actionmonkey on Step 5's

[d1sterbd]

Any good player is going to have an advantage by having more information. They know each other's cards and they have one less person to get reraised by. They can dump chips to each other. They can run plays on the other people on the table by raising and reraising once their are callers in between. If there is more than two people in their team, than it doesn't really matter who they are playing against in the long run. The advantage is just too big.

[Gramps]

Even though some fishy players make it up to Step 5s, that's no different from the 215s where some reckless gamblers reside from time to time. The difference is the higher shark concentration, hence your % return per SNG will be less. Your ITM would probably be more if an extra spot got paid, but that doesn't affect your ROI at all.

Thus, you're going to be susceptible to higher # buy-in downswings, and you're playing for 5 times as much $$ - that equals some serious ugly downswings for even long-term winners.

[Gramps]

I don't doubt that skilled players could work it out so that they could gain a slight edge here and there. Hopefully if they're doing it and it's clear, enough people complain and Party b-tch slaps them.

[ZeeJustin]

Your examples are attrocious. In the TT vs AKo example, why is the TT raising to only 1200 rather than shoving? The average stack is only 6 big blinds. Anyway, optimal colluding strategy has these players play exactly as they would if they weren't colluding in this situation because a fold could be too obvious a sign.

In your second example, you can use the same reasoning to show that AQ is better than AK. Obviously if you can pick out what cards come on the flop turn and river, you can make any situation look bad.

Here's the thing about colluding. If the two players know what they're doing, the worst case scenario for them is that they have to play the same way they would if they weren't colluding. Only poor colluders will ever find a -ev spot. Fortunately for us, most colluders aren't great players, but that doesn't mean there aren't any out there that are good.

Your logic throughout this thread is really poor Daliman.

[Pokerscott]

[ QUOTE ]
For the sake of argument, suppose you're playing against 1 total fish and 8 other players who are carbon copies of you. All you do every tourney is divvy up the fish's money. It would be advantageous to you then to get into a team with some other players, because it makes no difference to splitting up the fish's money and it helps you defeat the players who are copies of you.

[/ QUOTE ]

You are also taking on a double share of the rake, so it is not clear you are better off in this situation.

Suppose the fish is -50% ROI (he can get lucky every now and then!)

The fish is then donating $1069/2 = 535 dollars to the pool. Unfortunately, the rake is $690, so collectively you and the other copies of you have to pay up the remaining $155 rake. When you play by yourself, you only get a 1/9 share of this rake (~$17). However, when you play with a buddy, you get a double portion of the rake (~$34).
Depending on how much your collusion gains you relative to the other copies of you will determine if it is a good move. If it doesn't help at all it is a bad move however.

At the limit (colluding with all 9 other players) is clearly a dumb move since you all just lock in the rake loss [img]/images/graemlins/wink.gif[/img]

Pokerscott

PS this is similar to the chip dumping collusion theory. I am convinced chip dumping is not a big deal in single table SnGs. In general, I am ecstatic if a player goes all in early and doubles someone else up (that is one less competing for the money). In general if I am happy when someone doubles up someone else early(presumably +EV for me), then it can't be +EV to pay two entry fees and execute that play. Of course there are other ways to collude, but the early chip double is not a viable one imo.

[curtains]

Isnt the most obvious way to collude to sit next to each other, and if its SB vs BB confrontation late in the event, you can always let whomever you want win, assuming the cards arent ridiculous.

[ChrisV]

[ QUOTE ]
You are also taking on a double share of the rake, so it is not clear you are better off in this situation.

[/ QUOTE ]

You are taking on a double share of the rake AND a double share of the profit. Say, arbitrarily, that your profit is $100/tourney before rake. Individually you win $100 and pay $65 in rake, for $35. Collectively you win $200 and pay $130 in rake, for $70 = $35 each. There's no difference.

[ QUOTE ]
The fish is then donating $1069/2 = 535 dollars to the pool. Unfortunately, the rake is $690, so collectively you and the other copies of you have to pay up the remaining $155 rake. When you play by yourself, you only get a 1/9 share of this rake (~$17). However, when you play with a buddy, you get a double portion of the rake (~$34).

[/ QUOTE ]

And a double share of the profit, so $120 odd instead of $60 odd. Work it out, it's the same amount per player.

[ QUOTE ]
At the limit (colluding with all 9 other players) is clearly a dumb move since you all just lock in the rake loss

[/ QUOTE ]

No, it is advantageous. It changes nothing except that you all get to see each other's cards, which presumably means you beat the fish out of more money. A smaller team would be better since you can use your knowledge against the other players as well. Not sure what size team would be optimal.

[ QUOTE ]
PS this is similar to the chip dumping collusion theory. I am convinced chip dumping is not a big deal in single table SnGs. In general, I am ecstatic if a player goes all in early and doubles someone else up (that is one less competing for the money). In general if I am happy when someone doubles up someone else early(presumably +EV for me), then it can't be +EV to pay two entry fees and execute that play.

[/ QUOTE ]

This isn't what chip dumping is in SNGs. It's the opposite - a big stack dumping chips to his partner so that his partner doesn't get busted.

Getting colluded against on the bubble and ITM is very bad for you. Luckily, even if there's a team in the game against you, they mostly don't all make it to the bubble.

[Daliman]

I never said my examples were perfect, but this response shows a general misunderstanding about both SNG late game concepts and the possible gain from colluding. My examples, even still, are far from atrocious. Obviously, on the bubble, TT vs AK is going to have to get allin preflop in almost all cases, yet if people were colluding, they wouldn't want to do this. You can just as easily say TT pushes then, and gets called by the SB. Very often, AK will and should call there, but a case can be made for either folding or calling AK there. Your "optimal" strategy would have one KO the other if no one else got involved, which does create a larger stack, but does knock one player OOTM in a 3 pay game, therefore meaning the player remaining now MUST come in first to have the minimum profit they would have by both cashing, not to mention any lost strategy gain.

In the second example, what I am saying is that there are times when having more information at your disposal isn't always going to be +EV. It's nice, sure, but there will be many times you would make a marginal fold that would have won for you because you know you have dead outs.

Anyways, I was only using these as loose examples. The deep thinker should look at the other ways colluding can backfire from my examples..

Trust me, Ive done a lot of thinking and analysis about how collusion impacts a game, especially SNG's, and it ain't a big deal. If they were to just play the way they normally would, then they're not colluding, now, are they? But if one guy at level 3 says he has TT UTG 8 handed, and his buddy says he has JJ in the CO, TT is going to fold, and now JJ has lost a +EV situation tht may have improved his standing. Yes, TT has saved some chips, but it may just as easily end up not mattering, not to mention the fact that the standard UTG raise by TT could be reraised by JJ, thus thinning the field, which is, of course, a primary function of raising. There are TONS of reasons why it just isn't very effective, and while chip dumping/small stack CPR of a buddy can be frustrating, it can, and as often as not, does backfire on them.

Before you go impugning someone's logic, you should first consider the source of the logic, and do some thinking on your own, because you are flat wrong here.

[ZeeJustin]

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In the second example, what I am saying is that there are times when having more information at your disposal isn't always going to be +EV.

[/ QUOTE ]

This is obvious, and not even worth saying.

[ QUOTE ]
It's nice, sure, but there will be many times you would make a marginal fold that would have won for you because you know you have dead outs.

[/ QUOTE ]

Translation: Plays with less EV than the most +EV play will occassionally result in the best possible outcome due to variance. Ok great. That's obvious too.

[ QUOTE ]
The deep thinker should look at the other ways colluding can backfire from my examples..

[/ QUOTE ]

Ok, Here is your problem. If the colluders play perfectly, IT CAN'T BACKFIRE. In the sense of you getting your chips all-in with aces, and losing to a lucky river, sure, it can backfire. But in the longrun, this extra information will addup to be very +EV if utilized correctly.

In no way shape or form should optimal colluding ever result in a loss of EV.

[ QUOTE ]
But if one guy at level 3 says he has TT UTG 8 handed, and his buddy says he has JJ in the CO, TT is going to fold, and now JJ has lost a +EV situation tht may have improved his standing.

[/ QUOTE ]

Assuming they have equal stacks, it is very -ev for them to gamble against each other. It doesn't even matter what the odds are. This is one of the many benefits of colluding. Since you are sharing your profits, every same stack all-in is exactly the same as a coinflip, and for good players, coinfips are generally -EV. By avoiding -EV plays, they are profiting.

You keep talking about plays backfiring. Yes, +EV plays backfire all the time. There's variance in poker. That doesn't mean the play wasn't +ev in the first place.

[The Yugoslavian]

I think I have a solution that I may have brought up before:

A 10k HU freeze-out at Party Poker: winner takes home chips, pride, and perhaps some of Dalibaby's Gerber $$.

I'm sure others would want to watch this freezeout happen. It'd be faaaaaaaaaaaaaaaantastic.

Yugoslav