Stopping Bluffs

[Luke]

Isn't the answer simply to keep him bluffing at a percentage less than the bet size divided by the size of the pot. So if we suggest that we consider the pot to be "pretty big" at 10 BBs, as long as he is bluffing less than 10% of the time , we can safely fold 100% of the time.

Luke

[1800GAMBLER]

No. As that may not be more profitable than the other situation.

[ML4L]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Let me get this stright.

You're playing against a player who bluffs too much and you think it's a good idea to get him to bluff less?

I'll let other elaborate the logical flaw in the above reasoning.

[/ QUOTE ]

And I'll let others elaborate on the logical flaw in yours.


[/ QUOTE ]

There is no logic in my post. But good try.

[/ QUOTE ]

But, there was (poor) logic in your reasoning, which is what the word "yours" clearly described. Nice comeback.


[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
What's better than your opponent consistently making a big mistake? Your opponent consistently making a BIGGER mistake...


[/ QUOTE ]

Are you arguing for or against my point?

[/ QUOTE ]

Against. If David would have said that you could get the guy to start bluffing 50% of the time, wouldn't that be a good thing? Yes. Big mistake (bluffing 1/3 of the time) goes to bigger mistake (bluffing 1/2 of the time).

Explain to me why it can't work in the other direction. For a while, down to 20%, 15%, etc., it is a step in the right direction for your opponent. The bluffing frequency gets closer to being in tune with game theory. But, once you pass the optimal point, he starts making mistakes again. And, eventually, once you get low enough, the mistake that he makes by almost never bluffing gets you MORE money than his bluffing too much now.

Thank you. So much.

ML4L

[ZeeJustin]

To decide if you want him to bluff less often, the easiest question to analyze is this:
Which is more profitable? The current scenario, or him never bluffing at all?

The way you asked the question, if he value bets the river, you are always beat. Therefore, I think it's safe to assume that if he bluffs the river, you always have him beat.

If he never bluffs, all the sudden he never makes a profit on the river. So now the first question is simplified: Is his strategy more profitable than checking every river?

Since he averages 1/3 a bet per river bet he makes, clearly his strategy is more profitable than never bluffing.

Since he's bluffing about 3-4 times optimal frequency, I'd estimate that he'd need to bluff about 1/3rd to 1/4th of optimal frequency to create a more profitable river scenario.

[chief444]

That was my exact thinking as well, which is how I came up with the equation in my first response. You gave a much better explanation.

[DcifrThs]

here's how i did it with absolutely no math.

he currently bluffs 1/3 of the time.

we can intimidate him but how much is intimidation really going to do. we want him bluffing fewer times on the river so we can start making laydowns. therefore i felt that if we got him bluffing less than 33% as our "intimidation" would do it would be to our benefit. i didn't think we could get him down much past 20% so 4:1 i felt was just about right as far as the conditions david stated were taken into account....

clearly, we want the bluffing frequency of his to be WAY out of line. either way too much or way too little. granted 20% is near optimal frequency but how much is intimidation really going to affect his bluffing frequency...

guess i'm looking at it the wrong way as 1800's answer (and yours) is where we'd want him to be. i think david may be trying to point out how much force you have to put in the "bluff less" direction to show that we should really not be fighting the current and try to get him to just bluff MORE.

-Barron

[droidboy]

[ QUOTE ]
Yes. He's argueing against. Would you rather have him bluff 1 in 3 times or bluff 1 in 100 times?

[/ QUOTE ]

That's an excellent question. Unfortunatly, it doesn't take into acount what level of bluffing is correct.

Here's one for you to ponder. Who is more profitable to exploit, someone who bluffs twice as much as optimal, or somenoe who bluffs half as much as optimal?

- Andrew

[droidboy]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Let me get this stright.

You're playing against a player who bluffs too much and you think it's a good idea to get him to bluff less?

I'll let other elaborate the logical flaw in the above reasoning.

[/ QUOTE ]

And I'll let others elaborate on the logical flaw in yours.


[/ QUOTE ]

There is no logic in my post. But good try.

[/ QUOTE ]

But, there was (poor) logic in your reasoning, which is what the word "yours" clearly described. Nice comeback.



[/ QUOTE ]

I'm sorry, what was the logical statement that I made? The only "reasoning" in my original post was David's. So, are you saying that there was poor logic in the reasoning?

Again, are you trying to argue for my point?

- Andrew

[ike]

I think I must be missing something about this question. How does asking the "intuitive types" to come up with a number accomplish anything? Even the "intuitive" players on this board can do the math for this question and if they are doing anything else when deciding how to play this, it has to do with deciding on a case by case basis what to do not with any numbers. Also, assuming a "big pot" is more than 3BB isn't he bluffing too much? Why are you stopping his bluffs, you need to go much farther in that direction than you would on inducing bluffs. If you can get him bluffing half the time or more you never have to fold and will overall make money on these calls.

[DcifrThs]

[ QUOTE ]
Here's one for you to ponder. Who is more profitable to exploit, someone who bluffs twice as much as optimal, or somenoe who bluffs half as much as optimal?

[/ QUOTE ]

the guy who bluffs 2x optimally always gets called. 1/2 the times you win and 1/2 the times you lose that extra bet. so you're overall expectation is 0.

the guy who bluffs .5x optimally never gets called and sometimes takes the pot away when you would have had the best hand, something that never occurs to the first opponent of the 2xoptimally bluffer.

-Barron