A Few Simple Questions

[baggins]

to answer all of your questions:

no. it is never ok to choose to cause someone's death. even if inaction causes someone's death. i didn't choose to be in the situation where either 100 or 1000 people die. so i am not morally culpable for the 1000 if i choose inaction. but i am morally culpable for the 100 if i do act to save the 1000.

[EnderIII]

"The assumption is that it is better if fewer people die, barring any other knowledge about the situation."

I find this assumption very interesting and do not think it is as clear as many people do. I know that you specified 'barring any other knowledge' and the information I want isn't even avaialable, but I think it is interesting to think how one might respond to this question given different assumptions of net quality of life. While this is not information that we have access to, it might be the type of knowledge that we can make educated guesses about using some sort of empirical standard of living measure. I wrote this in response to a conversation, so it is missing some of the background information but I could fill in the gaps if anyone finds it interesting.

Broad question # 1 --- Why is the ability to remember and be aware of the future important? Does that require that we treat things capable of doing this any differently?

Broad question # 2 --- What is the ideal way to distribute power, resources and in a sense happiness.

Interestingly, I think both of these questions are closely linked. In many ways I think they both resolve down to the issue of variance. As beings that experience variance in our lives (we are not static) we are inclined to assume that variance is good, so we need to examine whether this assumption is warranted. First, I suppose I should explain how they are both related to variance if that is not apparent.

The ability to remember and be aware of the future (planning and such) allows for a more varied existence, you can remember past joys and sorrows and likewise expect such differences in the future. All of this gives you the capacity to compare to the now so that your now is relative to the past and your expected future. Without being aware of the past and future you would have nothing to compare the now to and your existence would seem static to you. I think it is worth noting that it would not actually be static (a cow still has good days and bad) but since it perceives it existence as static (if it perceives at all) it still has no way to reference so nothing ever seems extreme. So the traits we are talking about, essentially allow for greater variance in the lives of beings that possess these traits. Whether this variance is good or not may well depend on the net resources available, which we have no way of figuring out (as far as I can tell) but we can make different assumptions and see where they lead us.

Possible average resources(or happiness or whatever you are interested in..something considered a good I guess is the best way to put it) if evenly distributed (through time if in the case of a single individual relating past and future or over all individuals if considering a group [this is where question two comes in])

Significantly below a neutral baseline – there isn’t much to salvage here and so I’m not sure if it matter much. In order to propel a few members of society or a few moments of your life to any significant good it seems as if you or some people would have to endure truly awful possibly torturous circumstances. I’d probably side with everyone being significantly below baseline at all times than allowing for truly awful experiences. I guess one way to think about is what would be your preferred version of hell.

Somewhat below a neutral baseline –here is where variance I think can do the most good…having everyone have a slightly negative life or living a slightly unhappy life at all moments sounds quite awful. I think most people would correctly be willing to be significantly below baseline at some moments (or have some people below baseline) in order to allow some people or moments to pass above and have a genuinely good experience.

At a neutral baseline --this is the trickiest one and gets at the heart of the issue. Is it better to have a neutral existence or one with peaks and valleys? Is there much, if any difference between living a neutral existence and not existing at all? I think it is in here that we will discover whether there is any inherent value the characteristics we are talking about. I haven’t thought all of this out, but I’ll be thinking about it.

Somewhat above a neutral baseline --somewhat above a neutral baseline seems like contentment to me, I’d find this easy to accept both for a society and for every moment of my life, but I think this is more a battleground issue that is debatable. Some people would revile at the idea of being content all the time. But I’m not sure they’ve ever experienced the wonderfulness of a content sit.

Significantly above a neutral baseline –this one seems the easiest, if everyone can have a very high quality existence, or if you yourself can have a high quality life at every moment, minimum or no variance seems to be the best. This is perhaps where the two questions diverge, some people might think that sure we want everyone in society to be equally very happy, but still want fluctuation in their own lives. This reminds me a lot of theology and the concept of heaven…notions of how can there be good without some bad moments to compare it to and such. I think those arguments fall short of changing anything as they are limited by the way in which we experience the world…in that we assume variance is good because we experience variance in our lives. Living a static but entirely way above baseline life sounds fantastic to me.

My reactions to the extremes (wanting to avoid truly bad things and forgoing truly amazingly good things) makes me think that my opinions may be clouded by my risk averse nature…but I’m not sure, I think there are thoughts at work beyond personal preference.

[MMMMMM]

[ QUOTE ]
no. it is never ok to choose to cause someone's death. even if inaction causes someone's death. i didn't choose to be in the situation where either 100 or 1000 people die. so i am not morally culpable for the 1000 if i choose inaction. but i am morally culpable for the 100 if i do act to save the 1000.

[/ QUOTE ]

Are you sure about that, and have you really thought this through?

What if you are a commercial pilot on a jumbo jet, and all engines fail and you cannot avoid crashing in a very highly populated area. You have tried to glide the plane as far as possible but you are now stuck with the horrific scenario of making a crash landing, that will either: A) kill approximately 1000 people on the ground, or B) kill about 100 people on the ground. All aboard the plane are expected to die anyway. You have a few seconds in which to decide and the plane is headed straight for the area that will kill about 1000 people on the ground. However if you act quickly you can divert it to the area where fewer people would be killed.

Now, apply your reasoning above to that scenario. Note that if you divert the plane the area where only about 100 people will be killed, rather than 1000, you would be "choosing" to cause the deaths of the 100. Do you still derive the same answer that you gave above? Do you think that it would be morally culpable to divert the plane in order to save the 1000 lives at the expense of the 100 lives? And do you think the only way to avoid culpability would be to let the plane crash where it was headed anyway?

Please don't dodge the question by saying you are not a commercial pilot and would never be, or could never be in a similar situation. A similar but lesser example could be constructed for any driver of an automobile who lost his brakes at highway speeds coming down the off-ramp and was forced to choose between: A) plowing into a crowd of people on his present course, or B) diverting the vehicle from hitting the crowd at the clear expense of running over a few people in the process.

[muckdumper]

in a situation like the 9-11 attacks,when the occupants of the airline jet overtook the terriost and forced the plane down into an open field thus killing everyone onboard and sparing the lives of possibly gov't. employees.i guess it is correct and brave.nobody wants to die.

[veganmav]

[ QUOTE ]
My answer to the first question is yes. It cannot be otherwise. I'm not sure about the other two. By that I mean I haven't thought of a way to reduce them to questions that are not a matter of opinion. As to:

"For the person who argues that it is ok to kill a 100 people to save a 1000 people, it now seems to follow that it is ok for the doctor to kill this otherwise unknowing and absolutely innocent patient going in for a routine check in order to save the five sick patients. Intuitively, I think most people would find this absurd as well."

But it is not absurd. Not if the randomness stipulations were strictly held to. How could it be otherwise?

[/ QUOTE ]

There is a difference between this analogy though. The sick patients probably are sick because of lifestyle choices that they could control, meanwhile the healthy person is healthy because he made the right lifestyle choices. Therefore he probably has more right to his life than an individual chosen at random.

[Kripke]

This answer will get you nowhere, just assume their illness was caused by things out of their control.

- Kripke

The vast majority of the people on this site have replied to this question in the negative. This is either due to a blatant misunderstanding of basic maths, which I seriously doubt, or a misunderstanding of what we mean when we say somebody has a right to live, or a right to anything for that matter.
There is a common misconception that when we say somebody has a right to life or a right not to be tortured that these rights, referred to as human rights for the most part, are absolute and so should never be forfeited in any situation regardless of the circumstances. This is just silly. Of course our rights should be protected, and rights definitely serve a purpose, but to say that they are completely inviolable in all circumstances including the ones mentioned above just doesn't add up. Of course killing one person to save a million is the right thing to do, there is simply no argument.
The interesting part of Mr. Sklansky's question has more to do with where we draw the line when attempting to formulate an entire ethical system around this new conception of rights. Does this now mean that it is ethical to kill a person in public for the momentary thrill of millions? I hope not.There has to be some sort of middle ground, where rights are important and protected insofar as it is feasible, but where it is also possible to forfeit people's rights when common sense and reason tell us that we simply must, as in Mr. Sklansky's question.
This is an ethical system which you will find is already endorsed by most Western governments; the U.S. often forfeits peoples' rights to freedom so that they are unable to carry out terrorist activities, even if there isn't a huge amount of evidence to hold them.
Basically the bottom line is that despite utilitarianism being an ugly word and being pretty unpopular in most philosophical circles, some level of it is necessary in our thinking and actions, and as a result unfortunately in some circumstances individual rights will have to be forfeited.

[Lestat]

I believe a true fatalist would answer: Do not divert. The plane will crash where it may and what will be will be.

[Stu Pidasso]

[ QUOTE ]
Perhaps you answered this way because I didn't define "kill". Suppose I am talking about redirecting a bomb to a less populace area?

[/ QUOTE ]

Droping a bomb is an act of killing people. Redirecting the bomb to a less populated area is an act of saving people.

Stu

[pankwindu]

[ QUOTE ]
First assume a world where everyone knows that 5x people will develop a fatal disease, totally at random, while x people will develop immunity to it that will save the 5x if they are killed. If you go to your doctor you will either be irrelevant, have the disease and be treated, or will be painlessly killed. If you don't go you will die tomorrow if you have it. Wouldn't most people think a law that forces everyone to go today is a moral one?

[/ QUOTE ]

(Nit: even more analagous would be x and 10x I suppose.)

Intuitively my first instinct is to choose in favor of fewer deaths (both in this and the first question of the thread).

But what if the number in this scenario were x and 1.0000000000001x? Or if, instead of killing 100 to save 1000, we could choose to kill fifty million people to save fifty million and one?

If I chose fewer deaths with the original parameters, it seems I should still do the same with the new parameters for consistency, but it just doesn't feel quite as ok anymore. But if one's ok and the other's not, what is the magic ratio marking the point where ok becomes not ok?