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#11
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I'm guessing you were addressing this to someone else as my message was totally facetious
One Street at a Time wdbaker Denver, co |
#12
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But...if I loose my ten dollars...I might not get to play any more...then what would I do???
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#13
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Stop playing poker or deposit more money.
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#14
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i think this was addressed to me. i'll see if it applies..
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#15
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You keep losing your money because you are a bad player not because of collusion.
I don't see how collusion can effect your game very much. I mean they don't know what cards you have so they could be bumping the pot for you. It would hurt the fish much more because they are taking their bad hands too far. Oh no someone is bumping the pot up when I have the nut flush draw. |
#16
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The number of cases of collusion is unknown. So the answer to your question is that it is unknown if there are many or there are few cases.
There would be an obvious mathematical/logical approach to analyzing the +EV of acting in collusion. The value would fluctuate, depending upon circumstances, but in general it would be a strategy that offers more value than acting fairly. If you take a statistically significant number of hands, something north of 1,000, and apply a mathematical analysis to each, assigning an EV differential to the hands, you would attain your expected advantage for that particular strategy. It gets more complicated with analysis of position, number of players, number of players acting in collusion and other factors. I can only guess that the +EV would be great, enough to support an ongoing strategy. Other problems then surface. If you utilize a strategy of collusion on any particular site you run two risks: 1) you get caught by system surveillance and the strategy is defeated or, more likely 2) you ruin the experience for the opponents by eliminating or severely reducing their normal EV and therefore making the games unplayable. Your anticipated advantage never materializes and the strategy fails. It's an interesting problem. |
#17
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It's a problem for bad colluders.
Good colluders can potentially not use the blantantly obvious raise / reraise trap, therefor not raising suspicion or lowering the perceived EV of the other players. Also, sites don't really have any kind of sophisticated check for collusion. From my understanding some of them try to use rough computer analysis to try and keep an eye on people who consistently raise and then fold before showdown, especially to another player. There's not really anything they can do, though, to catch the simplicities of instant messaging. Weak colluders simply use IM not to maximize their own profit, but to simply prevent their own loss; when does my friend have a better hand than me? Iffy colluders do the whole raise / reraise thing. Picking their spots might give them a helluva pot here and there, but this method can't be pulled off extensively without becoming blatantly obvious. And as for good colluders, they're rare, so worrying about them only affects your play in general. Stop worrying, play, and as has been said, in the long run your ROI will be fine. Or you can do what I do and stick mostly to home poker games. [img]/images/graemlins/grin.gif[/img] |
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