophisticated, proprietary secrets

uhhhh...yeah....great post.... [img]/images/graemlins/confused.gif[/img]

[/ QUOTE ]

Hm... Go away?

I liked it, and I'm sure almost everyone else did.

[ansky451]

[ QUOTE ]
Qd][10c][3c] and both players checked. The turn came [2c] and Vahedi bet. Rodman called and the river came [3h]. Vahedi bet 25k on the river and Rodman called saying he wanted to see Vahedi's hand. The players turned up:

Amir Vahedi [Ah][5s]
Blair Rodman [Ac][4c]


[/ QUOTE ]

I'm assuming its a typo, but I do beleive a flush beats ace high.

Yeah its a typo. The turn was a 2[img]/images/graemlins/diamond.gif[/img]

And thanks Blair for the report! More please. [img]/images/graemlins/grin.gif[/img]