Re: What is it to have knowledge?
One way I think of knowledge is as the aim of beliefs that can never be reached.
Suppose I believe P and have two reasons R1 and R2.
If R1 is a better reason for thinking P is true than R2 is then (R1,P) is closer to knowledge than (R2,P) is.
If I had a perfect reason, R to believe P i.e. R->P then I would know P.
I don't believe this perfect reason can ever exist about truths of the world. I'm not even sure the idea of better reasons for beliefs about the external world is coherent.
I also think Nozick is on to something important
[ QUOTE ]
Nozick offers a review of the suggests his own solution, called the Truth-Tracking view. P is an instance of knowledge when:
p is true
S believes that p
if p weren't true, S wouldn't believe that p
if p were true, S would believe that p
[/ QUOTE ]
chez
|