[The_Baron]

The most recent UN inspectors documented unloaded, chemical artillery shells. This was even given face time on the BBC. (A delightful picture of one of the inspectors staring into a 152mm shell with a flashlight.) While these shells "could" be used for non-proscribed payloads, their basic design is such that this isn't a reasonable assumption. A projectile is designed from the ground up for a specific purpose. While some can be jury-rigged to other purposes, this degrades the design of the shell. This is even more critical in the G-4, G-5 series of artillery. Their superiority is profoundly affected by the design of the projectiles. This goes even to the point of a shell designed for delivery of VX having Lewisite substituted for its payload. The bursting charge, prefragmentation of the case, exterior configuration and base design are all based around the chemical properties of the agent for which they're designed. Yes, you can put mustard gas into a nerve agent shell, but don't expect it to hit your target and don't be overly surprised when instead of blasting the projo out of the muzzle, all you succede in doing is sending a geyser of shattered shell fragments and vaporized chemical agent out of the gun.
We also have to consider the budgetary constraints inherent in arming a military force. While they're comparitively inexpensiv e compared to precision guided munitions and electronic payloads, simple chemical projos are expensive. On the order of $75 to $300(US) each. This is without the payload. While this isn't a great amount, you have to factor in the total number of shells purchased which can literally range into the millions. You simply can't afford to purchase empty, VX configured artillery shells in the hopes that you can someday fill them. It's much the same as purchasing the chasis of a tank in the hopes of someday being able to build the complete vehicle. It's just too expensive. Troops have to be trained using either live or realistic simulated projectiles, firing tables have to be generated and published, handling and firing protocols have to be developed, published and trained. When you factor in all of the aspects of firing an artillery piece, the total cost runs into the thousands of dollars even if you amortize the expenditures.
While it's possible that Iraq deliberately purchased a limited number of empty projectiles with radically disparate lot numbers and manufacture dates, this would accrue significant expenses in and of itself as well as exposing the unusual purchase requirements to an unnecessary risk of exposure by the manufacturer or anywhere along the logistic train.
While it's "possible" the empty shells were all that was left, had been "forgotten" and not destroyed and weren't intended to be used, the odds are significantly against it. It's literally similar to expecting a king high straight flush to be beaten by an ace high straight flush playing stud. The odds are just against it happening. (Yes, I know it has and will continue to happen, that doesn't change the math.)
The empty chemical shells, the forward deployed chemical protective gear and chemical exposure treatment equipment, combined with the traditional lack of issue of those items in the current Iraqi Army, combined with the plethora of industrial facilities that are more suited to chemical weapon production than to their aledged non-military production, lead one to believe there are stockpiles of chemical weapons. Throw in the speed with which an empty chemical shell can be fully militarized and you've got an extremely valid concern for the presence of chemical weapons on the battlefield. (For whatever it's worth, having just spoken with an associate at the Dugway Proving Ground, the militarization time is roughly five minutes assuming the projectile is still sealed in its shipping container. It's literally a matter of removing the shipping plug, putting a funnel in the opening, pouring the agent into the case to the fill line and installing the burster and fuse... less time than it takes to fill a one gallon gasoline container.)
With the indicators of presence of the weapons, the forces can't afford to plan around anything but their presence and use on the battlefield. This doesn't even begin to discuss the political concerns inherent in the problem.
As for Bush looking like Johnson. Not really. The basic social factors of the various nations are radically different than they were in Vietnam. It's simply not the same. Of course there will always be people who want to find the similarity regardless of the rationality of that belief.
As for the US losing. Nope, won't happen. With the exception of some sort of divine intervention along the lines of comets striking the attacking forces but leaving the Iraqis unscathed, the Iraqis simply have no chance. They can't win. They don't have the logistic base. They don't have the level of military technology. Their forces don't have the skill and training. They simply have no way to win. An analogous situation would be a 12 year old, playground ruffian stepping into the ring with George Foreman at the height of his career. Yes, that kid could kick George in the shins and hurt him. Of course that kid could get a lucky punch in and scuff George's chin. But that kid is going to be crushed. He simply doesn't have the skill, strength, experience or even the body mass to win the fight.
As always, YMMV. But in this case, variance in that mileage is based on wishful thinking and deliberate avoidance of the realities of the modern battlefield. The allies haven't even fought at their full capacity. They're still fighting with one hand deliberately tied behind their backs and wearing blinders. An escalation of the allied tactics could literally leave nothing but smoldering ruin in the path of advancing forces. Fortunately for the Iraqis, the allied forces have agreed not to just crush their opponents. That can always change.

The Baron