War Strategy

[MMMMMM]

Of course the element you mention exists as well.

I left out mentioning it because Chris left out mentioning those terrorized and forced to fight by the Fedayeen;-)

[Chris Alger]

It’s not just the ferocious resistance, it’s the absence of any noticeably broad support among the “liberated” that shows that this is a war of naked imperial conquest. In response, you attribute Iraqi hostility and apathy toward the US solely to terror threats by Saddam’s Fedayeen.

It doesn’t wash. The US military estimates that there are between 5,000 and 25,000 of these agents in Iraq. Iraq’s population is about 23 million, with most families armed, and 40% of Iraq is under US control. So how can you use these guys to explain the absence of cheering crowds, indigenous resistence and collaboration, masses of surrendering troops? Just where is the Iraqi version of the French resistance, who took on nothing less than the Third Reich? Richard Perle told us that the widespread desire for “liberation” would lead to the regime’s collapsing at the “first whiff of gunpowder.” Hyperbole, perhaps, but the experience so far has been close to the opposite.

Can you honestly say that you expected to see as many reports like this one (by MSNBC), a link provided by Billy LTL above:

“Crowds started gathering wherever we stopped, and the mood was getting more and more ugly. People complained about the shootings, the lack of aid, even the shortage of water because electricity had been shut down and water pumps didn’t function. Arab journalists with us were accused of being Kuwaiti and threatened with death.”
http://www.msnbc.com/news/890712.asp?0cb=-h1l143917

They don’t even like our reporters, much less our troops. We are embarking on a hostile occupation of a foreign country marked by continuous urban guerilla warfare that will make the British experience in Northern Ireland (supported there by 2/3's of the public, and ultimately unsuccessful) look like a cakewalk.

[MMMMMM]

Chris you are presuming that I am attributing resistance only to the enforcement by Saddam's Fedayeen. My point in mentioning it as I did was primarily to draw attention to the fact that you neglected to mention it at all.

Of course there is other resistance which may be quite significant. However let's not forget that the crowds cannot afford to cheer too loudly or even at all as long as Saddam is still in power. Saddam has spies throughout the country and only fools or very brave souls would cheer prematurely for fear of horrific reprisals later on if Saddam somehow retains power and/or the coalition leaves.

I think a fairer assessment of the overall Iraqi attitude will be possible later, and I'm withholding final judgment on this until such time.

By the way what do you think of initial reports that a large terror training camp has been captured in Northern Iraq?

[Clarkmeister]

"I think a fairer assessment of the overall Iraqi attitude will be possible later, and I'm withholding final judgment on this until such time."

So if we lose the war and the Iraqi civillians say they are glad we lost that's proof they like Saddam? Because you seem to be implying that if we win and they say they are glad its proof they were in favor of the invasion.

To me, the ultimate test is whether they choose to defend or rebel with force of arms.

[MMMMMM]

"To me, the ultimate test is whether they choose to defend or rebel with force of arms."

Well then Clarkmeister, I don't think we are seeing a very significant percentage of the population defending against us with force of arms, and of those that are, most are Saddam's elite Republican Guards and conscripted regular army, and his Fedayeen. Of the civilians who are resisting (a small number relatively speaking) many have been pressed into service by the Fedayeen.

[Clarkmeister]

But they haven't had a chance to defend yet. We'll get a better picture when coalition forces actually enter cities. Its not like some store clerk is going to just stroll on out to the front lines. They have, however, had a chance to rebel and haven't taken it.

Anyways, my point is simply that its a self fulfilling prophecy to say "wait til we win, then see how happy the people are". Saddam could just as easily say "why are you invading on the pretext of liberation when my people are obviously content as evidenced by my 100% victory in the last election"

We've seen a small (1000 person?) uprsising in Basra, where the anti-Saddam sentiment is supposedly highest. We've seen several thousand expatriates return from Jordan to defend. And we've seen small pockets here and there. In all it certainly seems too early to tell.

Personally, I suspect that the vast majority of Iraqis hate Saddam, but also hate us invading their country and destroying their homeland. I think they'll be happiest when we get the F out of their country and take Saddam with us.

[Chris Alger]

I usually agree with you, so take this as a nuanced disagreement. [img]/forums/images/icons/smile.gif[/img]

I take it as a given that the manufacturers and promoters of "hype" are not likely to take it seriously.[1] Overall, however, I think the individuals have a better understanding of what they're trying to accomplish.

How can the first week's conduct of the war be deemed rational? Deep oppostion to the war and shallow support for it places a premium on quick and cheap success. This dictates taking longshot gambles at the early stages. They started with a virtually impossible "decapitation" attempt to murder Saddam, then moved in ground forces in the hopes that Saddam's troops would surrender en masse, and only afterward started the bombing campaign that meant widespread civilian casualties. Even then, the bombing has been much more limited than what was originally threatened. The pattern is slow escalation to accomplish no more than the minimum that might lead to something that approximates success, similar to the pattern of escalation in Vietnam. This doesn't mean that the leaders actually expect success through these limited efforts. With this war, the political cost of a Powell-like massive use of force might have been seen as too high.

The downside is a sense of early failure, but with a complacent media and a general attitude of needing to "support the troops," damage like this can be controlled. And if the polls are correct, so far it has been.

The entire war is a hail mary. Who would have imagined, three years ago, that any sane leader would back an infantry land war in order to conquer a hostile Arab country that has neither attacked nor threatened to attack the US? Before 9/11, hardly anyone took Iraq seriously enough to favor invasion.

But 9/11 was too good an opportunity to pass up. Shortly after the attacks, The Economist quoted the newspaper Ma'ariv as noting that 9/11 was a public relations gift to Israel of unprecedented magnitude, a feeling that various Israeli leaders have echoed. You can imagine how 9/11 was welcomed in the US by the minority faction that wanted the US to take more turf, especially Iraq's. Indeed, within hours after personally surviving the Pentagon attack, CBS notes that Rummy was telling his staff to figure out a way to finger Iraq. His lack of success hasn't deterred him yet.

Rather than being driven by optimism, the leaders were presented with a rare opportunity to advance an otherwise dead-end agenda. They took it despite the long odds because capable people seize the day. Inherently, they occasionally overreach, but the rewards (to them) are worth the risks (mostly assumed by others).

[1] Some of them certainly take the hype seriously (Wolfowitz), because any regime that runs on heavy doses of misinformation is likely to be infected with a kind of institutional stupidity. Zealots often get promoted. In Vietnam, for example, there were probably US officials that believed the conflict was driven by a Red Chinese plot to conquer the world, and a few who believed this even after China invaded Vietnam in 1979 and lost, proving that the USSR wasn't much of a Vietnam ally either. In the early days of Carter's presidency, his people had to get rid of some military clown in high office who talked openly of a Soviet "time table" for world conquest. But these are the exceptions.

[Clarkmeister]

I'm not saying that the initial thrust/gamble wasn't rational or a reasonable plan. What seems obvious to me is that it was unreasonable to count on it to succeed. If we had looked upon it as a calculated risk, we should have had backup constantly arriving.

Instead, we took our shot, it didn't work, and *then* said 'OK, lets bring in the proper amount of troops'. A well thought out plan would have had the "backup" troops already arriving even as the cavalry was blitzing to Baghdad. If we ended up not needing the backup, no biggie. Better to send them home unused than to lose momentum and PR points by having to stop and reload.

[Parmenides]

I have no doubt that the USA can flatten Iraq. The way the USA could lose is if the objective is not met, and we withdraw. A sceanrio in which this could happen would involve Syria and and/or Iran entering the war on the Iraqi side, and the Russians intervening on their behalf after the USA counter-attacks. The Russian conventional forces are no threat. The Russian nuclear capability, however, cannot be ignored.

[Chris Alger]

"By the way what do you think of initial reports that a large terror training camp has been captured in Northern Iraq?"

I don't know of any camp that's been "captured," but the US working with the Kurds apparently destroyed the Ansar camp that Powell described to the UN.

There doesn't seem to be much to it. There isn't any known tie between the camp and the government of Iraq. It as created in a place where the Iraqi government has no control after the Taliban fell in Afghanistan (about 150 of the 700-800 fighters that operated there appear to be Afgahnis). It's occupants seemed to restrict their activities to fighting Iraqi Kurds. I'm not aware of any act of international terrorism that's been linked to it.

When it was first mentioned, the big question was why hasn't the US just bombed it? The obvious answer was that the US wanted to preserve it as a pretext for invasion. See LA Times, 2/7/3 ("Lawmakers who have attended classified briefings on the camp say that they have been stymied for months in their efforts to get an explanation for why the United States has not launched a military strike on the compound ... Absent an explanation from the White House, some officials suggested that the administration has refrained from striking the compound in part to preserve a key piece of its case against Iraq.")
http://www.google.com/url?sa=U&start...fg-intel7feb07,0,5391792.story&e=2436

Powell's allegations about the camp were so exaggerated that its owners opened it up to journalists for inspection. "Ansar allowed 20 journalists to pass through its front lines Saturday and enter the Victory Brigade compound. They found a wholly unimpressive place, a small and largely undeveloped cluster of buildings that appeared to lack substantia industrial capacity. For example, the structures did not have plumbing and had only the limited electricity supplied by a generator. Roughly half the buildings in the compound appeared to have recently been used as civilian homes, and one contained the sandals of a small child. The remaining buildings were in military or political use, serving as either fighters' barracks or as a television and radio station for the Islamic party. Two Ansar officials who escorted journalists through the compound's buildings spoke of its unmistakably crude condition and dismissed Powell's allegation as baseless. 'This place is an isolated place, and we have just our weapons,' said one of those in the camp, Ayub Khidir, adding that by weapons he meant rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and machine guns.'" Int'l Herald Tribune, 2/10/3
http://216.239.53.100/custom?q=cache...3&ie=UTF-8