Your citation of the WSJ editorial which mentioned cases probably got somewhat lost buried in the other thread. I see nothing wrong with having a thread here started by Adios, who is a longterm and justly respected poster.
I looked over the case the WSJ mentioned. Here's a link:
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/t...a111802opn.pdf
It's hard reading. The relevant section is section III, but it's not too relevant. It seems to be talking about using intelligence gained from FISA for the purpose of conducting foreign policy vs. using it for the purpose of criminal prosecution. All it does that is relevant to warrantless wiretapping, it seems to me, is cite another case, United States vs. Truong, 629F.2d, 4th circuit. (I could not find that case with a somewhat cursory google search just now.) See page 48 of the link.
My question is this: If indeed, Truong and other cases have asserted or assumed the president's right to conduct a warrantless search prior to the institution of FISA, does FISA define a new procedure, in other words, superseeding that assumption, or does it merely say how a search
with a warrant is to be conducted? I note that the case cited by the WSJ talks about Truong as dealing with "pre-FISA" surveillance. That would seem to indicate that FISA established new parameters for both warrantless and warranted suveillance.
Here's a link to FISA:
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/h...0_36_20_I.html