Revising plans for Iraqi elections

[sam h]

Predictably, prominent people in Iraq are criticizing the way we plan to go about holding elections. Nobody seems to understand the convoluted caucus system we've proposed, and many Iraqis are (rightly) concerned that it will be manipulated. But of course, a more preferable direct democracy approach will be difficult to implement by June 30 since it requires voting rolls and an accurate census to make sure people don't vote twice or that dead people don't cast ballots, Louisiana style. But Bush won't budge on pushing back the date, because he needs the election to be conducted and a buffer period afterwards before our own election that fall. So what we may be looking at is a marginally undemocratic election based on caucusus controlled by US-vetted organizers that will be received with great fanfare in America but will be considered illegitimate in Iraq by many people. Great.

If we really want to make things work in Iraq, we need to take the time to do things right. The Bush people say that's still very possible with the June 30th date. Every administration prediction concerning the amount of time necessary to get a given task satisfactorily accomplished has proven far wrong thus far in the post-war period. But there doesn't seem to be much wiggle room with the election. So it will be interesting to see how it turns out.

Bonus question: What is to explain the undeniable pattern of huge discrepencies between administration predictions (conducted pre-war, immediately afterwards, during the late summer, etc) about timetables and cost estimates for the post-war/reconstruction period and the reality that has unfolded? Deceit or incompetence? Assign relative percentages to each causal factor.

(My reply: 25% deceit, 75% incompetence.)

[MMMMMM]

"Bonus question: What is to explain the undeniable pattern of huge discrepencies between administration predictions (conducted pre-war, immediately afterwards, during the late summer, etc) about timetables and cost estimates for the post-war/reconstruction period and the reality that has unfolded? Deceit or incompetence? Assign relative percentages to each causal factor.

(My reply: 25% deceit, 75% incompetence.)"

Conceptual error: By assigning 100% total to those two factors, you are presuming that there is no inherent unpredictability built into forecasting in this scenario. You did not allocate a percentage for the inherent unpredictability involved in forecasting for such a complex and variable model.

My first guess is that you should allocate around 50% for inherent unpredictability due to the complexity and messiness of the situation, then possibly allocate your remaining 1:3 ratio between the two factors you mentioned. Oh and let's not forget that a great many projects of all types exceed initial cost and time estimates, whether it be in public sector or private. The larger the project the more likely it is to exceed initial estimates, as a general rule. So try working that into the model as well, if you can.

Regarding Iraqi elections: I do think it important that the necessary time be taken to do it right.

[sam h]

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Conceptual error: By assigning 100% total to those two factors, you are presuming that there is no inherent unpredictability built into forecasting in this scenario. You did not allocate a percentage for the inherent unpredictability involved in forecasting for such a complex and variable model.

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Ok, so the comment was made with tongue firmly in cheek. But I think 50% is a bit high for unpredictability. The US government had great resources to marshall in terms of people with knowledge of Iraq and experience with nation-building endeavors. The simple fact of the matter is that they chose to ignore any advice that didn't paint a rosy picture of the situation. While in general Iraq/Vietnam analogies are overused, this is one case where it is quite proper. Unpredictability, while part of the scenario here, can only be understood in terms of how good you are at predicting things and how forthright you are about those predictions.

Seriously, just go back and review the comments made last spring about the post-war - people greeting us with flowers, Iraqis embracing Chalabi as a leader, us being able to build institutions like a taxation system in a year or so - then look at how things have shaken out. You can't just shrug your shoulders and chalk most of that up to the innate unpredictability in the situation.

[MMMMMM]

Most of the Iraqi population is indeed on our side (to varying degrees), and some did greet us with flowers. What we didn't foreseee was the degree of Baathist resistance allied with Islamist terrorim after the war ended.

[sam h]

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Most of the Iraqi population is indeed on our side (to varying degrees), and some did greet us with flowers. What we didn't foreseee was the degree of Baathist resistance allied with Islamist terrorim after the war ended.

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While we certainly didn't forsee (or foresaw and didn't mention for reasons of expediency) the degree of Baathist resistance, we also seem to whiffed on a few other key issues.

1) Basic democratic and market institutions. You cannot just quickly "build" these things and expect them to work. How do you conduct elections without a census? How do you tax people without information about what they own? How do you organize an economy when five different currencies are circulating? How do you train and install a security force that will not just abuse its power?

2) General illegitimacy of the occupation. While much of the Iraqi population is probably "on our side" as you say, it is clear that a large portion are not, and that this group is not comprised solely of ex-Baathists and Islamic terrorists. Why would somebody like Ayatollah Sistani refuse to meet with Bremer? Because he realizes its not a good move to endorse the occupation when so many of his followers/constituents, just average Shiite Iraqis not rabid terrorists, don't have very charitable feelings about it.

[adios]

"Seriously, just go back and review the comments made last spring about the post-war - people greeting us with flowers, Iraqis embracing Chalabi as a leader, us being able to build institutions like a taxation system in a year or so - then look at how things have shaken out."

Can you be more specific? Many on this forum didn't anticipate an easy transition and I would think that very few really expected an easy transition. The fact of the matter is that there still is a gigantic risk that the US efforts in Iraq will turn out to be a dismal failure. Transitioning Iraq to a market driven, free enterprise, and democratic society is a monumental task. I've seen where the plan now is to have the Iraqi oil industry nationalized which I think is probably the right decision. But as far as I know their isn't a constitution yet. Without private property laws and the legal infrastructure to support such laws, free enterprise will not be viable in Iraq IMO. Establishing a legal tradition in Iraq based on a non existent constitution seems to be years away if not decades away from being established, not months away.

[MMMMMM]

Agreed. Just a few of the many reasons it is a very complex scenario. I personally have great doubts aboutIraqi elections taking place any time this year.

[sam h]

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Can you be more specific? Many on this forum didn't anticipate an easy transition and I would think that very few really expected an easy transition.

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When I referred to "comments," I meant those coming from the administration not the board. I didn't discover this other topics forum until about a month ago, so I'm not sure what the tenor of debate here was back then.

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Without private property laws and the legal infrastructure to support such laws, free enterprise will not be viable in Iraq IMO. Establishing a legal tradition in Iraq based on a non existent constitution seems to be years away if not decades away from being established, not months away.


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You are exactly right, and I think decades is probably the right unit of measurement here. We have a tendency to look at the institutions that form of the core of our society and think that we can just transport them over there. Unfortunately, it's not so easy and the history of most post-colonial development enterprises in the 20th century and post-communist projects in the last fifteen years should be a huge warning. The fact that Iraq itself is really somewhat of an arbitrary state, a product of the British colonial legacy composed of diverse ethnic groups that don't necessarily get along, makes this even more complicated and precarious.

[adios]

"I meant those coming from the administration not the board."

I realize that but I can't remember to be honest the administration stating that the transition would be easy and at least if I had observed these observations I would have pointed them out as being probably too optimistic.

"The fact that Iraq itself is really somewhat of an arbitrary state, a product of the British colonial legacy composed of diverse ethnic groups that don't necessarily get along, makes this even more complicated and precarious."

I've seen many quotes from Iraqis including Chalibi (spelling?) that this is not nearly the problem that many in the West think it is. Seems like it would be a problem to me but time will tell.

[Chris Alger]

I believe the "unexpected" problems arose because Rumsfeld wanted to spend less than other military planners felt necessary, and because his staff at the Pentagon was overly enamored of Chalabi's faction.

Official words concerning the transfer of power are mostly deceitful because the presumption they're built on is absurd. U.S. policy in Iraq purports to be an attempt to surrender power to Iraqis that represent indigenous constituencies more than they represent the U.S. and its constituents. That event might ultimately result, but not because the U.S. wills it. Although many war defenders apparently believe that we did this in Germany and Japan and that it amounts to template for U.S. intervention, there's virtually no historical precedent for the altruistic surrender of power when retaining control serves significant interests cost effectively (and even this requirement is sometimes ignored for long periods, as in Vietnam). A free and democratic Iraq might want, say, protectionist trade policies, nationalized oil, friendly relations with Iran, no U.S. military presence, or be hostile to Israel. (Or put Rumsfeld and George Schultz on trial for helping keep Saddam around). None of these options are viable to U.S. planners. U.S. policy is geared toward building pro-U.S. institutions and policies rather than giving back the farm.

The U.S. desire to retain power is the basic reason for the U.S.'s objections to nationwide elections (which it might have to accept anyway). The purported reasons, after all, are pretty weak. The absence of a recent census, the possibility of fraud, the lack of party structures and so forth are partly the result of U.S. policy and hardly obstacles to holding a reasonably democratic election. They haven't before been obstacles in countries (like El Salvador, Vietnam and Nicaragua) where we hailed election results as triumphs of democracy, after our guys won.

As far as the technical mechanisms for "transferring power," I doubt that they make much difference in the long run. The U.S. was able to engineer the election of pro-U.S. forces in several countries by all sorts of methods, most significantly making the electorate understand that if they want things to get better, our guy (or someone on our short list) better prevail. In Iraq, at least so far, I doubt that many are willing to risk jeopardizing the availability of reconstruction money, debt relief and other aid. Aside from the benefits of pleasing the U.S., there's also the "virtual parliament" of foreign capital investment and the international institutions like the IMF that facilitate it. All of these need to kept happy if Iraqis, especially the relatively affluent and elite, are to avoid losing ground. Iraq will therefore be kept under the American thumb for many decades, although through nominally local actors, regardless of what sort of country most Iraqis really want.

[sam h]

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The absence of a recent census, the possibility of fraud, the lack of party structures and so forth are partly the result of U.S. policy and hardly obstacles to holding a reasonably democratic election. They haven't before been obstacles in countries (like El Salvador, Vietnam and Nicaragua) where we hailed election results as triumphs of democracy, after our guys won.


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I don't know much about the Vietnamese case, but the El Salvador and Nicaragua comparisions are not very good. In both instances, there was both much more institutional infrastructure, a fairly well established set of parties, and more time allotted.

Why is it material to this issue that the absence of a census may or may not be partly a result of US policy?

The issue is not nationwide elections, it's whether they'll be directly democratic or caucus-based. Of course, the US wants to structure things to increase the likelihood of a market-oriented, secular, pro-American, government emerging. And the caucus system does open up many possibilities for manipulation, which is why many Iraqis are objecting to it. But the basic fact of the matter is that a direct democracy election is probably not all that viable by the June 30th date.

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The U.S. was able to engineer the election of pro-U.S. forces in several countries by all sorts of methods, most significantly making the electorate understand that if they want things to get better, our guy (or someone on our short list) better prevail.

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I don't know to which countries you are referring. But, as far as the Latin American cases you mentioned go, this is a very reductionist view of why right of center parties have managed to regain and retain power in post-conflict situations.

[Chris Alger]

In El Salvador and Vietnam, large parts of the country were outside the control of the government staging the elections. Voting was in El Salvador was mandatory were it was available, and the lack of a stamp on a voter identity cards could be used as evidence of sympathy for the rebels, who boycotted the election. In Nicaragua, the U.S. spent lavish amounts to promote its favored candidates and emphasized that the terrorist war we were directing would not end unless Chamorro won. In all cases, the U.S. and the American media hailed the results as democratic.

The absence of a census isn't a result of U.S. policy but the "time allotted" certainly is. Note that the U.S. doesn't want to even negotiate election timing with the Shii'tes. As for the census, this argument smells funny. Is there no accounting at all about who lives in this former police state? Why wouldn't a reasonably good census be necessary for national caucuses?

"Of course, the US wants to structure things to increase the likelihood of a market-oriented, secular, pro-American, government emerging."

Which is why the talk about "liberating" Iraq and "transferring" power to Iraqis is misleading. After all, the degree of influence the U.S. will exercise over Iraqi "democracy" would amount to outrageous, anti-democratic interference by any foreign power that attempted to do the same here (or, to take a more realistic example, if Iran had defeated Iraq and tried to transfer power in a similar fashion. The notion of it being democratic instead of narrowly controlled to reflect Iranian interests would be ridiculed throughout the U.S. media). I would be skeptical about the emphasis on secularism. The U.S. has no problem with apolitical religious fanatacism in the Muslim world and has generally supported it. It's only when Islamicism endangers U.S. interests that it becomes a problem.

I'm not referring to the post-conflict situations, but to the elections held during the conflicts themselves. The cases I know of are Vietnam, El Salvador and Nicaragua. For a fuller account see Herman's "Demonstration Elections." Also, U.S. campaign support was critical to several of Yeltsin's elections.

[sam h]

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Voting was in El Salvador was mandatory were it was available, and the lack of a stamp on a voter identity cards could be used as evidence of sympathy for the rebels, who boycotted the election.

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We're talking about different elections. The 1991 election was not a big deal for, as you noted, the "rebels" (FMLN) didnt participate, and the armed conflict was still going on. El Salvador had conducted this type of election before. The 1994 election was the one heralded as a signifier of real democratization by most observers and the one that was really latched on to by the US media. And while substantial amounts of fraud may still have occurred, it was conducted in an institutional context far, far different than Iraq, which was my point.

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In Nicaragua, the U.S. spent lavish amounts to promote its favored candidates and emphasized that the terrorist war we were directing would not end unless Chamorro won.

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We did piss a lot of money into Nicaragua through illegal, covert means. Despicable, but irrelevant to the point at hand. The election was conducted under the auspices of the FSLN government (who opted to move it up 9 months from its original date for strategic reasons) and international observers. Two major legitimate candidates, backed by parties with signficant institutional infrastructure, contested the election. There was a reasonable voter role, though certainly not one beyond manipulation.

In both cases, the context was simply quite different than the situation unfolding in Iraq. Is the American government hypocritcal when it comes to democratization? Of course, and deeply so. But you can't just latch on to American involvement and then start comparing cases willy-nilly. Domestic politics, especially political institutions and infrastructure, matter a great deal.

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The absence of a census isn't a result of U.S. policy but the "time allotted" certainly is. Note that the U.S. doesn't want to even negotiate election timing with the Shii'tes. As for the census, this argument smells funny. Is there no accounting at all about who lives in this former police state? Why wouldn't a reasonably good census be necessary for national caucuses?

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I agree the time allotted stinks. But while it might be convenient for the administration, I think its much more a product of the timing of our elections than their desire to push through an undemocratic vote as soon as possible. I think most people agree that while some kind of voter role is necessary for a caucus, its deficiencies pose less of a threat, since the process is more public. That doesn't mean a caucus is more fair or less subject to manipulation in other ways - perhaps a caucus-based system favors US indirect fraud, while a direct democracy election favors direct cheating by everybody.

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Also, U.S. campaign support was critical to several of Yeltsin's elections.


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Yeah, but not nearly as much as Russian oligarch campaign support.