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Now you're asking [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]

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His on my reading list. Am I correct in thinking:

He is not explaining how these conscious phenomena are caused.
He is not claiming they are necessary.


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On the first point I'm not quite sure. He basically sketches his ideas about how seperate feedback mechanisms in the brain, of increasing complexity would be driven by an evolutionary process. For him the existence of said feedback mechanisms is enough to explain conciousness, as for Dennet conciousness is the extent to which the Brain takes account of its own state and responds to it.

What I think you're asking about is the status of the private, *felt* nature of conciousness, and what is it that causes that experience. Dennet doesn't think that the experience of conciousness is itself important to its functioning. Note, though that's different to saying that conciousness itself is not important to the functioning of the brain (which is the traditional epi-phenomena position, and which he he doesn't hold).

So, what I'm saying is he explains what causes conciousness, but does not explain what causes us to *feel* it. Reason being he doesn't think that we can have reliable statements about what it is to *feel* concious. Again, without going into massive detail, he thinks there would be no possible way to distinguish between someone who genuinely *felt* his conciousness and a 'zombie' (as the literature terms it) who says he does, but actually doesn't.

As for whether it is necessary. The mechanisms he posits for the brain, which constitute conciousness, he thinks are necessary for the evolutionary advantages we have. The private felt nature of conciousness he doesn't think is necessary because, as I said above, he thinks there is no logical way to distinguish between a person who has it and one who doesn't.

Hope that helps. Also, as it is years since I read him, if anyone can summarise his position better/correct errors feel free.