War Strategy

[Mason Malmuth]

Hi Everyone:

Here's my take on the pause in the war strategy.

First, you need to understand that in the last few wars we have fought, the enemy was bombed into submission and then the ground troops, if needed were sent in to mop up. (Yes I know I'm over simplifying.)

But this Iraq conflict was different because of the WMD. We couldn't afford to slowly degrade thier defenses just by bombing since it might allow Iraq to get a shot off at either Kuwait or Israel. So we had to send the ground troops in immediately.

So what has happened is that the western part of Iraq is now held by the coalition. Thus the chemical shot that we were so afraid of is now very unlikely. But the Iraqi army is not completely degraded which an extensive bombing campaign might have done. So the purpose of the pause is to do that degrading and not risk our troops unnecessarily. So in my opinion, this does not mean a set back has taken place.

All comments welcome,

Mason

[Cyrus]

"In the last few wars we have fought, the enemy was bombed into submission and then the ground troops, if needed were sent in to mop up."

There is one more important difference and that is the disproportionate opposition, both in public opinion and in the stance of governments, to the action undertaken by the U.S. among historically both neutral and friendly countries. This opposition, which has its home-grown and very vocal expression as well, must have shaped the War Strategy into one that tries to put the best humanitarian face on it. This implies precision-bombing as opposed to Beograd-style, rather indiscriminate bombing, the latter being the kind that truly saps morale.

"This Iraq conflict was different because of the WMD."

Alright, this assumes that WMDs actually exist and can be used. Bu suppose they don't, what then? More importantly, if the American military and political command knows that they don't (and we have to assume that they base their strategies on cold hard reality and not on what they will say in public), then the War Strategy they followed shows that they had expected a rather quick collapse of the Iraqi regime. Hence, the "Decapitation" opening gambit.

The "Pause" button in this War has been pushed by the United States because, exactly like another conflict in Asia, many many years ago, the attitude of the local population has been vastly misjudged. More ground troops must be called in, once again, in order to persuade the locals to be liberated. But that's where most comparisons with Vietnam end, I'm afraid; things will not be allowed now to drag on, no matter what.

[MMMMMM]

I don't think we severely miscalculated, although we may have miscalculated a little (which is to be expected in such imprecise sciences as politics and war). The pause, as Mason pointed out, allows further degrading of the Repulican Guard by air strikes. It also allows consolidation and resupply to take place, and it allows our forward ground troops to get a little rest after that lightning advance.

One reason we don't have as many ground troops as we would like in place yet is because Turkey decided against allowing land passage at a very late date--I think it was 2 days into the war. We have been rerouting that entire division through the Red Sea I believe (a relatively slow process).

Pausing for public opinion reasons would seem counterproductive, since it apears that the long pause leading up to the war was instrumental in the nurturing and flowering of so much worldwide opposition.

I get the impression that you may think there is a significant chance Iraq does not have WMD--even after recent developments. LOL. If so, that's the only severe mistake in judgment I can recall offhand seeing you make: IMO the chance that Iraq does not have some usable chemical shells or missiles is essentially nil.

[Cyrus]

"I don't think we severely miscalculated, although we may have miscalculated a little. One reason we don't have as many ground troops as we would like in place yet is because Turkey decided against allowing land passage at a very late date--I think it was 2 days into the war."

The U.S. had a plan that included passage through Turkey. Turkey forbid that passage. Then the U.S. went ahead with the rest of its plan anyway, without substantially changing it, if at all. Well, something just isn't right, obviously. A plan cannot be correct if, after an important factor changes, the plan remains the same. This is a severe miscalculation from the part of the planners, by definition.

"I get the impression that you may think there is a significant chance Iraq does not have WMD--even after recent developments."

I don't know what "developments" you are talking about, really. But, come to think of it, Mason might be right! The whole American strategy might be based on the solid conviction that the Iraqis do, in fact, possess WMDs. See, one way that I can be 100% certain that you have the seven of clubs in a card game is when I have given you that card myself.

[MMMMMM]

Feel free to correct me if I'm mistaken but I believe Turkey forbade the land passage of US troops after the war commenced.

One development that springs immediately to mind was the discovery of a tank and several thousand chemical warfare suits in that hospital in Iraq. The Iraqis know we aren't going to use chemical weapons so what do you suppose those suits were intended to be used for?

Hey I just thought of something: The less benefit of the doubt one gives to Saddam Hussein, the more likely one is to be right. Let's dub this the "Saddam Hussein Axiom".

[Cyrus]

"Feel free to correct me if I'm mistaken but I believe Turkey forbade the land passage of US troops after the war commenced."

Without quibbling about chronology : either way, the American plan was flawed, and it is now being corrected. At least, that's what they're trying to do.

See, if Turkey forbade passage before the war begun, then the plan was based on something that wasn't there! (Imagine the Kuwaiti government forbidding passage of troops!) If Turkey forbade passage after the war begun, then the plan was flawed because it was executed without having secured one of its basic assumptions.

Denying that the plan was flawed (over-confidence, over-simplification, lack of understanding of basic human attributes such as the will to defend one's homeland, etcetera) is at the very least counter-productive.

Central Command has to give daily press briefings and, thus, conduct also a "press war". The Generals cannot admit the plan was flawed and so they find themselves in a lose/lose PR position. Daily briefings, like daily progress reports in a business, can be shortsighted, awkward affairs -- and I should know, I'm in the business.

[brad]

'The Iraqis know we aren't going to use chemical weapons so what do you '

chemical weapons were used by both sides in the iraq-iran war. casualties were very high.

[Clarkmeister]

"I don't think we severely miscalculated"

I don't know how you can make this claim. It is fairly obvious to me that we made the fatal flaw of believing our own hype and really thought this was going to be over in like 5 days with the help of a surrendering Iraqi military and popular uprisings against the regime.

"One reason we don't have as many ground troops as we would like in place yet is because Turkey decided against allowing land passage at a very late date--I think it was 2 days into the war. We have been rerouting that entire division through the Red Sea I believe (a relatively slow process). "

Exhibit A. Even though we knew we hadn't secured passage, and despite the fact that the Turks had already turned us down, we gambled and left that entire division up there sitting on their butts for nearly a week with essentially no backup plan. That is horrific planning and is quite frankly inexcusable. Note that even if they HAD been allowed to go through Turkey, we would still need massive reinforcements in the south of Iraq. In fact, had they gone through Turkey, you would see just how ill-prepared our leadership was by an even longer reinforcement delay in Southern Iraq than the present one.

"Pausing for public opinion reasons would seem counterproductive, since it apears that the long pause leading up to the war was instrumental in the nurturing and flowering of so much worldwide opposition. "

We can debate what caused worldwide opposition to the war all day. What isn't debatable is that this delay is clearly a PR nightmare for the administration. Which should be all the proof one needs when asking whether or not we severely miscalculated when making our initial plan. Its a PR nightmare, they know it, and they are still doing it. They had no choice.

The fact of the matter is that our initial plan was grossly overoptomistic. Now that we are faced with the reality of an enemy that is not only going to fight, but fight effectively, maybe our next phase will be more effective. I certainly hope so. But I doubt it. Yesterdays quote from a pentagon official that Baghdad is going to fall "from the inside out" seems to indicate that we have not adjusted to the realities of the situation at hand.

[MMMMMM]

I could be wrong but I believe Turkey had agreed to allow land passage for our troops (but no air bases) before we commenced the war. Two days later they reneged.

The war is going fine. After all it's only what, ten days yet?

We'll see how effectively the Iraqis fight after some further "degrading" and after our reinforcements arrive. Baghdad will eventually be locked down almost as tight as the IDF locked down Arafat's headquarters and surrounding area some months ago.

What I want to see is live video footage when we start exploring the tunnels and bunkers under Baghdad.

[Chris Alger]

I usually agree with you, so take this as a nuanced disagreement. [img]/forums/images/icons/smile.gif[/img]

I take it as a given that the manufacturers and promoters of "hype" are not likely to take it seriously.[1] Overall, however, I think the individuals have a better understanding of what they're trying to accomplish.

How can the first week's conduct of the war be deemed rational? Deep oppostion to the war and shallow support for it places a premium on quick and cheap success. This dictates taking longshot gambles at the early stages. They started with a virtually impossible "decapitation" attempt to murder Saddam, then moved in ground forces in the hopes that Saddam's troops would surrender en masse, and only afterward started the bombing campaign that meant widespread civilian casualties. Even then, the bombing has been much more limited than what was originally threatened. The pattern is slow escalation to accomplish no more than the minimum that might lead to something that approximates success, similar to the pattern of escalation in Vietnam. This doesn't mean that the leaders actually expect success through these limited efforts. With this war, the political cost of a Powell-like massive use of force might have been seen as too high.

The downside is a sense of early failure, but with a complacent media and a general attitude of needing to "support the troops," damage like this can be controlled. And if the polls are correct, so far it has been.

The entire war is a hail mary. Who would have imagined, three years ago, that any sane leader would back an infantry land war in order to conquer a hostile Arab country that has neither attacked nor threatened to attack the US? Before 9/11, hardly anyone took Iraq seriously enough to favor invasion.

But 9/11 was too good an opportunity to pass up. Shortly after the attacks, The Economist quoted the newspaper Ma'ariv as noting that 9/11 was a public relations gift to Israel of unprecedented magnitude, a feeling that various Israeli leaders have echoed. You can imagine how 9/11 was welcomed in the US by the minority faction that wanted the US to take more turf, especially Iraq's. Indeed, within hours after personally surviving the Pentagon attack, CBS notes that Rummy was telling his staff to figure out a way to finger Iraq. His lack of success hasn't deterred him yet.

Rather than being driven by optimism, the leaders were presented with a rare opportunity to advance an otherwise dead-end agenda. They took it despite the long odds because capable people seize the day. Inherently, they occasionally overreach, but the rewards (to them) are worth the risks (mostly assumed by others).

[1] Some of them certainly take the hype seriously (Wolfowitz), because any regime that runs on heavy doses of misinformation is likely to be infected with a kind of institutional stupidity. Zealots often get promoted. In Vietnam, for example, there were probably US officials that believed the conflict was driven by a Red Chinese plot to conquer the world, and a few who believed this even after China invaded Vietnam in 1979 and lost, proving that the USSR wasn't much of a Vietnam ally either. In the early days of Carter's presidency, his people had to get rid of some military clown in high office who talked openly of a Soviet "time table" for world conquest. But these are the exceptions.