what do you guys think of this?

[ccwhoelse?]

Short Handed Poker: Defending the Blinds
By Jason Pohl

I received an email early in January regarding heads-up strategy. Tom asked, "How much is being in position worth? Or to put it another way, how often should you be defending your blinds?" In the last article, I examined reraises from the big blind. In this article, I will focus on how often you should be calling from the big blind.

Before I begin, let's repeat Sklansky and Malmuth's recommendations in Hold'Em Poker for Advanced Players. They suggest calling at least 40% of the time, reraising with the top quarter of these holdings. They include "Any pair, any ace, any other two cards that are both nine or higher, any other straight flush combination with no gaps or just one gap, and any king little suited. (You might add in a few more hands such as J8s, 98, or 97.)"

As I noted in the last article, I firmly trust the guidances in Hold'Em Poker for Advanced Players along with Theory of Poker. I believe Sklansky and Malmuth are brilliant teachers and excellent poker authors who take their material very seriously. However, I believe they use unsound logic to determine the number of playable hands in a short-handed game, and I don't feel our differences in opinion are insignificant. Sklansky and Malmuth have an irrefutible reputation that is well deserved. Therefore, I am not questioning their character, skill, brilliance, or credibility. It is only my intention to prove that in this one exceptional case, Sklansky and Malmuth's advice is flawed.

Could Sklansky and Malmuth be wrong?
The analysis used by Sklansky and Malmuth to find 40% does not quite make sense, and it can help indicate why current theory on short-handed play sometimes fails to designate the best strategy. Sklansky and Malmuth point out that in a $10/20 game, with the preflop raiser risking $15 to win $15, the raiser must steal the blinds only 50% of the time to make an immediate profit (assuming no reraises).

On one hand, they point out correctly that "{the small blind} is entitled to a profit because he has position on you and because you have a larger blind than he does." On the other hand, they follow up by suggesting, "The idea is to keep his profit to a minimum. This means that when the player on the button raises a lot you must call (or reraise) a lot." Herein lies the fallacy. Sklansky and Malmuth are saying that you should call because your opponent will make money if you don't call. Makes sense, right? If your opponent makes money (maximizes his profit), you must be losing too much, right? Let's recall an example from last week.

Example 1:
$10/20 heads-up game. Blinds $5/10.
You have AhAc.
Your opponent flips over 7c2s and raises preflop.
There are 3 small bets ($15 total) in the pot. But there's a catch. It will cost you $20,000 to play your hand due to some vicious house rules. Should you call? Of course not. It does not matter that your opponent makes $5 stealing your blind. Even though the opponent would lose money if you played your pair of Aces (and thus maximizes profit when you fold), it is still correct for you to fold because the only relevant point is that you lose much, much less (minimizing your losses) by folding.

Conclusion: Don't worry about the odds of the preflop raiser. Your only concern is whether a call or raise has positive expectation. We'll use some more examples to crystallize this argument.

Example 2:
$3/6 heads-up game. Blinds $1/$3.
To steal, the small blind raises $5 to win $4.
Using simple arithmetic, we calculate that the preflop raiser needs to steal the blinds 55% of the time to make an immediate profit, a considerable increase over the 50% needed in the $10/20 game. If your goal was only to counter your opponent's strategy, you could call less since you would only need to defend 45% of the time. Should you therefore play differently? No. As a big blind, you're facing the exact same situation in both games.

In the $10/20 game, there is $30 in the pot, and you must call $10.
3:1 ratio.
In the $3/6 game, there is $9 in the pot, and you must call $3.
3:1 ratio.
Also note that the small blind is still raising 100% of the time, so his potential holdings have not changed in frequency.

Example 3:
$10/20 3-handed game.
Blinds $5/10.
Again, we assume no reraising. Our assumptions are helpful to keep the playing field even in our comparisons of heads-up and 3-handed games. The button is raising 100% of the time, attempting to steal the blinds ($20 to win $15). Small blind folds. There is $35 in the pot, and you must call $10. 3.5:1 ratio.

Sklansky and Malmuth suggest that since the small blind is also defending, the big blind needs to call 70% as often as it would in a heads-up game. This advice is where I differ the most. As big blind in a 3-handed game, you have better odds to call then you would in a heads-up game, and with the small blind's cards in the muck, the proper play should clearly include more calling, not less. Remember, the button is still raising 100% of the time, and even if you assume the small blind is more likely to fold small cards, the distribution of cards that the button is raising does not change much.

Calling from the Big Blind
So, how often should you be defending your blinds? To figure that out, we only need to consider which hands are profitable to call. A reraise will affect how much profit will be won, not whether the hand should be played. In other words, both raising and calling will have +EV, but one play makes more profit than the alternative. After a certain point, raising becomes less profitable than calling. At another point, calling will incur a loss, and the hand should be folded. Last article, I argued for reraising with approximately the top 17% of all hands, although that number depends on certain factors. Now, we will examine how many hands should be called, again assuming that your big blind is raised 100% of the time. We will examine three circumstances: heads-up, 3-handed, and heads-up when the big blind has position.

Heads-up (Small blind has position.)
The irony of Sklansky and Malmuth's analysis is that even though the reasoning behind the recommendation is imperfect, playing 40% of hands in the big blind is close to correct against an opponent of equal skill. The exact number is impossible to discern, because it depends on the skill of both you and your opponent. If you are a complete novice, but your opponent is a novice also, the disadvantage of being out of position is lessened. If you are an expert, but your opponent is also an expert, the disadvantage of being out of position is magnified.

My recommendation is to tend towards a tighter strategy for several reasons. First, the 40%+ strategy includes many marginal hands such as J8s, 97, 64s, and K3s. While these hands appear to have sufficient pot odds, they also have two fundamental problems. They will not hit any of the flop approximately 40-50% of the time and will give up on the flop. Also, when they hit the flop with a pair, it will often be a very exposed position, susceptible to a well-timed bluff or semibluff. Since so much of today's opposition relies heavily on bluffs and semibluffs, hands that are exposed to these moves will pay a significant penalty after the flop.

Finally, these marginal hands are more likely to hit and still finish behind, either because the opponent has flopped a higher pair, or because the opponent draws out on the turn or river. The vulnerability of these hands can be reduced to some degree with strong play, especially in position where free card plays are available. Out of position, they will lead to some of the toughest decisions to be made in short-handed games, and these tough decisions will cause even experts to make mistakes.

The other reason to lean towards a tighter strategy involves the overall aggression you will want to incorporate into your post-flop style. You should be reraising preflop 17+% of the time. Coupled with postflop aggression, consistently revealing strong cards will likely lead to successful bluffs and semibluffs, as well as having the general effect of slowing down your competition (which is rarely a bad thing). While it seems that an opponent could thwart your strategy by simply giving up on the flop without a big hand, the reality is that you will either get action with your big hands or win with your bluffs/semibluffs more than your fair share, depending on how your opposition adjusts.

3-handed
We should assume the small blind has folded to be able to compare fairly. In Hold'Em for Advanced Players, Sklansky and Malmuth state, "you need to realize that the little blind should be aware that the big blind may also call. Consequently he should only play his better hands. Thus the little blind should play about half as often as the big blind, and their combined playing fequency should be only a little more than it was for the big blind when the game was heads-up. In other words the big blind should play approximately 70 percent as often as before, and the little blind should play approximately 40 percent as often as the big blind played in the previous case." We will discuss the small blind's quandary another time, but the key for now is that this advice is incorrect for the big blind.

As a big blind, you do not care what "should" happen. Nor should it concern you that the small blind did not have a playable hand. The only important items are (a) the skill of the button player, (b) the likely raising hands from the button, and (c) the pot odds you are receiving. In both (a) and (b), there is no difference from the heads-up example. However, the pot odds have increased. It is straightforward that you should play more hands out of your big blind since the pot size has increased for your call. I would recommend calling with 40-45% of hands in this situation.

Remember, your real concern is not how much your opponent is winning or losing. It is only how much you are winning or losing. The two matters are not necessarily equivalent.

Heads-up (Big blind has position.)
This position is unique and should only occur when everyone has folded to the small blind in a 3-handed or larger game. If the small blind raises 100% of the time, how much should you call? In this scenario, we continue to assume an average player raising 100% of the time, as well as the same 3:1 pot odds. However, now the big blind will have position post-flop.

Obviously, position makes a tremendous difference, with the advantage yielding dividends immediately on the flop since you will be able to gain information about your opponent. If your position will earn an edge, and you have 3:1 pot odds, it should seem obvious that you can defend very liberally against an opponent who raises 100% of the time.

Personally, I would play about two-thirds of all hands (sometimes more since I tend to make good use of position), as you should find a significant profit in several ways, such as earning extra bets when you hit your hand, picking up pots when your opponent misses, buying free cards, and many more. You wouldn't mind winning ½ a small bet (and saving your big blind) when your opponent folds, but if he is raising 100% of the time, you will turn a tidy profit by taking advantage of position. Some hands I would call include: QXs, JXs, T7s, T6s, 96s, 85s, 74s, J8o, T8o, T7o, K8o-K4o, Q8o-Q5o, 87o, 76o, and 65o. Of course, this assumes my opponent is raising 100% of the time preflop. In reality, I don't see players make that mistake from the small blind above the $3/6 limit (and even then it is fairly rare).

Learning to Think for Yourself
In conclusion, this has been a very difficult article for me to write. When I began, I re-examined correct big blind play and compared it to Sklansky and Malmuth's recommendations. I found some similarities, but ultimately concluded that the advice I read in Hold'Em for Advanced Players was based in part on faulty premises. The concept of playing to reduce the opponent's profit can go too far. But even the best strategists and theoreticians can be wrong sometimes, and so each idea should be examined on its merits, even when it is the advice of authors who are "correct" 99.9% of the time. After all, whether you win or lose does not depend on what you've read as much as it depends on what you learned and how much it helps you think.

If you have any questions, or comments, please feel free to email me at jason@pokerpages.com .

[CreamPuff]

I was actually just thinking about this topic yesterday,
so Ill throw in my 2 cents.

In other words the big blind should play approximately 70 percent as often as before, and the little blind should play approximately 40 percent as often as the big blind played in the previous case."

Concerning calling 70 percent from the BB 3 handed
compared to HU...Jason is right, that when the
SB folds, you will actually be calling more since
your getting better pot-odds...

So in this spot, if S&M recommend calling 40%, it
may now jump up to 50%....But they actually recommend
calling 70% of 40%...which is 28%..How can this be?

Well we have to go back and consider that the SB
will be reraising a certain %...say 25%..Forcing
us out....So overall, the BB may be playing less
than 40% 3 handed...Im still not sure if S&M's
numbers add up, but its just a factor
I didnt see Jason mention.

S&M's short strategy also is dependant on your
opp acting somewhat rational..They recommend calling
40% preflop, and over 50% on flop (turn Ace into 2 theory).
This may work fine vs an opp that checks a reasonable
amount on turn, but goes out the window vs and aggressive
turn bettor...It wont work.

Your opp's turn strategy should often dictate how
you decide to play preflop from the BB...Its probably
the most important factor...Yet not much if any
emphasis was placed on this by S&M or Jason.

Against typical aggressive HU opposition I thought 40%
was too tight preflop based on my experience.
Jason says too loose...Based on my experience with
some stat programs on the market, it seems
very hard to lose more by defending the BB (small
sample size)..However some take it way too far.
Daniel Neg. told me he thought it wasnt a bad
play defending with 65 off vs an UTG raiser 10 handed.

Jason writes some real good stuff.

Comments?

[Jason Pohl]

CreamPuff said:
Well we have to go back and consider that the SB
will be reraising a certain %...say 25%..Forcing
us out....So overall, the BB may be playing less
than 40% 3 handed...Im still not sure if S&M's
numbers add up, but its just a factor
I didnt see Jason mention.

******************************
Hmmm...I see what you're saying. When I read S&M, I interpret what they are saying differently from above. But, it might just be awkwardly worded. Either way, it needed some clarification.

Creampuff said:
Your opp's turn strategy should often dictate how
you decide to play preflop from the BB...Its probably
the most important factor...Yet not much if any
emphasis was placed on this by S&M or Jason.

*******************
I think the turn play is very important, but I wouldn't say it should dictate preflop play. I think what you're saying is: If your opponent is taking advantage of position well, then you should play fewer hands, and vice versa.

Tighter play preflop keeps players out of trouble. Marginal hands are lessened. That's the main reason I suggest it. However, I think 40% is the baseline. S&M are correct about that. In my own play, where I believe I can minimize the positional disadvantage, I would play more than 40%.

Also, I don't place much credence on stat programs, especially when the ability to take advantage of position is considered. JXs, T6s, K6o, etc. do not play well after the flop. They miss the flop often and then must be folded against most opponents. But stat programs will say they are winners. Not against my typical opponent. [img]/forums/images/icons/grin.gif[/img]

--Jason

[tewall]

Thanks for the reply Jason! (I'm Tom). I need to check these posts more often!

I think there's no question that the determining factor as to which hands are playable are whether or not their EV is positive or not. I also think it's likely that this is what Sklansky was actually doing even though it was worded that way. That is, I think intuitively he knows which hands can be played profitably out of position (the top 40%), and that's how he came up with the number. His intuition is pretty good (he'll often guess at figures that later turn out to be very close when calculated). I think you're using the same criteria (intuition based on experience), although your reasoning is sounder.

The question as to what hands are +EV is an interesting one. I know there are good players who play a lot of heads up who play far more than 40% hands out of position. I don't know to what extent this is due to playing poor opposition or if they may be hurting their profits by doing so.

I think the conjecture that position is more imporant as one's skill increases is valid, and this is also the reason that computer programs tend not to give good sims for heads up play (position is devalued). It would be interesting to know what optimal play would be (that is, how much one should adjust playing hands given the skill levels).

Another point. One can play in a theoretically suboptimal way to gain an advantage against an opponent who will play even more incorrectly. For example, against an opponent who folds way too often at the flop you would want to play as many hands as possible without his catching on without caring what your cards were.

A follow up question. Given that lesser skilled players take advantage of position less skillfully, this would suggest that as the level of skill goes down, the number of hands that can be played goes up. So if you play poorly enough, the 40% should go up. (I'm assuming equally skilled opponents) Do you agree with this, and if so what % of hands should one novice play against another out of position?

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
One final observation which I think is interesting even though perhaps maybe no one else will. I have played go by myself (a complex oriental game, comparable in some sense to chess). I am a pretty good player (very good for an Anglo, just average for an oriental). What I noticed is when I play myself, I have no idea what will happen. Usually the games are not close. I defeat myself decisively. Given that I am obviously the same skill as myself, the fact that the games are often not close suggests to me that there is quite large random element involved just due to the skill level. That is, if a top pro were to play himself in a game, I would expect nearly all the games would be very close.

So the poker analogy is this. Not only is there a large random element built into the nature of the game (cards are dealt, which can turn out unusally well or poorly), but there is a large random element due to ones skill ranging dramatically. An expert's play will be much more consistent, so his (short term) result will depend more on the luck factor. A lesser player's play will vary a lot more, meaning that he may due very well (or poorly) in a given session not simply because of the cards he's drawing, but how he's playing them at that particular time.

I think these random factor make it very difficult to determine which hands should be played. That is, it's hard to come up with a model.

[CreamPuff]

I think what you're saying is: If your opponent is taking advantage of position well, then you should play fewer hands, and vice versa.

Actually my thought process was somewhat opposite of
this as STRANGE as it sounds. Thats because GOOD players
on the button tend to check the turn more than bad
over-aggressive players.

Now the only problem with my thought process is that
a good player will eventually adjust. So in the
end you're probably right about playing fewer hands vs
a good player , but I'll just fill you in
anyways.

We'd both agree that you should play more hands vs
a passive opp.

I think a players aggression level is as
important than if they are a good or bad player.
Ive seen some real good hyper-aggressive "good players"
and some real good selectively aggressive "good players".
Also there are players that for the most part
know all the tricks of playing position well, and are
good value bettors, but they still don't like to
put a bet in on the turn without something decent vs
another good/tight player.
(most GOOD players fall in this category).


So let me use the S&M example of turning an
ace into a deuce:

You have TJ, flop A92 w/backdoor flush draw.
Now part the reason your gonna check-call flop,
is because a good player will have the sense to check
the turn often enough(because your a tight player)
.A bad overaggressive player will keep firing.
Regardless of whether you call this a good/bad play,
I would say bad players tend to bet more than good
players overall in situations like this.

Now either way your going to play TJ preflop.
But its the bad players strategy that thwarts you
from even calling on the flop (Because you know he'll
always bet turn).

But against a better player you can get away with more
hands preflop, because you know that he'll check
the turn often enough after you call the flop (approx
55% of time you'll call flop vs good player).


Also your mediocre hands like JT, QT go up in value
vs aggressive PREFLOP/TURN players, cause you'll be able
to check-raise more often on the turn successfully.

Marginal hands like T7s, go way down in value vs.
aggressive turn players. But this is the range of
hands that we are concerned with. We're always
going to play our TJ's...its the hands in the 40-55%
range that we need to be most concerned with, because
were not sure if they are +EV vs whatever opp we
may be up against.

I would say a players BET TURN frequency is a key
factor in determing Call/Fold preflop when you hold
a hand in this range (not just their preflop
raise freq.)...But its always this range that concerns
us the most in a call/fold scenario.


Along with all the other factors you've already mentioned.


Also I went back yesterday and skimmed through
your articles in the archives...I didnt get a
chance to go over the math, but if its right, these
articles are instant classics for me.

[CreamPuff]

Im not sure if youve read some of his articles
in the archives at pokerpages.com, but
they are really good, and may answer some of
your questions.

[CreamPuff]

But against a better player you can get away with morehands preflop, because you know that he'll check
the turn often enough after you call the flop

I was dead wrong on this issue.
I compiled a list of hand rankings for HU situations.
Basically all hands that might be opp. dependant
as far as a call/fold is concerned preflop, fall
in the 40-60% range (or higher if someone wanted
to argue that).

Hands that you would consider peeling off the flop
with vs. players that check the turn often
enough are hands like 89, TJ, and other high
cards.

These hands are automatic calls preflop (better than
the 40-60% range).

So when deciding to call preflop with marginal hands,
it might actually be better if your opp. were to
always bet the turn...Because your not calling
the flop with the 40-60 range unless you hit.

[Copernicus]

Its important to distinguish between "open ended" HU play, and "freezeout" HU play. When it is freezeout, such as the last two players in a tournament, the chip ratios are a critical factor. Limit vs NL is also crucial. I only skimmed the article but it did not seem to make these distinctions.

If applied to Limit, Freezout, when the blinds are not a huge % of the stacks and when the stacks are pretty even, I think the suggestions are far too conservative.

If a player has a substantial chip lead or the blinds are getting relatively high then I think the article approximates good strategy.

[AeonBlues]

I didn't read the resposnces, but your question about Sklansky's logic leaves some of the logic out of your post.

When you review the specific stratagy your talkikng about, you'll notice that this stratagy is specificly designed for a super agressive raiser, in short handed play. Not say, AeonBlues, or any other reasonably tight player, who isn't constantly trying to steal the blinds. This stratagy was specificly refering to the type of player that raises almost 100% of the time. Which he writes isn't a bad stratagy, if your opponet will fold more than 40% of the time, hmmmm.....

AeonBlues

[Jason Pohl]

The article applies to open-ended play. Not just HU, but any situation when the preflop raiser has position and raised 100% of the time, to steal the blinds (i.e. the raise is opening the preflop action and thus the big blind is left with a heads-up decision.)

It also assumes competition that is EQUAL in skill to the big blind; we can assume then that they will take a fair advantage from having position.

My argument is simply that postflop considerations far outweigh preflop pot odds.

I concede I am advocating a tight strategy, because the big blind is out of position. Also an aggressive one. In other articles, I try to make it clear that in my own play, I play a few more hands than I would suggest for the novice.

I am surprised more players don't take being out of position against a skilled opponent more seriously. But I'm not really surprised people disagree. If they didn't, what fun would it be?

--Jason