The old free will question revisited. - Page 3

Scotch78 · #21 08-16-2005, 05:01 PM

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ok, free will independent of the physical world is easy. My silly many worlds idea is one way but any view that meant the decision was being made in another realm would do.

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No, this is just a rephrasing of Descartes' mind-body problem. It is a solution only insofar as the two worlds do not interact.

Scott

chezlaw · #22 08-16-2005, 05:04 PM

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ok, free will independent of the physical world is easy. My silly many worlds idea is one way but any view that meant the decision was being made in another realm would do.

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No, this is just a rephrasing of Descartes' mind-body problem. It is a solution only insofar as the two worlds do not interact.

Scott

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I don't understand what you mean. Can you explain please?

chez

Scotch78 · #23 08-16-2005, 05:24 PM

World 1 is physical and obeys the deterministic laws of cause and effect. World 2 is immaterial and has different rules for causality (for the sake of argument I am ignoring the problems inherent in defining those rules). Free will exists in world 2, but affects world 1. We want acts of free will in world 2 to cause effects in world 1, but the two world solution will fail if acts in world 1 can cause effects in world 2 (that would maintain a continuous causal loop and thus a wholely deterministic universe).

This is just a rewording of the original dilemma, namely that we want our acts of free will to have necessary (and sufficient) effects, but merely sufficient causes. It does not explain how one would actually achieve that solution.

Scott

maurile · #24 08-16-2005, 05:28 PM

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Here is how I define free will:

The ability to do two or more different things in the same situation. That is, given the exact state of the universe at the time of a decision, the actual decision can vary.

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That's a good start. It's more of a description than a definition, though, since you can still do two or more things in the same situation without having free will if the action is decided randomly instead of being decided according to what you want.

Which raises another point: what do "same situation" and "exact state of the universe" mean?

Suppose that there are two universes that are exactly the same except for one thing: in the first universe, I feel like having ham; in the second, I feel like having turkey.

Would you say that those two universes qualify as being in the same situation?

I think that's the key. Having free will means having the ability to do two or more different things depending on which one you want to do (as opposed to, say, randomly).

Piers · #25 08-16-2005, 05:35 PM

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since QM is not a loophole for free will to sneak through, is there one and if so what is it?

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Free will exists at the level of human consciousness, and to the extent that human consciousness is an hallucination, so is free will.

Scotch78 · #26 08-16-2005, 05:39 PM

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Free will exists at the level of human consciousness, and to the extent that human consciousness is an hallucination, so is free will.

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How about redefining free will and consciousness as descriptive theories (as opposed to prescriptive laws)? I know an awful lot of people who don't want to believe that they are an hallucination.

Scott

Piers · #27 08-16-2005, 05:51 PM

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descriptive theories (as opposed to prescriptive laws

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Sorry don't understand what you mean.

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I know an awful lot of people who don't want to believe that they are an hallucination.

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Tough $hit; altough I am sure they will just ignore me.

fnord_too · #28 08-16-2005, 05:54 PM

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That's a good start. It's more of a description than a definition, though, since you can still do two or more things in the same situation without having free will if the action is decided randomly instead of being decided according to what you want.

Which raises another point: what do "same situation" and "exact state of the universe" mean?

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When I say the same, I mean all the random things come up the same in both instances. That is, everything is in exactly the state (or lack of state), so the randomness is not an issue, and the decision is a real decision.

Scotch78 · #29 08-16-2005, 06:10 PM

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descriptive theories (as opposed to prescriptive laws
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Sorry don't understand what you mean.

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A descriptive theory is an explanation based upon experience. Basically, it's the supposition that the past can/will model the future. We use it because it works, but do not make any metaphysical claims about the universe based upon such a theory.

A prescriptive law would claim something about the nature of the universe and then say that the future must act like the past.

Scott

maurile · #30 08-16-2005, 06:10 PM

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That's a good start. It's more of a description than a definition, though, since you can still do two or more things in the same situation without having free will if the action is decided randomly instead of being decided according to what you want.

Which raises another point: what do "same situation" and "exact state of the universe" mean?

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When I say the same, I mean all the random things come up the same in both instances. That is, everything is in exactly the state (or lack of state), so the randomness is not an issue, and the decision is a real decision.

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So the state of wanting ham or the state of wanting turkey would be considered the same state (even though they involve different configurations of the brain)? Thus the person in the first universe could order ham and the person in the second universe could order turkey, each acting in accordance with their (different) desires.

That is free will, IMO, and it is consistent with a completely Newtonian, deterministic universe. Quantum indeterminacy exists, but it is unnecessary for free will.