Can we have knowledge of the future?

Back on topic of knowledge, I have another interesting question. Can we have knowledge of the future?

[daryn]

no

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no

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I would have to agree, but then someone told me "Don't you know that you're going to die in the future?"

[Piers]

Yes depeinding on how your define your terms.

[daryn]

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no

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I would have to agree, but then someone told me "Don't you know that you're going to die in the future?"

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that's different.. that's more like a definition of life. assuming the universe exists for a while, yeah we will all die. also you can say other meaningless future predictions like:

tomorrow, f will still be equal to m*a (most of the time)

You can have reasonable expectation based on previous experience/precedent, and on recognition of causal sequence. We rely on anticipating the future every day - we park our car and assume it won't transmogrify into an elephant while we're gone. We use a combination of past experience and logical inference to predict that the sun will rise, that we will die etc.

This mightn't be knowledge strictly speaking, but it's predictive value is so high it functions pretty much as well as knowledge would. All these predictions exist on a continuum, the further down you go the less useful the prediction - 'I'm going to live until the end of this week' ranking higher than 'my cat will learn to play the violin'.

[Trantor]

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Back on topic of knowledge, I have another interesting question. Can we have knowledge of the future?

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If we, as macroscopic entities, could then this would prove general Relativity, is not true theory. As there is no evidence that GR is incorrect I would say the answer is "no".

[maurile]

Knowledge = justified true belief.

If you accept inductive reasoning as being justified, then yes, we can have knowlege of the future.

If you accept only deductive reasoning as being justified, then we cannot have knowledge of the future.

[Bork]

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If you accept only deductive reasoning as being justified, then we cannot have knowledge of the future.

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Tomorrow, nothing will exist which is both red all over, and green all over.

This is a conclusion I arrived at through deductive means.
I know it to be true. Its about the future.

So to answer the OP's question, ya we can have knowledge about the future.

[Scotch78]

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Can we have knowledge of the future?

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The problem with knowledge of the future is that it tends to be wrong a lot, kind of like science and memory. Oh, [censored]! Is that a black hole?

Scott

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If you accept only deductive reasoning as being justified, then we cannot have knowledge of the future.

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Tomorrow, nothing will exist which is both red all over, and green all over.

This is a conclusion I arrived at through deductive means.
I know it to be true. Its about the future.

So to answer the OP's question, ya we can have knowledge about the future.

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I don't believe that knowledge of the future qualifies under the guidelines of justified true belief.

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You can have reasonable expectation based on previous experience/precedent, and on recognition of causal sequence. We rely on anticipating the future every day - we park our car and assume it won't transmogrify into an elephant while we're gone. We use a combination of past experience and logical inference to predict that the sun will rise, that we will die etc.

This mightn't be knowledge strictly speaking, but it's predictive value is so high it functions pretty much as well as knowledge would. All these predictions exist on a continuum, the further down you go the less useful the prediction - 'I'm going to live until the end of this week' ranking higher than 'my cat will learn to play the violin'.

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You're talking of induction. The sun rose yesterday and the day before that so I believe it will rise tomorrow. Many would argue that induction is not knowledge at all. There is no reasoning behind induction. Of course, simplicity is inductions best ally.

[Bork]

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I don't believe that knowledge of the future qualifies under the guidelines of justified true belief.

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I just gave you an example.
Tomorrow, nothing will exist which is both red all over, and green all over.


I do believe it. Do you think it isn't true or that my belief isn't justified. Please explain.

Here is another one: A week from today there will be no squirrel which is fatter than itself.

[chezlaw]

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I don't believe that knowledge of the future qualifies under the guidelines of justified true belief.

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I just gave you an example.
Tomorrow, nothing will exist which is both red all over, and green all over.


I do believe it. Do you think it isn't true or that my belief isn't justified. Please explain.

Here is another one: A week from today there will be no squirrel which is fatter than itself.

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I think we usually accept that knowledge of tautologies is always possible. Not sure how relevent they are to the problem of knowledge and its a moot point as to whether they are about anything.

chez

[Bork]

Neither of my examples are logical tautologies.

They are necessarily true, but not by virtue of their logical form.

The problem that was posed was whether we can know anything about the future. The answer is yes because we can deduce necessary truths. Some of which are tautologies( my examples are not). Even if they were they still count as knowledge about the future, useful or not.

Now if he was asking whether we can know which possible future events will occur then the answer is also yes. Unless you are some kind of uber old fashion skeptic who thinks no inductive support can justify a belief. This person would also be commited to say we arent justified in believing that we have hands, or that we know our parent's names, or that physical objects exist, etc.

[peritonlogon]

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Neither of my examples are logical tautologies.

They are necessarily true, but not by virtue of their logical form.


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Actually what you said is true precisely because of it's logical form... Even if you did not write it down, or elucidate it.

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Tomorrow, nothing will exist which is both red all over, and green all over.

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If we can all except this proposition.

All logical forms that are true today are true any other day.

"Tomorrow, nothing will exist which is both red all over, and green all over"

Is true because of this identity


All-red-all over things are red-all-over things

and its converse

All non red-all over-things are non red all over things.

and this proposition.

A green all over thing is a non red-all-over thing.

Since, principle of non contradiction "A thing can not both be and not be in the same respect at the same time"

Which means, what you said is just a specific instance of the principle of non-contradiction, which is a rule of logic that is also provable by tautology.

[Bork]

Nothing that is red all over is green all over.

Its logical form is: Something that has property X cannot have property Y.

You can make substitutions which make this true and which make it false.
It is NOT true because of its form. It is not a logical tautology.

You seem to be confused about what logical form is so I will provide you with a couple links.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-form/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/

The above is completely tangential to the OP's question. The fact remains if you only accept deductive justification for knowledge then you better be an almost absolute epistemological skeptic. Almost every belief we form is the result of induction.

[Bork]

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All logical forms that are true today are true any other day.

"Tomorrow, nothing will exist which is both red all over, and green all over"

Is true because of this identity


All-red-all over things are red-all-over things

and its converse

All non red-all over-things are non red all over things.

and this proposition.

A green all over thing is a non red-all-over thing.

Since, principle of non contradiction "A thing can not both be and not be in the same respect at the same time"

Which means, what you said is just a specific instance of the principle of non-contradiction, which is a rule of logic that is also provable by tautology.

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One more point.
Just because you used a tautology (you used more than one btw) in your 'proof' of my statement it does not follow that my statement itself is a a tautology or an instance of the the tautology that you invoked in the proof.

[chezlaw]

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Neither of my examples are logical tautologies.

They are necessarily true, but not by virtue of their logical form.

The problem that was posed was whether we can know anything about the future. The answer is yes because we can deduce necessary truths. Some of which are tautologies( my examples are not). Even if they were they still count as knowledge about the future, useful or not.



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They are necessarily true by virtue of the meaning of the parts. Thats what I mean by tautology, but lets not have an extremely dull conversation about that /images/graemlins/smile.gif

The point remain, all you are saying is that you know that necessarily true propositions wont be false tomorrow.

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Now if he was asking whether we can know which possible future events will occur then the answer is also yes. Unless you are some kind of uber old fashion skeptic who thinks no inductive support can justify a belief. This person would also be commited to say we arent justified in believing that we have hands, or that we know our parent's names, or that physical objects exist, etc.

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I dont think thats what skeptics claim. Induction can support beliefs, one question is can it support knowledge. Even if you allow that induction can support knowledge then thats not enough to make knowledge possible.

chez

[maurile]

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If you accept only deductive reasoning as being justified, then we cannot have knowledge of the future.

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Tomorrow, nothing will exist which is both red all over, and green all over.

This is a conclusion I arrived at through deductive means.
I know it to be true. Its about the future.

So to answer the OP's question, ya we can have knowledge about the future.

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Your statement isn't about the future. It's about word definitions.

[Bork]

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I dont think thats what skeptics claim. Induction can support beliefs, one question is can it support knowledge. Even if you allow that induction can support knowledge then thats not enough to make knowledge possible.


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I dont understand what you mean by this.

Im simply saying if you think induction cannot justify knowledge, then you are commited to saying we only know very few present tense things. People who used this rationale when answering no to the OP must also believe we cannot know anything about past events either. Any justification for a past event requires induction. I claim this a defect in the rationale.

Specific knowledge of the future negates free will if the event is specific enough and sufficiently removed from the present to be influenced by the choices of others. It's either fortune tellers or free will, you choose.

[Bork]

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If you accept only deductive reasoning as being justified, then we cannot have knowledge of the future.

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Tomorrow, nothing will exist which is both red all over, and green all over.

This is a conclusion I arrived at through deductive means.
I know it to be true. Its about the future.

So to answer the OP's question, ya we can have knowledge about the future.

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Your statement isn't about the future. It's about word definitions.

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No its a statement about a future state of affairs, ie the future. It requires some discussion of definitions to justify but thats not relevant to what it is about.

Take the statement: In the future pigs will fly.

Using your line of reasoning this statement is not about the future, its about definitions? (or maybe you would say pigs) It seems obvious to me its about both the future and pigs.

[maurile]

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If you accept only deductive reasoning as being justified, then we cannot have knowledge of the future.

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Tomorrow, nothing will exist which is both red all over, and green all over.

This is a conclusion I arrived at through deductive means.
I know it to be true. Its about the future.

So to answer the OP's question, ya we can have knowledge about the future.

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Your statement isn't about the future. It's about word definitions.

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No its a statement about a future state of affairs, ie the future. It requires some discussion of definitions to justify but thats not relevant to what it is about.

Take the statement: In the future pigs will fly.

Using your line of reasoning this statement is not about the future, its about definitions? (or maybe you would say pigs) It seems obvious to me its about both the future and pigs.

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"Pigs will fly" is about the future because that phrase says something about the world.

"Nothing will be both red all over and green all over" is more like "in the future, two plus two will still equal four." That's not a statement about the world. It's true just because of what the words "two," "plus," "equals," and "four" mean.

Similarly, no objects will be both red all over and green all over simply because of what "red all over" and "green all over" mean. You don't have to know anything about the world to know that the statement will be true. You just have to know some word definitions.

[chezlaw]

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I dont think thats what skeptics claim. Induction can support beliefs, one question is can it support knowledge. Even if you allow that induction can support knowledge then thats not enough to make knowledge possible.


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I dont understand what you mean by this.

Im simply saying if you think induction cannot justify knowledge, then you are commited to saying we only know very few present tense things. People who used this rationale when answering no to the OP must also believe we cannot know anything about past events either. Any justification for a past event requires induction. I claim this a defect in the rationale.

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There's much debate about whether/why induction suuports rational beliefs. I don't think I've ever heard an argument that shows that induction supports knowledge in the sense meant by skeptics.

Of course your right about past events, skeptics clearly don't believe you can have knowledge of past events (nor present ones for that matter).

You claim there's a defect in the rational, fire away.

chez

[Bork]

I guess I wasnt clear. The defect is simply that if you claim that it is impossible to justify knowledge through induction, which I am guessing all the 'no' answer people are doing then they are commited to saying that we know almost nothing. They dont know that Bush is president, they don't know that that the earth isnt resting on a turtles back, they dont know that dinosaurs existed, or JFK existed, etc. If you define knowledge in that sort of cartesian (must be proven deductively to be true) sense then you are going to know almost nill. Even when you think you have proven something deductively doubts will still creep in about error of inference or memory and with them inductive reasoning creeps in. Induction is not something that can be dismissed if we want to have knowledge beyond things like I am having a monitor like sensation right now, or the a priori necessary truths that were mentioned earlier.

[Bork]

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Similarly, no objects will be both red all over and green all over simply because of what "red all over" and "green all over" mean. You don't have to know anything about the world to know that the statement will be true. You just have to know some word definitions.

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I understand they require different truth makers. One requires some events to take place in the future, and another can be said to rely on definitions and logic to be a certain way in the future.

My statement being a necessary truth is not relevant to whether it is about the future. It is a claim that a necessary truth will obtain in the future. It is obviously true and of dubious utility but attacking it on the grounds of whether its about the future is misguided.

Tomorrow, two plus two will equal four.
Tomorrow, the sun will rise.

Both are statements about the way things will be in the world tomorrow. The first happens to be the way things will be in all possible worlds but that does not mean it's tense doesnt modify it to include content about the future in the same way the tense modifies the second.

[chezlaw]

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I guess I wasnt clear. The defect is simply that if you claim that it is impossible to justify knowledge through induction, which I am guessing all the 'no' answer people are doing then they are commited to saying that we know almost nothing. They dont know that Bush is president, they don't know that that the earth isnt resting on a turtles back, they dont know that dinosaurs existed, or JFK existed, etc. If you define knowledge in that sort of cartesian (must be proven deductively to be true) sense then you are going to know almost nill. Even when you think you have proven something deductively doubts will still creep in about error of inference or memory and with them inductive reasoning creeps in. Induction is not something that can be dismissed if we want to have knowledge beyond things like I am having a monitor like sensation right now, or the a priori necessary truths that were mentioned earlier.

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It sounds like you basically agree with the skeptics but wish to you the word knowledge to means something weaker and attainable. Us skeptics have no problem with that but we would like our word back.

I think what you say about deduction isn't quite correct. Skeptics are saying there is a problem in knowing anything about the world even in principle. If there was in principle a method for gaining knowledge then the fact that you might make a mistake when putting it into practice is a very minor issue.

chez

[Bork]

Yep chez, thats right. The only reason I bring it up is i suspect many of the people who said no probably think they know they have hands or that they know what they ate for lunch this afternoon.

If they dont think those things, and really are through and through consistent skeptics, fine; but I suspect many are just inconsistently rejecting induction when it pertains to future events but not present or past events.

[peritonlogon]

The statement was that no logical form makes it so, not just tautology. The fact of the matter is that, as I said, this statement is simply a specific example of the logical rule of non-contradiction. Simply to state that things won't be contradictory in the future isn't really a deduction a of the future, only a deduction of logic. I'd write a proof, but I don't think it's worth my time.

[Bork]

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The statement was that no logical form makes it, so not just tautology.

[/ QUOTE ] You still dont know what logical form means and ignored my links which would have been helpful in this area.

Nothing can be both X all over and Y all over is not an instance of Nothing can be (X and not-X).

Do you believe its contradictory for something to be red all over and fuzzy all over? Its the same logical form as the statement you are claiming is an instance of a simple contradiction.

The contradiction does not come from merely the logical form but from the logical form in conjunction with the concept of colors.

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Simply to state that things won't be contradictory in the future isn't really a deduction a of the future, only a deduction of logic. I'd write a proof, but I don't think it's worth my time.

[/ QUOTE ] Well first it requires a deduction using logic and the concept of color to come to the conclusion that something that is red all over and green all over is impossible. Then you validly infer that necessarily impossible things things are impossible in the future. So yes you use logic in your deduction, but you certainly can make necessarily true statements about future states of affairs. I would really like to see your proof to the contrary.