Against pvn, part 2

[bobman0330]

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So basically your contention is that nobody will pay because they assume everyone else will pay and they plan on just taking a free ride. We can also address those too poor to purchase police protection.

Assume there is perfect police protection, no crime. Those who pay will have direct protection (or whatever they've purchased) while the free riders only derrive security as a side benefit of the general increased level of security in their area. Lots of people will get sick of paying for something they're "not using". Police protection will decrease. Crime will start to appear. As fewer people pay for protection, more crime will appear. Eventually the free riders will decide they are no longer happy reaping the (decreasing) side benefits of everyone else's protection and pony up.


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So, you imagine an equilibrium position in which there's some crime, some payers, and some free riders. interesting.

Let's make the example a little sharper, and with less market feedback. Say instead of talking about police we're talking about some sort of military defense force to protect our fledgling A-C state from Canada. At some point, the Canadians are going to pour over the border with their tanks and hockey puck launchers. If the military is funded to a sufficient level, the Canadians are repelled. If not, they win.

In this situation, the same problems exist, but without your sneaky market solution. What happens?

[tylerdurden]

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we have a bad example of a free rider dilemna, how do you deal with a real free rider dilmna, when who recieves the public good can't be controled.

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See my response in the other thread.

[TomCollins]

Screw hiring a police force, I'm hiring a gang to go kill anyone that doesn't pay me $1000 a month!