Collusive Entanglement
 

If there's a bustle in your hedgerow, don't be alarmed now, it's probably just Sredni Vashtar.

Collusive Entanglement:

In physics, the term "quantum entanglement" refers to actions between objects.(1)

What does this have to do with poker? Nothing (well nothing in the same sense that gravity has nothing to do with poker) but Sredni figured Ikke would like that.

The term 'collusive entanglement' refers to the interrelationships between poker players' strategies.

Let's state the following:

A) Player 1 has entered the pot and has an exploitable strategy.

B)You are acting behind him, have the knowledge and hand to exploit player 1.

C)Several players act behind you who all have exploitable strategies


Sounds like a good place to play? Right?

But of course your head is humming and it won't go, because you know very well that Sredni has let a rooster into the henhouse.

Let's go straight to an old thread called "Think about Shania." Here, long time poster Phat Mack brought up a situation which will help shed some light on collusive entanglement.

In that post PHat Mack wrote " I don't know Mr. AA, but I used to play PL with his cousin. Cousin would only play AA, KK and AKs UTG, and he would always bring it in for the max raise. I would make it a point to sit at his left. I'd keep track of his stack, and if it was suitably big, I would call his bring-in raises with almost anything. I had two reasons: a) I knew where he was, and if I hit, I had his stack; and, 2) my calls might bring other players in, and if I didn't hit, they would, knocking his chips loose and putting them in play. Cousin was a good example of a player with an outed Shania."



Notice here that we have a player with an exploitable strategy meeting condition A) above. Phat Mack has met condition B.

Now for condition C, we'll put several players with exploitable strategies behind. Ok, let's put a couple of maniacs back there.

So we have met conditions A, B, and C. So surely this is a profitable situation right?


Phat Mack is shaking his head, as he knows all that glitters is not gold.


To make this clear as possible let's have a remaining player make a raise for sure. This allows the AA to reraise, taking Phat Mack's price away. See?

We have multiple exploitable strategies that *combine* to produce a dire situation.


Obvious right? In extreme cases, yes.

Using simulations and thought experiments as well as empirical data, it has become quite clear to me that there are sometimes situation in shorthanded *limit* play where if certain combinations of patterns continue to play out, it is difficult if not impossible to beat over the long run. In spite of the fact the opponents seem to have flawed strategies.

This post has just touched the surface. This topic is huge and largely unexplored at least in publicly available literature. I may post more specific stuff later, but probably not.

So think about Collusive Entanglement, and Shania will love you for it.





Here's a post by Tom Weideman to think about:

(just goto google groups rec.gambling.poker and search for Weideman advantage stupidity)


http://groups.google.ca/groups?hl=en...gambling.poker




Sredni Vashtar, whose stairway lies on whispering wind.









(1)Quantum entanglement is a quantum mechanical phenomenon in which the quantum states of two or more objects have to be described with reference to each other, even though the individual objects may be spatially separated. This leads to correlations between observable physical properties of the systems that are stronger than any classical correlations. As a result, measurements performed on one system may be interpreted as "influencing" other systems entangled with it. However, no information can be transmitted through entanglement. See http://www.free-definition.com/Quant...anglement.html

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

I don't know what pills you're on, but I'd like to try a half.

Ejnar Pik, Southern-Docks.l

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

It really is a shame you don't post more often.

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

I don't think this is quite as paradoxical as it appears, and in fact conventional strategy addresses this type of situation when, for example, you 3-bet a strong player who you think might be raising to isolate a weak limper, or when you consider how the rest of the table is adjusting to your adjustments to a maniac.

The interference patterns that emerge from the overlapping wave functions of multiple exploitable strategies are still potentially exploitable. I mean, in theory, not by me. I'm usually the Planck's constant in such equations. Which is n-n-nobody's fault but mine.

/mc

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

There should be a link on every page of the forums to Tinyurl.com.

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

There's always been a bustle in my hedgerow, but that's a whole 'nother story. Hopefully, others won't elaborate.

Good stuff, Sredni, as usual. Shades of the Prisoner's Dilemma, Abdul's fishes schooling together for unintentional mutual benefit, and Caro's A beats B and B beats C, but, somehow, C beats A (which struck me as one of Mike's typically long-winded ways of playing rock/paper/scissors).

One problem I have is getting from Mr. AA's cousin to " . . . impossible to beat over the long run." Because the exploitable strategies (or should I say, tactics) are not, in actuality, employed 100% of the time (e.g., andyfox's pump-or-dump occurs 100% of the time on paper but maybe only 85% of the time at Commerce) or the situation comes up so rarely (e.g., Mr. AA's cousin having A-A, K-K or A-K UTG and the exploiter being directly on his left).


Hopefully, your (or others') more specific stuff will help.

Best regards,
Andy

On Lepore\'s Objection to Weideman\'s Argument
 

In the linked Weideman thread, Vince Lepore questioned how a stupid tactic could result in a more positive outcome for the stupidman than a smart tactic for a smartman. If a stupid tactic ends up +EV, how can it be stupid?

Smart tactics can end up -EV as compared with less smart tactics. There's an example of this (I think) in (I also think) the original HEFAP (it's probably also in the 21st centruy edition). It concerns levels of thinking. I don't remember the exact example, but player A and player B are going to increasingly high levels of thinking and the result is more "fantastic" (this might have been the exact word used; perhaps is was "unbelievable" or something else) than if two clueless players had been simply doing clueless things.

Would it be logical that, since smart players can end up with stupider results than stupid players would in the same situation, that stupid players can then also end up with smarter results than smart players would in the same situation? Or is this itself an illogical conclusion?

Can a realman economy result from economic girliemen?

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

"Cousin would only play AA, KK and AKs UTG, and he would always bring it in for the max raise"

"To make this clear as possible let's have a remaining player make a raise for sure. This allows the AA to reraise, taking Phat Mack's price away. See?"

"We have multiple exploitable strategies that *combine* to produce a dire situation."

I'm still blasting Zep, and saw them the last time they played Madison Square Garden in June 77 for $5 without a ticket (and have the button given out by WPLJ to prove it) I can appreciate your post for reasons other than the poker.

This looks like a hand where a rock who only raises AA, KK or AKs raises UTG and got a lot of maniac callers, then a guy who read HPFAP looks down on the button and sees 88 and re-raises for an all or nothing flop. Big pots, especially with maniacs on board, attract all or nothing flop callers.

The guy calling with 53o, figuring all the high cards are out, will win a few very big pots.

BTW - The $5 I paid went to the usher. I sat with a buddy on the stairs of the red seats (1st level above ground) and there were two guys to my left. While the lights were still on, one guy pukes in the others lap. Catches it all. They run out. We look, it's clean. Oh yeah. Best $5 bucks I ever spent.

Other than that, all I know is "I've got a woman I want to ball all day......"

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

Hey, that Tom Weideman dude is a pretty smart guy.

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

Great breadth!
/M

Re: On Lepore\'s Objection to Weideman\'s Argument
 

It is in the 21C ed, invovling two people playing junk cards because one knows the other one has 'nothing' and the other knows the first has less than his 'nothing'.

We all see it when we call down someone, holding Queen high, with a scary board and take out the missed draw. (or for that matter make the crying call because it -does- pay off one in twelve or whatever, that time it does pay off we look like a genius)

Anyway, what that all comes back to is one of those fundamental rules not to force your opponent to play better when you could otherwise have him playing stupid. Don't give him odds to chase, don't bluff into the calling station... all that stuff. He's not playing smarter, but the quality (EV) of his play is substantially higher because you're playing as if he's better than he is.

Of course it may not make a -EV player +EV, but anywhere he improves against you, you lose.

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

Forgive me if you're going over my head, but once the jargon level reaches a certain critical mass you risk people like me missing the point entirely.

This seems both simple and a little complicated. At the heart though, it goes like this:

Against one bad strategy you need a given strategy to beat it. Against two bad strategies you need either a completely different strategy to beat them both, or you need to wait for luck to sort things out.

In this case you want Cousin to lose his chips, because they're much easier to get from other people than from him. At a normal table there's a good strategy involving turning to the other players and (essentially) saying 'alright, he's ready to put a lot of his chips in the pot, let's gang up on him and even if we take the worst of it, he's only got 30 or 40% to take the pot.' This isn't a play where you're going to be winning money up front, heads up it's a gamble and with a couple callers you have the added ability to take the money from their stacks later.

So you add in the maniacs behind you and suddenly the worst part of the gamble, you putting in a pot-sized bet to induce callers and more, isn't necessary. From here on out Cousin is Not Your Problem. Now's where you're happy to be on his left, because you know that any hand he's not in (almost every hand), you can manipulate the other exploitable strategy at the table. The rest of the time you can't help is because Cousin, when he's in, has the best possible strategy against the maniacs (i.e. having the best hand and betting the heck out of it).

All you can really get out of this, and it's not a terrible lesson, is that you can fool all of the people some of the time... yeah, that thing.

Re: On Lepore\'s Objection to Weideman\'s Argument
 

Andy posted, "In the linked Weideman thread, Vince Lepore questioned how a stupid tactic could result in a more positive outcome for the stupidman than a smart tactic for a smartman. If a stupid tactic ends up +EV, how can it be stupid?"

Easily due to collusive entanglement or just dumb luck. Vince's objections hold no water. Probably he was riled up by the terminology. However, tournament players who intentionally adopt what appears to be bad strategy for overall strategic gain our not stupid at all, they are masters of Shania.

Andy Fox posted, "Would it be logical that, since smart players can end up with stupider results than stupid players would in the same situation, that stupid players can then also end up with smarter results than smart players would in the same situation? Or is this itself an illogical conclusion?"

Sredni won't pretend to understand that. Andy, very meshugina of you.

SV

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

Yes, the Led Zep lines were integrated in for sanity purposed (mine not everyone elses). Had to lower the Sredniness of the post because otherwise it becomes to complicated a subject.

Yeah, that sounds like a well invested $5.

[ QUOTE ]
Other than that, all I know is "I've got a woman I want to ball all day......"

[/ QUOTE ]

I'll leave it at that then and let you return to your task.

SV.

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

[ QUOTE ]
Good stuff, Sredni, as usual. Shades of the Prisoner's Dilemma, Abdul's fishes schooling together for unintentional mutual benefit, and Caro's A beats B and B beats C, but, somehow, C beats A (which struck me as one of Mike's typically long-winded ways of playing rock/paper/scissors).

[/ QUOTE ]

Not sure where Prisoner's Dilemma fits in, and Caro's A beats B thing is not quite the same idea, but Morton's Theorem is definitey a sub case of the general form of collusive entanglement.


[ QUOTE ]
One problem I have is getting from Mr. AA's cousin to " . . . impossible to beat over the long run." Because the exploitable strategies (or should I say, tactics) are not, in actuality, employed 100% of the time (e.g., andyfox's pump-or-dump occurs 100% of the time on paper but maybe only 85% of the time at Commerce) or the situation comes up so rarely (e.g., Mr. AA's cousin having A-A, K-K or A-K UTG and the exploiter being directly on his left).

[/ QUOTE ]


To demonstrate the general case I chose a very simple situation, improbable though it may be. IF you were really on a *Coilean* and wanted to do the work, you would have to approximate the times the maniacs raised, approximate the various percentages the "cousin" makes a devastating reraise (note from Phat Mack's point of view, he has to fold, so it won't matter if cousin is getting funky with something loosey goose like JJ [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img] )

So we are getting into an area that is very difficult to do at the table. At the table, as is often the case with poker strategy, we are frequently better off using baselines and general principles.

Remember a few things:

1)Just because there are mulitple bad strategies at play doesn't mean that this is necessarily the time to enter the pot.

2)Imagine if the other players were actually intelligently colluding against you. What wou their strategy look like? To what degree do the actually strategies match collusive ones albeit unintentional?

3)When playing, ask yourself, how do I make the collusive entanglement work for me?


SV

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

[ QUOTE ]
I don't know what pills you're on,

[/ QUOTE ]

Change that to Pilsner....

SV.

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

I [ QUOTE ]
don't think this is quite as paradoxical as it appears, and in fact conventional strategy addresses this type of situation when, for example, you 3-bet a strong player who you think might be raising to isolate a weak limper, or when you consider how the rest of the table is adjusting to your adjustments to a maniac.

[/ QUOTE ]

Since collusive entanglement to varying degrees is all over the place, conventional strategy does deal with it routinely and effectively.

But there is a fairly small class of cases where conventional strategies seem to fail. That's one area of research I am now doing.

Yes, with mulitple exploitable strategies one will inevitably be able to exploit it in the real world. Mainly because the highly entangled situations won't arise often enough to be concerned. Note in the Phat Mack hand, while that particular situation is hard to beat, the table itself would likely be highly profitable.

SV.

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

[ QUOTE ]
Against one bad strategy you need a given strategy to beat it. Against two bad strategies you need either a completely different strategy to beat them both, or you need to wait for luck to sort things out.

[/ QUOTE ]

Well, waiting might be an option, since in other hands the exploitable strategies shouldn't collude enough to harm you. But ferrets wouldnt wait for luck to sort it out. They'd go in there and sort em out.

And there are cases where the entanglement is such you are better off leaving the table. But they are quite rare in full games, less so in short games.


sv

Re: On Lepore\'s Objection to Weideman\'s Argument
 

[ QUOTE ]
Can a realman economy result from economic girliemen?

[/ QUOTE ]

Perhaps we could consult Van Damme and Steven Seagal.

SV.

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

"I'm usually the Planck's constant in such equations. Which is n-n-nobody's fault but mine."

Oh man, Monty, sweet post and especially the ending. I'm sitting here just home from practicing with Lee Jones' band because he invited me to play drums with them at an upcoming fundraiser for Kerry. I must admit this was the first gig I ever had where the first interview question was "Who are you voting for?"

I was all over Sredni's post and thinking I had something to say in reply, and you totally derailed me now by planting "m-m-m-m-monkey on my back back back back" in my brain, supplanting, so to speak, what had been on replay there, leftover from practice, some bluegrass tune I think. I forget.

Thanks bye.

Tommy

Re: On Lepore\'s Objection to Weideman\'s Argument
 

[ QUOTE ]
(or for that matter make the crying call because it -does- pay off one in twelve or whatever, that time it does pay off we look like a genius)

[/ QUOTE ]

This is over the hills and far away but I still don't get it with the calling-at-the-same-rate-that-the-guy-bluffs as being some achievement or something. How does that make money exactly? The way I see it is, If, in a particular river situation, I think my opponent will bluff one time in ten, then my goal is to call the one time I have him beat, and fold the other nine.



Tommy

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

Great concert story, taking me back.

Here's a so's-you-know:

""I've got a woman I want to ball all day......"

Is actually, "I got a woman, [she] wants to ball a day."

(or "she wanna" and other random forms.)

It's the same gal who won't be true.

yeah no yeah no yeah no

No wonder he asked Hey what can I do?

This time Robert wasn't orgasming during the song, as your version might suggest. But he was complaining about orgasms so it still counted.

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

supplanting, so to speak


Heh. Pretty sweet, yourself.

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

To make this clear as possible let's have a remaining player make a raise for sure. This allows the AA to reraise, taking Phat Mack's price away. See?

Of course, this happens all the time. And then you have some more information: the remaining player is a fool, or he has made a remarkable read and believes that he can get Cousin to lay KK down. Valuable things to know, but they may kill the play against Cousin for the forseeable future.

When the smooth-call play is made against Cousin, it may bring in a string of callers who know exactly what's going on, it may provoke a play-foiling raise, but it may bring in players who are, regretably for their bankrolls, nothing more than calling stations. So the collusive entanglement of the unwitting can fall either way. (To digress a bit from the theory, there are set plays and observations that can be made when joining a new table. One is to smooth-call the rock and observe the results, another is to re-raise the maniac and again observe the results. Very enlightening. A few years ago, ray zee made a post something like, "here's the secret to poker. look left before you bet." Many readers may have thought he was jesting.)

To take your example, in short-handed limit there are a lot of collusive entaglements that seem to baffle me. If I keep thinking about certain games, a couple of years later, when falling asleep or driving or falling asleep driving, I'll have one of those 'Aha!' moments and suddenly realize a useful strategy that could have been employed. Then it is certain that I will never encounter a similar situation again. My theory of short-handed play is to get lucky or leave.

This all (sorta) relates to Tom's RGP post. I believe that if you analyze the idiotic plays of idiotic players, you may not find intentional brilliance, but you may well find "found" brilliance, and brilliance that may be intentionally replicated for our own benefit.

To risk correction from Mr. Angelo, "It's been a long time since I walked in the moonlight." IV: My favorite.

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

[ QUOTE ]
Using simulations and thought experiments as well as empirical data, it has become quite clear to me that there are sometimes situation in shorthanded *limit* play where if certain combinations of patterns continue to play out, it is difficult if not impossible to beat over the long run. In spite of the fact the opponents seem to have flawed strategies.


[/ QUOTE ]

Full games can also expand into this realm. But this is nothing new, right?

This is why the most important thing about poker is not to play.


Much speech leads inevitably to silence. Better to hold fast to the void. - Lao Tzu


The Myriad Creatures

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

"Using simulations and thought experiments as well as empirical data, it has become quite clear to me that there are sometimes situation in shorthanded *limit* play where if certain combinations of patterns continue to play out, it is difficult if not impossible to beat over the long run. In spite of the fact the opponents seem to have flawed strategies."

This is either way over my head, or wrong, or applies only online.



Tommy

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

Great post Sredni!

I remember your Shania post and feel that the concept it discussed was explored more fully in John Vorhaus' book 'Killer Poker'.

Along those same lines, anyone playing with an exploitable strategy can be dominated and controlled profitably. Even when the exploitable strategies are combined to make them more difficult to beat, a new approach may be necessary, but that does not make it impossible to win.

(Unless real collusion is going on, because the situation you describe with Cousin will repeat itself far too often for you to showdown enough winners.)

In Cousin's case, why can't this situation be exploited by folding and letting the maniac outdraw him? Cousin will play his blinds far too tightly anyway and we can get the chips from Cousin's stack when the maniac(s) get lucky.

Why would you want to enter a pot, knowing that you are taking the worst of it, without being able to improve your image to the degree that you will be able to influence Cousin's play?

I understand that you are giving up equity PF to get a huge pot if you hit, but that might not happen either. If Cousin misses the flop completely, he may go into check-call, or even check-fold on a scary board leaving you with 3-4BB profit for all of your failed starts against him and maniac. If Cousin plays well post flop, you will still lose money even without the maniac present.

I'm just rambling now, sorry. I think it's past my bedtime.

Thanks again for another great post.

Dov

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

[ QUOTE ]
This is either way over my head, or wrong, or applies only online.


[/ QUOTE ]

None of the above [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img] Thanks for posting, brief and to the point. Was hoping the Led Zep lines would draw you out of your lair.

I'll try to show the general case logically.

How about we see if we can agree on something?

In a four player game (you and three opponents), the three somewhat skillful opponents are allowed to collude against you. You agree to this for experimentation purposes.

Do you think you can make money in this game? And if the answer is "it depends on the skill level of the opponents".

Would you agree that there would come a skill level where against three opponents that:

you could have a positive expectation when they were playing fairly (not colluding), but would not have a positive one when they were colluding?


And if you agree to that then:

Do you think that there is some probability that opponents strategies could inadvertantly mimic those collusion ones above? Especially when you consider that opponents who tend to be agressive are much more likely to produce "collusive entanglement" situations?


Or have I missed your point?

PS In the Phat Mack hand, while this is what I term collusive entanglement, even there, its beatable. AA would show a profit.

PPS The situation that Monty described (three betting a maniac) is not really what I would consider to be collusive entanglement.

SV.

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

I love this line, [ QUOTE ]
My theory of short-handed play is to get lucky or leave.

[/ QUOTE ]

Sredni thanks you for your contributions. Told ya I would get back to that Shania thread [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]

SV.

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

Zeno writes, 'Full games can also expand into this realm. But this is nothing new, right?"

I really don't think published conventional strategy addresses collusive entanglement completely. Though most good to great players intuitively and strategically know how to manipulate it to their advantage.


[ QUOTE ]
This is why the most important thing about poker is not to play.


[/ QUOTE ]

Which is more or less what I do more often than not.

SV.

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

[ QUOTE ]
I remember your Shania post and feel that the concept it discussed was explored more fully in John Vorhaus' book 'Killer Poker'.

[/ QUOTE ]

The main reason for the Shania post was because I thought it was fun. Heard many good things about the Vorhaus book (Tommy Angelo I think recommends it) but haven't read it yet. I've read so much poker theory/twoplustwo, etc that I rarely find anything new to me.

[ QUOTE ]
(Unless real collusion is going on, because the situation you describe with Cousin will repeat itself far too often for you to showdown enough winners.)

[/ QUOTE ]

See my post to Mr Angelo, if you would like to comment on that.


Thanks,

SV.

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

Sredni, I think the concept you've laid out here is fantastic, fun, and useful.

"How about we see if we can agree on something?"

And here I thought we had already agreed to agree on everything.


"In a four player game (you and three opponents), the three somewhat skillful opponents are allowed to collude against you. You agree to this for experimentation purposes.Do you think you can make money in this game?"


It depends on how we define "collude." I believe item 2 is the one we're after.

1) If they are colluding by sharing a bankroll, and I know they are sharing a bankroll, and they know that I know, then I think my edge or disadvantage would be exactly the same as if they were all on their own money, minus whatever stabilizing effect that being diversified might have on any of them individually.

2) If again their only collusion is bankroll sharing, but I do not know they are sharing, then I would expect to lose against "somewhat skillful" opponents, the same opponents who, without the collusion, I would expect to beat.

3) If they share a bankroll, and they all know one another's hole cards, and I know they are signaling, then I'd lose a lot.

4) Same as item 3, except that I do not know they are signaling, then I'd lose a lot, a lot faster.


"And if the answer is "it depends on the skill level of the opponents" Would you agree that there would come a skill level where against three opponents that you could have a positive expectation when they were playing fairly (not colluding), but would not have a positive one when they were colluding?"


Yes! Yes! I agree! I always did! I always will! See item 2!


"And if you agree to that then:

Do you think that there is some probability that opponents strategies could inadvertently mimic those collusion ones above?"


I'd say it's past probable and into inevitable.


"Especially when you consider that opponents who tend to be aggressive are much more likely to produce "collusive entanglement" situations? Or have I missed your point?"


I'm not all too sure I had a point. What got me (and has me) financially interested is what you said about short-handed.

I'm starting to see two separate topics here. One is the definition of, and then evidence of, collusive entanglement. On that stuff we agree for sure. It exists, and it has been defined, and it's a nifty concept.

Where collusive entanglement gets hazier in my understanding-so-far is in the application. Tell me again about the part about shorthanded. And is there any distinction that needs to be made between B&M and online?

Also, in thinking of your questions above, is there a semantic element of confusion here, over the word collusive? In collusive entanglement, the entangled players gain some edge merely by being entangled. But in collusive cheating, their edge still depends on how they utilize their entanglement. Does that distinction help things along, or does it reveal my shallowness of understanding of CE?

Good stuff SV,



Tommy

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

My experience is that collusion is most often intentional. Not that players are cheating by sharing information or bankroll; but in the sense of making actions based on your outspoken expectation of other players actions.

For example, is there is a mildly TAG twoplustwo reader playing at a family game with some semi-loose weak amateurs. After watching him take away their money for a while, they decide (above table) to start being looser and more aggressive when he is in the pot. Players will call even though they don't have pot odds because they expect the other amateurs to call as well.

-Magnus

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

[ QUOTE ]
Do you think that there is some probability that opponents strategies could inadvertantly mimic those collusion ones above? Especially when you consider that opponents who tend to be agressive are much more likely to produce "collusive entanglement" situations?

[/ QUOTE ]

Her's a situation I run into in home games all the time. (10-20 with a half kill and 15-30):

2 people who know each other well get into a raising war on on the flop, and after everyone else drops out, they just check it down the rest of the way. If I am in the hand, they will bet the turn and river.

I no longer play in these games, even though I know they are just being nice to each other and not splitting up the money later. The problem is that it feels so much like collusion, that I get taken off my game. This is what makes the game unbeatable for me. It is otherwise a good game with terrible players.

[ QUOTE ]
PS In the Phat Mack hand, while this is what I term collusive entanglement, even there, its beatable. AA would show a profit.

[/ QUOTE ]

It is interesting, but the more I think about it, the more it seems to me that your concept of 'collusive entanlement' is actually one of the main reasons why good players win. For example:

Let's say that in a given hand if you want to prtoect your hand, you will need to c/r the flop. In order to accomplish this, someone else will have to bet after you check, preferably the player on your immediate right. If this player bets, he has actually helped you to beat the field by cutting everyones odds for their draws when you make it 2 bets back to them. This is something you couldn't do by yourself, and without his assistance you would lose this pot quite often, as well as lose a number of bluffing/semibluffing opportunities.

In conclusion, it seems like 'collusive entanglement' cuts both ways. If you can employ the help of the table, you are essentially getting them entangled with you, but if not, you will be entangled with them. The difference lies in the control of the entanglement. If you can control it, you'll win. If you can't, you need to get lucky to win.

I hope this made sense to someone else.

Dov

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

Great post and very important subject.

Collusive entanglement happens IMO a lot in shorthanded play. An example:

Shorthanded and button open-raises. Button is on the weak-tightish side. Now, for the SB a good strategy can be to play on the loose side and let him lay down postflop. So he can 3-bet a wide range. But if BB is a very loose player who will defend his blind a lot a problem arises. BB basically makes a bad move by calling 2 cold with trash hands, but by doing so he gives the weak-tight button an advantage and you, in the SB, a tremendous disadvantage. Now his "stupid" play caused your initially maximizing strategy to be exploited by buttons weak/tight strategy! (you're now in a 3-handed pot, which is kinda protected by loose BB, so a tightish strategy is probably preferred)

IMO is collusive entanglement strongly related to the use a maximizing strategies, which, in itself, are exploitable as well. In a full game, standard play approaches a more optimal startegy and therefore is less vulberable to be exploited by a set of entangled strategies. In shorthanded, a maximizing approach is often far more rewarding, so there we see a vulnerability to collusive entanglement.

The example I gave is hard to overcome IMO. You probably have to play tighter, but by doing so you give up a lot, especially if it's 3 handed and blinds come around fast.

Thanks for the post...I haven't thought enough about this subject and your post is making me do so (even with this terrible hangover I'm having ;-) There's a lot more to it, but I really have to sit braindead on the couch now and watch some Southpark.

Regards

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

In a full game, standard play approaches a more optimal startegy and therefore is less vulberable to be exploited by a set of entangled strategies.

Why would this be so? It seems that any time we step outside the realm of heads-up poker, we are potentially entangled. Wouldn't a full game present more possible entanglements? Or does a larger table offer more self-policing peer pressure that keeps entanglement at bay?

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

2) If again their only collusion is bankroll sharing, but I do not know they are sharing, then I would expect to lose against "somewhat skillful" opponents, the same opponents who, without the collusion, I would expect to beat.

Wow. Are you saying that you would go from winner to loser if the same "somewhat skillful" opponents secretly started sharing their bankroll? That and nothing else? Not to kidnap a thread, but why?

Also, in thinking of your questions above, is there a semantic element of confusion here, over the word collusive? In collusive entanglement, the entangled players gain some edge merely by being entangled. But in collusive cheating, their edge still depends on how they utilize their entanglement.

It could be merely a matter of intent. But collusive entaglement, as I understand it, has the added feature of being able to change the composition and nature of the "colluding team" every time the action moves. This protean nature makes it harder to identify and deal with.

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

And does a tight full game populated with nits, where the fight is usually in later positions and blind play, become, in essence, a short handed game with all the attendant collusive entanglements?

Or for that matter in any type of game where circumstances and situations always ebb and flow about some mean or, on occasion, suddenly ratchet up or down depending on the illogical whims and psychological predilections and of some players.

If nine-handed and the first four or five players fold then you are in a short-handed game – yes, or no.

If two maniacs populate a full game, with some skilled players trying isolation plays do collusive entanglements change not just outcome but the very nature of strategies employed?

Is it then best not to play poker and instead go fishing?

All rhetorical questions really.

-Zeno

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

Yes, I stand corrected. What I said isn't necesarrilly true, but my initial thought was that a maximizing strategy is so sensitive to a certain players strategy that a slight shift in circumstances can easily make the maximizing strategy useless and due to this sensitivity I guessed that the maximizing strategy is more vulnerable to entanglement. I can't back this up though.

Thanks for your post, I was way too quick in drawing conclusions. This subject really is fascinating.

Regards

Re: Collusive Entanglement
 

"Which is more or less what I do more often than not."

One of my favorite sentences. Reminds me of the beginning of a response I got from one of my employees when I asked why a certain product was not inspected more thoroughly. She began:

Well, . . . . actually, . . . . probably, . . . ., maybe, . . ."