[bohemian]

Reading the debates on this forum, it becomes clear that the fundamental question is usually missed. I realize that not everyone has a grad degree in philosophy, but I hope this post will orient some of you in new directions.

Question: Suppose our belief system consists of a set of propositions. For every proposition P in this set, do we need a reason or evidence for believing that it is true?
Obviously, implications in the philosophy of religion will be huge depending on how we answer ("God exists" and "God does not exist" are examples of such propositions in this set).
This is a classical debate between Clifford (evidentialist) and James (pragmatist). Clifford states that "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." James refutes that. Among other things, it is easy to see that this is in fact impossible:
What is my evidence/reason for belief A? B.
What is my evidence/reason for belief B? C.
What is my evidence/reason for belief C? D.
etc.
In other words, the evidentialist requirement can never be met. We'd need an infinite sequence of reasons. It appears that there must be some sub-set of beliefs which are foundational (i.e. can/must be believed without appeal to any other beliefs or reasons, which provide a foundation/ground for all the other beliefs).
Question: Does (dis)belief in God belong in this set? Still open question in contemporary philosophy of religion. But it is hard to see how it would not.

Contrary to popular conceptions of philosophy, theism made a huge comeback in recent years (mostly thanks to reformed epistemology such as that of Alvin Plantinga). If you think otherwise, you are still living in the 70s. The days of Flew and Mackie are gone.