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Well, this question is pretty silly. I don't agree that Hume would say there was no sound. He wouldn't say anything definite like that. For Berkeley, the question is sorta nonsensical. Since, for him, basically everything exists in the mind as provided by God, the notion of an event that doesn't get experienced is contradictory. I guess the 'proof' you'd want against his position could be easily summed up as, "Berkeley is full of [censored] on everything, so why should this be any different?"

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I disagree - Hume would say that. He says that there are relations of ideas and matters of fact, and ideas are only memories. Matters of fact are impressions or direct sense experiences; thus, if someone does not experience the sound of the tree falling, he could not say it was fact that it made sound.

I agree that this is silly, but just want to prove it wrong philisophically.