[Mergualdo]

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Because chipEV != $EV, amongst many other reasons.


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I've thought about this a fair bit and have a hunch that deviations of chipEV from $EV are rare and probably not that important in the grand scheme of things. Still, I'd love to know the shape of the chip EV/$EV curve--where are the nonlinearities, etc.
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In my initial formulation, the strategy remains fixed for the tournament - that's just currently a constraint of the strategy.

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Tsk tsk I do not approve.

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If you can think of a good way to approach it, I'm certainly interested in it.

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I think you have to work backwards from a static end point. Say, the opponent is down to his last chip. No, that's not static because to solve the one-chip problem you have to know what to do in the two-chip problem in case he doubles up. So it is still dynamic, but finite at least. So what you have to do is come up with strategies for each of the possible chip combinations and then figure out how to vary them so that they eventually converge. I.e., given the one-chip strategy, the two-chip action is optimal, and given the two-chips strategy, the one-chip strategy is optimal, and so on and so forth for every possible combination. Because it is finite (chips are integers) you could conceivably do it, but man would probably walk on Mars before the computation was complete. Still, it would be interesting to look how the equlibrium strategy changes conditional on the dead money and relative chip count. Probably the optimal strategy isn't very much less maniacal than the maniac strategy.

It is moments like this that I am glad I have very limited programming skills because I would have wasted a lot of time on this kind of stuff.

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If you remember my first set of simulations that you dismissed [img]/images/graemlins/wink.gif[/img],


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That must have been a different Mergualdo. This is the first I've ever posted here.

Good luck