Zeroing in on free will
 

I know this has been done before, but I really want a good answer to this challenge; a philosophical/hypothetical one, not a scriptural one. (link me to one if it already exists)

Let us say that there is another planet, identical to Earth in every concievable way, down to the molecule. Same people, same animals, same families, etc. etc. etc.

Person A (who resides on Earth) and Person A' (who resides on our parallel planet) are both born into identical families with identical genetics and identical environments. God gives each a soul, and the power of free will.

Twenty years later, A and A' mature and walk down the street where they are hassled by person B and B' respectively. A gives B some money; A' kills B'. Different choices were made, because they each had free will.

Something must cause an action. Either 1) the soul of A had a different quality than the soul of A', or 2) the souls act at random.

Explain how another possibility could exist that explains this phenomenon.

__________________________________________________ __________

Secondly, a neat little idea I was thinking about before:

A certain robot is programmed with a random number generator; whenever someone asks for a random number, it automatically takes the millisecond from its clock, enters it as a variable, and out comes a random number between 1 and 10.

However, the program exists outside of its main OS (or whatever), and the robot can't detect the presence of this program. It readily uses its RNG, but doesn't know that it exists.

The robot believes it has free will.

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

This situation is useless as a hypothetical problem. It is designed so restrictively as to be virtually meaningless. It's like saying, if some wildly improbable situation with no possibility of being proven or carried out were to occur, what would it mean? If free will indeed exists, then there is no way the person and his doppelganger reach identical situations twenty years down the road. If there is anything random about molecules and physics, this situation would never occur. If this situation did occur, it would mean free will and randomness do not exist and both men perform the same action.

NT

NT

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

there is no answer. otherwise this topic wouldn't be discussed for thousands of years.

someone else on this forum posted this...i forget who, so i can't give credit. on the determinism vs non-determinism universe debate of free will, we cannot prove whether our universe is really random, or if it is a deterministic universe simulating pseudo randomness. thus, that possibility removes all decisive conclusions.

and then there's the omnipotent God. personally, i think if God is omnipotent, then we cannot have free will because by definition, God must be able to give and take our free will.

time argument? like the thread i started a couple weeks back, i think if a certain timeline which includes a beginning and end must mean we have no free will, since everything is predetermined and must be followed a certain. whether we "choose" or not is irrevelant because we will always choose the same result. but of course, there's no way to prove that this is the case.

blah blah blah and the list goes on...

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

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This situation is useless as a hypothetical problem. It is designed so restrictively as to be virtually meaningless. It's like saying, if some wildly improbable situation with no possibility of being proven or carried out were to occur, what would it mean? If free will indeed exists, then there is no way the person and his doppelganger reach identical situations twenty years down the road. If there is anything random about molecules and physics, this situation would never occur. If this situation did occur, it would mean free will and randomness do not exist and both men perform the same action.

NT

NT

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Hypothetical yes, useless no. It should be assumed that all events leading up to that point are identical, and the only meaningful variable are A and A''s actions. I figured this was implied, but apparently I was wrong.

It is impossible to conduct this experiment practically to the satisfaction of any reasonable person; the natural variations of reality, no matter how subtle, can cause things that would interfere with the experiment. It also assumes something (free will) that is philosophical in nature and I don't feel that it needs real empirical evidence to debate effectively. It is useful to deal with it hypothetically.

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This situation is useless as a hypothetical problem.

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Why are you in a philosophy forum?

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

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there is no answer. otherwise this topic wouldn't be discussed for thousands of years.

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There are answers, just not ones that satisfy everyone. I'm just asking for answers, not perfect ones.

What have you got? [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

So let me get this str8. You want to know that if two different people are really identical in every possible way. And you give them an instant to exercise free will. Is this a fair assessment of free will? You are correct about the two options the souls could be different or the souls act randomly, but to think that these are the only two mutually exclusive options is short-sighted.

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Something must cause an action.

[/ QUOTE ] You do, it's called freewill. When you examine the "instants" of peoples life, freewill isn't so apparent, it is only when we look at the longevity of life that one can understand freewill. As a rational creature you can change your future actions by educating yourself today. So in a sense you are right there are a ton of people who do not have free-will, others of us choose to be human. Free-will isn't random it's calculated. It isn't given, it's earned.

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

There is no logically consistent solution to the free will problem using traditional causality, i.e. A, therefore B. This leaves us with two options. First, we have simply defined the problem incorrectly, that is to say, there are no such things as free will and determinism. Second, causality is not what we think it is.

If you decide to go with option two, then I have some good news: there is a logically consistent explanation of free will. The key is to redefine causality with the form A, therefore ~B. For example, you and nine friends are deciding which of ten bars to hit up tonight. In scenario one, they unanimously force you to bar seven. In scenario two, they allow you to pick the location. However, each friend hates a different bar and vetoes one of your choices such that bar seven is the only option where you can effectively exercise your will. So far, it does not matter which view of causality one takes.

Enter scenario three, where you only have eight friends and can effectively exercise your will by choosing either bar six or seven . . . now traditional causality breaks down. There is a catch though. While we can construct a sound definition of free will by changing our defintion of causality, we cannot maintain our traditional definition of reality with the new causality.

Scott

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

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Hypothetical yes, useless no. It should be assumed that all events leading up to that point are identical, and the only meaningful variable are A and A''s actions. I figured this was implied, but apparently I was wrong.

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No, I understand this. What I'm saying is, the question answers itself. If you create two parallel planets, and the same events take place over a person's lifetime as you describe, the laws of physics and what we know of the complexity of life DICTATE that every action is the result of inevitable physical reactions or some other deterministic, presumably metaphysical force. The probability of that inestimable number of atomic, molecular and cellular movements leading up to the moment in question all taking place in the same fashion in a universe where randomness exists, and then having a different event occur at the critical moment in your scenario (the robbery and A's actions), is so mathematically absurd as to be called impossible. The very terms of this exercise negate the possibility that free will exists in your universe. Therefore it's a useless hypothetical, not because this issue is useless, but because your question does a poor job of framing the issue.

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Why are you in a philosophy forum?

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Just because I have no use for poorly devised hypotheticals does not mean I have no interest in philosophy or nothing to contribute to the search for knowledge in general. Unless you were being sarcastic. Philosophical inquiry that disregards practical application or the observable circumstances of reality is masturbatory and counterproductive.

EDIT: and to answer your question, the other possibility is that your all-powerful interventionist God stepped in and made one person act in a particular way.

NT

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

The free will question seems very easy to me:

free will exists = alot of very confused and unsatisfactory arguments.

free will doesn't exist = no logical problems with this view.

Is this being to obvious?

The real question is wether there is such a thing as randomness? especially at the sub-atomic level. My suspicion is no, just unpredictability- think of it like the poker hand generator online.

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

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there is no answer. otherwise this topic wouldn't be discussed for thousands of years.

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This hardly seems correct. Plato's theory of knowledge stood as widely accepted for 2300 years before it was more or less refuted by Gettier's counterexample. And there was a 700-year gap between Anselm's ontological argument and Kant's refutation. Time does nothing for an argument's soundness or validity.

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

Mike Caro's law of loose wiring, anyone?

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

[ QUOTE ]
I know this has been done before, but I really want a good answer to this challenge; a philosophical/hypothetical one, not a scriptural one. (link me to one if it already exists)

Let us say that there is another planet, identical to Earth in every concievable way, down to the molecule. Same people, same animals, same families, etc. etc. etc.

Person A (who resides on Earth) and Person A' (who resides on our parallel planet) are both born into identical families with identical genetics and identical environments. God gives each a soul, and the power of free will.

Twenty years later, A and A' mature and walk down the street where they are hassled by person B and B' respectively. A gives B some money; A' kills B'. Different choices were made, because they each had free will.

Something must cause an action. Either 1) the soul of A had a different quality than the soul of A', or 2) the souls act at random.

Explain how another possibility could exist that explains this phenomenon.

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I think your example is less useful than it could be. Your hypothetical is that person A(A') will either 1) give B some money or 2) kill B'. If A' kills B' for hassling him on the street there is clearly something wrong with him, and by your setup, the same thing is wrong with A. I'm not saying it well, but my gist is that "give a bum some change" and "kill total stranger on the street" are not events that are likely to be chosen at random if such a thing exists.

A better example would be A and A1 after 20 years of identical life in every way down to every molecule going to the Waffle House and sitting down to look at the menu. A chooses pancakes, where A' orders a waffle. A/A' like waffles and pancakes equally well. He is just as likely to choose one as he is another. Why does he choose one over the other?

Frankly, I think free will comes down to randomness and probabilities. Somewhere down at the molecular level in your brain totally random quantum mechanical processes occur until an emergent pattern (a thought, a decision) says, "Waffles."

So free will is random, yes? Well, yes and no. I think that even though the decision process is fundamentally random, the weighting of various options is not. For example A/A' may prefer waffles much more than pancakes, but still enjoy pancakes occasionally. The resultant decision is random, but one choice is made more often than another. We can shape these probabilities, for example, in our children as we raise them. But aren't the decisions about what behaviors to reward or not (how to shape the probabilities) based on random decisions and previously set probabilities. Yes, I suppose so. So is free will an illusion? Is it all just random? Maybe. But I don't see how it matters to me. I'm the robot in the second example, say. Do I really care that my decisions are coming from some emergent random process? No, not really. I still get to eat pancakes. Or waffles. I haven't decided yet.

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

I don't think it's going to boil down to the quantum level so much as the chemical level. Neurons communicate through bundles of neurotransmitters, not electrons.

Not that quantum randomness doesn't have any impact, but I think the biochemical reactions are more deterministic than indeterministic.

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

How do you shape the probabilities? If you exercise "control" over the probability, then you must cause the probability to be different, and ... this runs into the same problem as standard determinism, but with the unimportant addition of probabilistic causation.

Secondly, intuitively, I don't think acting randomly is acting freely. In the case of pancakes or waffles, perhaps it could be, but if our actions are determined by random chance, then you could just as easily have killed the bum on the street as opposed to giving him some change. The probabilities may be skewed towards giving him change, but when you consider that an alternate would have just as easily killed him, can we really say that you were acting freely? Can we ascribe any moral responsibility for randomly determined actions?

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

1.) Can an organism adapt to the exact same outside influence in different ways?

2.) Can free will be attributed to chaos and random occurences within the organism itself?

Saying yes in number two makes number one impossible to answer except on a theoretical level. If we accept chaos we can hardly accept that situations that are identitical on every physical level will ever happen.

What we know for a fact is that an organism can react to very similar outside influences in different ways.

Humans are even prone to take actions that would seem to contradict completely with the swarm intelligence of a random gathering of cells.

Not conclusive evidence for free will, but its better than nothing.

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

hmk,

Out of the two explanations you offer, I would pick neither. Does it matter if the soul has the same quality? I'm not sure what you mean by this, but it's not my answer. Do the souls act at random? It depends what you mean by soul; if you mean 'person,' which I think you must mean, then no it does not act randomly. Do you think you do things randomly with no hidden reason at all?

Many things we do are based on physiological, psychological, and other such factors, but they can also be based on pure whim. I think of Mike Caro's law of loose wiring in poker.

But that's not all either. I think our soul (or will) is so completely free to choose life for itself, that it cannot possibly be doubled and still be the called the same will. Only the bodies would be the same.

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

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hmk,

Out of the two explanations you offer, I would pick neither. Does it matter if the soul has the same quality? I'm not sure what you mean by this, but it's not my answer. Do the souls act at random? It depends what you mean by soul; if you mean 'person,' which I think you must mean, then no it does not act randomly. Do you think you do things randomly with no hidden reason at all?

Many things we do are based on physiological, psychological, and other such factors, but they can also be based on pure whim. I think of Mike Caro's law of loose wiring in poker.

But that's not all either. I think our soul (or will) is so completely free to choose life for itself, that it cannot possibly be doubled and still be the called the same will. Only the bodies would be the same.

[/ QUOTE ]

I agree that the situation I gave wasn't as effective as it could have been. I wrote rather quickly, on a whim. Law of loose wiring, again, comes into play [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]

Let's try it with a more meaningful decision: Two people in parallel universes, A and A', come from identical backgrounds. One goes on to earn a PhD in physics and win a Nobel prize, the other becomes a burnt-out drug addict.

In said case (or in any other case which you would deem to be representative of isolating free will as the independant variable), what can be said to cause the difference?

Essentially, why to some people choose X and others Y?

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

I don't have a great answer, but I would guess it has something to do with a long and delicate chain of experiences, sense perceptions, and memories that begins at birth and continues to expand as life goes on. These perceptions enter the brain and play off each other, while simultaneously playing off natural drives and impulses. All of this combines to make the "will," which is only part free and part influenced by this chain. The free part of it is self-evident. We choose what specific action we take, but part of what we PREFER is determined by this ever-fluctuating chain. What we do with our preference is wholly our choice, however.

The brain is somewhat like a computer in its analysis of the chain within, and it receives the data and stores it. There is no CPU, though; nothing processes the data accurately (or why would we need psychology?). It is stored in the back of our brain, subtly influencing our actions.

The existence of countless variables in everyday life and behavior means that the chain is affected almost at random. We experience something and immediately we reflect on an older experience, and relate the two according to an emotion we have felt before: all of a sudden there is a memory all of its own, with its own story behind it. If the same thing were to happen to A and A', both could easily end up experience totally different things because of this infinitude of possibility.

A million neurotransmitters fire at the same time in two different brains; they started in the same place, but they ended differently.

The chain begins at birth and its first experiences are its most influential. Psychologists say, I believe, that a person forms his/her personality very young. I say the chain is very delicate because it is similar to a set of domminos -- only more random.

That, in a nutshell, is why A' is a drug addict.

I got a bit carried away on that one.

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

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The free part of it is self-evident.

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I disagree.

Explain.

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

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Something must cause an action. Either 1) the soul of A had a different quality than the soul of A', or 2) the souls act at random.

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So...assuming that A and A' are athiests and don't believe that they were givin the devine gift of a soul by god...I'm curious about what your other possible reasons might be.

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

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Something must cause an action. Either 1) the soul of A had a different quality than the soul of A', or 2) the souls act at random.

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So...assuming that A and A' are athiests and don't believe that they were givin the devine gift of a soul by god...I'm curious about what your other possible reasons might be.

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That's your job. It says so in original post [img]/images/graemlins/grin.gif[/img]

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

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Something must cause an action. Either 1) the soul of A had a different quality than the soul of A', or 2) the souls act at random. [ QUOTE ]
So...assuming that A and A' are athiests and don't believe that they were givin the devine gift of a soul by god...I'm curious about what your other possible reasons might be. [ QUOTE ]
That's your job. It says so in original post


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Fair enough. In that case, I have to say that I can't seem to think about this problem too much on a serious level. If I'm supposed to assume that every single action up to this point was somehow cosmically identical, why wouldn't the same be the case with this action (which I guess is the problem.)

Just can't seem to make much sense of it.

I will moniter though, I'm interested in the replies. [img]/images/graemlins/confused.gif[/img]

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

The problem is that I am trying to observe an act of free will, the independent variable, in a perfectly controlled setting. That is, observe two actions where the difference can only be attributed to free will, and not something deterministic.

This of course is impossible, and this scenario, thus far, is the best I can come up with. I guess you can assume the very improbable chance that everyone, up until that point, made identical choices in both universes, and only here was a difference started.

All I'm looking to do is ask "what causes some people to choose X and others to choose Y, if not deterministic causes? And if both act in a manner that cannot be determined, how is this different from acting randomly?"

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

A man walks up to a wise man and says, "do humans have free choice?" The wise man thinks for a second and then kicks the other man hard in the knee. The man says, "Ouch. why did you do that." The wise man says nothing. He kicks him again. "What's your problem? Stop that!" Again, the wise man says nothing. Again, the wise man kicks the other, and again and again until he is irate. "That's it, I'm calling the cops! You should be punished for this!" he exclaims.

Should the wise man be held accountable for his actions? If so, he has free choice. If not, there is no basis for punishing him.

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

[ QUOTE ]
A man walks up to a wise man and says, "do humans have free choice?" The wise man thinks for a second and then kicks the other man hard in the knee. The man says, "Ouch. why did you do that." The wise man says nothing. He kicks him again. "What's your problem? Stop that!" Again, the wise man says nothing. Again, the wise man kicks the other, and again and again until he is irate. "That's it, I'm calling the cops! You should be punished for this!" he exclaims.

Should the wise man be held accountable for his actions? If so, he has free choice. If not, there is no basis for punishing him.

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First of all, if the querent didn't learn anything from this endeavor, then the wise man is hardly "wise."

Secondly, there are reasons to take action against the old man that fit with a deterministic paradigm. The old man is insane, and needs some help for his own good. The old man is also a likely danger to others, and needs to be "corrected," however that is to take place.

As for your concept of punishment, there is no reason to bring further suffering to the old man unless it does a requisite amount of good for him, and more importantly, others.

I don't see determinism as nihilistic or in any way an excuse to get out of personal responsibility. Quite the contrary. A sensible person who realises the relationship between cause and effect should realize also an increased sense of power and control, and accordingly strive for what is in his best interests.

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

Me: "Should the wise man be held accountable for his actions? If so, he has free choice. If not, there is no basis for punishing him."

hmk: "First of all, if the querent didn't learn anything from this endeavor, then the wise man is hardly "wise."

Secondly, there are reasons to take action against the old man that fit with a deterministic paradigm. The old man is insane, and needs some help for his own good. The old man is also a likely danger to others, and needs to be "corrected," however that is to take place.

As for your concept of punishment, there is no reason to bring further suffering to the old man unless it does a requisite amount of good for him, and more importantly, others.

I don't see determinism as nihilistic or in any way an excuse to get out of personal responsibility. Quite the contrary. A sensible person who realises the relationship between cause and effect should realize also an increased sense of power and control, and accordingly strive for what is in his best interests."

I only meant for my question to be hypothetical. The wise man should not really be punished, because it was only a demonstration. The guy who asked the question is supposed to reason this in his head:

"He is harming me. I am angry. Should he be punished for what he is doing? Yes. Why would I even ask this question if people don't have free choice? Would I punish a snake for biting me? No. Why then does a human deserve punishment? Because he has free choice."

The use of punsishment here is only to illustrate an example. Punishment comes later in reasoning as a solution to the problem.

Okay, so is it still possible that we don't have free choice? That we don't determine our actions, but some hidden force does? I said before that I think we are partly influenced by the subconscious chain of experiences and sense perceptions. But that only influences our decisions; it doesn't make them for us.

Think about everyday experiences. Do you think something else is making decisions for you? If you do, then you would have zero responsibility for your actions (and that doesn't have to be in the moral sense.)

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

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"He is harming me. I am angry. Should he be punished for what he is doing? Yes. Why would I even ask this question if people don't have free choice?

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Why does someone have to have free will for the querent to want to punish the old man? Innumberable psychological studies on humans and animals have shown that punishment can shape behavior, often in a predictable way. In this instance, punishment would be a useful tool to shape an undesirable behavior.

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Would I punish a snake for biting me? No.

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You wouldn't? I'd kill it.

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Think about everyday experiences. Do you think something else is making decisions for you? If you do, then you would have zero responsibility for your actions (and that doesn't have to be in the moral sense.)

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But I (that is, the collection of organs, thoughts, emotions, resources and social connections that constitute "me") is all part of this web of decisions. I have learned that responsibility is frequently advantageous to me. There is nothing gained by slumping back and saying "ho hum, nothing I do is my fault" when I could be out having fun, helping people or being a productive member of society.

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

"Why does someone have to have free will for the querent to want to punish the old man? Innumberable psychological studies on humans and animals have shown that punishment can shape behavior, often in a predictable way. In this instance, punishment would be a useful tool to shape an undesirable behavior."

This is why I regretted framing the question as I did. I realize this fact about punishment - what I'm getting at is the reason punishment is justified. Can you justify punishing something that doesn't know what it's doing is wrong?

"You wouldn't? I'd kill it."

In the heat of the moment I would probably kill it. But afterwards I would realize the futility and stupidity of my action.

"But I (that is, the collection of organs, thoughts, emotions, resources and social connections that constitute "me") is all part of this web of decisions. I have learned that responsibility is frequently advantageous to me. There is nothing gained by slumping back and saying "ho hum, nothing I do is my fault" when I could be out having fun, helping people or being a productive member of society."

So we're in agreement. All these subconscious forces influence us, but in the end we make our own decisions. Just because you learned something doesn't mean that what you learned made the decision for you. It just helped you make the right one. You just as easily could have done something different, like, as you say, slumping back and doing nothing. What was stopping you?

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

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In the heat of the moment I would probably kill it. But afterwards I would realize the futility and stupidity of my action.

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ALL healthy vertebrate animals are capable of learning. Otherwise B.F. Skinner wouldn't be known today. Teaching the snake, however, is probably not worth the effort.

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So we're in agreement. All these subconscious forces influence us, but in the end we make our own decisions.


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Where is this distinction between the subject and his environment? Both are constantly interacting. In an ocean of particles interacting with each other, the distinction between "me" and "not me" is as useless and arbitrary as the distinction between the Atlantic and the Pacific.

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You just as easily could have done something different, like, as you say, slumping back and doing nothing. What was stopping you?

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I could not have just as easily done that. The combination of a sound body and mind, a desire for security and success rooted in emotions forged from past events, a disdain for failure and losers (from similar causes) and the means to do so compel actions toward a good, prosperous life. My desires all seem to have a reason, althought I can't calculate them perfectly.

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

"I could not have just as easily done that. The combination of a sound body and mind, a desire for security and success rooted in emotions forged from past events, a disdain for failure and losers (from similar causes) and the means to do so compel actions toward a good, prosperous life. My desires all seem to have a reason, althought I can't calculate them perfectly."

These desires only compel our decision when we are not using rationality. If we think about it, we may choose the option that is more desirable, because we intuitively realize it is more desirable. Or, we may choose the less desirable one, because we reason that we want to try something new, or whatever. Reason has control over the desires. Or, the final option, we try to pick the more desirable thing but we don't know what it is. We don't always do the desirable thing. Often we screw up even if we think rationally about our options, because we can't calculate our subconscious perfectly.


If we are not thinking rationally we are just compelled by this chain of subconscious drives. Many people do this at the poker table; we call them fish.

In both cases our decisions are affected, but only in the second are our decisions unfree.

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

But reason deals in logic based on available data. It's basically a mathematical algorithm with a few more SNAFUs here and there due to the relative inefficiency of the brain. I don't see why it is any more "free" than a pinball is when it chooses its path down a row of pins and obstacles.

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

Reason can abstract things, do you agree?

It allowed you to think up the question of this thread and conceptualize free will.

Then you decided to post it.

Would you say the first action is free because it involves conscious thinking about an abstract idea? Or would that not be considered an action, and therefore not be within our bounds of free will? Or would it somehow be compelled?

Re: Zeroing in on free will
 

Will you privilege me with a reply?