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That is where meta-evidence comes in. [img]/images/graemlins/wink.gif[/img]

I guess it depends on why the two theories make the same predictions. If it's because the theories are identical, then one is as good as the other.

But if they are not identical, it's just that they differ only with respect to statements that are not testable, then one can still be right and the other wrong -- although it is impossible for us to determine empirically which (if either)is right and which is wrong.

In that case, I think the meta-evidentiary principle is relevant.

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but no-one ever answers the meta-evidence questions. There are no cases where one of two theories undecidable by normal evidence have been shown to be true, so if you apply meta-evidence you have no normal evidence that the meta-evidence approach is valid.

Hence meta-evidence is a fancy word for something that is not based on evidence.

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I don't think this is correct, if I understand what you are claiming. One is using meta-evidence as support for a meta-theory about which of the two indistinguishable theories is likely to be correct. That meta-evidence does not need to arise from observations about indistinguishable theories, though!

Here's a crude example: If I drop a lot of different objects, eventually I will arrive at the theory All Objects Drop. If I then find a new object of a type I have never seen before... I will expect it to drop.

Did I understand your point? Is the above clear?