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Tough Game Theory Problem
Forgive me if I have posed this before. Again I believe that the solution, if not already out there, is worthy of a thesis. Especially if it is generalized. I don't know the answer.
Two players ante a dollar. They are both dealt a real number between zero and one. First guy checks or bets a dollar. Second guy calls or folds if bet into. If checked to, he checks or bets a dollar. If first guy checks, he calls or folds if bet into. No raises allowed. If both players check, or if a bet is called, they are both dealt a second card. Same rules apply for a second round of dollar bets or checks. Highest total wins a showdown. What is the value of the game to the second guy and what is the optimum strategy? This question was posed only for game theoriticians who might like something to chew on. No other reason. |
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