[CurryLover]

I was thinking about that bit in Theory of Poker where Sklansky talks about how the Fundamental Theorem of Poker sometimes needs to be qualified in multi-way pots (p.25-26). Then I imagined a situation that could possibly arise to illustrate this concept in an odd way:

Imagine you've got the current nuts on the flop. You go all-in for a huge overbet of the pot. The situation is this: against every individual hand you are a substantial favourite and thus they should not call your bet. However - and this is the important point - because of a freak distribution of the cards, if every player calls your bet and sees the river it is impossible for you to win.

The point would be this:
Every individual player would be making a mistake according to the fundamental theorem of poker if they called your bet - since they have only a small individual chance to outdraw you. So you'd think that you would be rooting for every individual to call, since they'd all be making a mistake. However, since you could not possibly win the hand if every individual player called, you would not, in fact, be rooting for everyone to call - although you'd be happy if only one or two of them called.

I hope I've explained the imaginary situation well enough so far. Now here is the puzzle to work out:

Can you construct a Hold'em deal that illustrates this concept? i.e. The current nuts is unable to win the hand if all 9 other players see the river, but is a massive favourite against each opposing hand individually.

Now, I remember Ciaffone once gave an example of a possible hand where the current nuts in a multi way pot would not be able to win. However, this was in Omaha not Hold'em. Can you do the same for Hold'em?

If anyone is able to contruct a hand like this then great. If you're not bothered then fair enough - I just made this post because I was thinking about the concept last night and have not been able to construct such a hand myself.

Another thought. Imagine that all hands were turned face up on the flop after the player with the nuts goes all-in. Now each player sees that he can't call the bet because he knows he does not have the odds. However, one of them notices that, if they all call, then collectively they take away any chance that the player with the current nuts has of winning the hand. He says to his opponents/collaborators, "Hey, we're all huge underdogs to this guy. In fact, I'd say that we've each got only a 10% chance of outdrawing him. But let's all agree to call him. Then - regardless of which of us actually beats him - we'll just carve the pot up between us. So what we'll be doing, in effect, is just dividing that guy's money between us. We can't lose - what about it guys?"

This could be a situation in which the Fundamental Theorem of Poker is totally turned on its head.

I know this is not particularly important from a practical point of view since this situation is not going to happen. But the more I think about it, the more interesting I'm finding this whole idea from a theoretical point of view.

Final thing: In this situation you obviously don't want them all to call because then you can't possibly win. You'd obviously like one caller, however, since you'd be making Sklansky bucks. You'd probably like 2 callers as well. But what would be the optimum number of callers in this situation - how many callers would make you the most Sklansky bucks? And at what point would it turn into a break even proposition? For example, you might have the highest EV+ with, say 3 callers. With 7 callers the situation might become EV=. With 8 callers it might be EV-. And with all 9 callers it is obviously EV- because you cannot possibly win. Can this even be worked out before a hand has been constructed?

Anwyay, inane ramblings over now.