[Bozeman]

"I am doing something wrong, but I can't find out what.
Suppose we're looking at the bluff/no-fold strategy.

Player A will call a raise whenever he has something greater than z.
Player B will bluff with something smaller than x, and honestly raise with something over y and will call with the rest."

Because the bluff/no-fold strategy is not optimal: you need to add (the point I neglected to mention in my post, because it was so obvious) that B will fold hands below .5 that he doesn't bluff with.

This makes for the possibility of many cooptimal strategies: any strategy where B bluffs 1/18 of the time (all below .5), calls with .5-5/6 and bets 5/6-1. Thus the best strategy, if A is playing very poorly by calling with too many hands (more than 1/2), would be to bluff with 8/18-9/18.

I don't see how all this solving of the bluffless case is of any use: ANY PLAYER THAT NEVER BLUFFS IS GIVING AWAY EV (unless he is playing an absolute calling station). DO you solvers see anything wrong with my bluffless analysis that shows that B should use the same strategy for the (B) raise game as for the call or fold game if he is not allowed to bluff? And fnord, you are working too hard on the hard way to solve this, check out the game theory primer. Aisthesis: the math is much easier algebraically, though with programs to differentiate for you the differential analysis is not too bad, and getting results both ways provides a check.
Craig