[chezlaw]

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Its the *feel* that is the problem I think we are referring to here. Dennet's dealing with the 'easy' bit [img]/images/graemlins/tongue.gif[/img]

chez

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I understand what you're saying, and, to be honest I don't necessarily disagree with you. But, Dennet's book doesn't ignore the hard bit ... he argues that nothing profitable can be said of conciousness in just those terms, and that they're irrelevant when discussing the development, benefits and causes of conciousness.

I'd say his response to you would be: be careful that in focusing on the *felt* problem you don't artificially divide up what you're trying to investigate in a way which begs the question. In asking about purely the *felt* nature of conciousness you set yourself up to fail to be able to adequately explain it.

Not that I'm his biggest fan or anything, but I do think he has something there.

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I dont think I'm in disagreement with Dennet's view. From what you said it sounds like we agree that there is no understanding as to why we are not zombies.

Despite that we know that we are not zombies because we know we experience *feelings*. That leaves *feelings* as real but inexplicable by science which is what RJT was asking about.

Where we go from there I have no idea.

chez