02-22-2002, 01:41 PM
The current situation is reminiscent of the opening stages of the 1973 Yom Kippur, when the political leaders and the IDF were taken by surprise after they had dismissed the evidence of an impending attack. The cost of this misconception was horrendous, but once the counterattacks began, they reversed the course of the war. Similarly, the US failed to respond to bin Laden's early attacks, and was caught off-guard on September 11.
However, once the attention of America was focused, the full weight of US military power became engaged and the results were quick to follow. In the same way, many Israelis who were reluctant to give up the dreams of peace have finally woken up.
The Palestinian successes are also the result of exploitation of their strengths in this kind of terrorist campaign and guerrilla war. In the other Arab-Israeli wars, the IDF was able to attack major targets in the cities and military structures of opposing states. The application of "excessive force" against Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon raised the ante, eventually forcing these regimes to end support for terrorism. In 1973, when Ariel Sharon's armored column came within artillery range of Cairo, that war was brought to a rapid end. The Palestinian war, in which Arafat issues daily calls for a million suicide bombers, requires entirely different tactics.
To give the IDF some credit, many of the commanders did a good job of foreseeing at least some of the tactics and challenges that they have been facing. Clearly, the death toll of both civilians and soldiers would have been much higher if they had not spent the past five years preparing for guerrilla warfare and terrorist attacks. In the past week alone, alongside the painful failures, numerous suicide bombings were foiled.
Slowly, and often invisibly, the combination of very detailed intelligence and precise attacks on the terrorist leadership and infrastructure is grinding down the Palestinian ability to attack. The pressure resulting from Arafat's isolation in Ramallah is also beginning to pay off.
However, once the attention of America was focused, the full weight of US military power became engaged and the results were quick to follow. In the same way, many Israelis who were reluctant to give up the dreams of peace have finally woken up.
The Palestinian successes are also the result of exploitation of their strengths in this kind of terrorist campaign and guerrilla war. In the other Arab-Israeli wars, the IDF was able to attack major targets in the cities and military structures of opposing states. The application of "excessive force" against Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon raised the ante, eventually forcing these regimes to end support for terrorism. In 1973, when Ariel Sharon's armored column came within artillery range of Cairo, that war was brought to a rapid end. The Palestinian war, in which Arafat issues daily calls for a million suicide bombers, requires entirely different tactics.
To give the IDF some credit, many of the commanders did a good job of foreseeing at least some of the tactics and challenges that they have been facing. Clearly, the death toll of both civilians and soldiers would have been much higher if they had not spent the past five years preparing for guerrilla warfare and terrorist attacks. In the past week alone, alongside the painful failures, numerous suicide bombings were foiled.
Slowly, and often invisibly, the combination of very detailed intelligence and precise attacks on the terrorist leadership and infrastructure is grinding down the Palestinian ability to attack. The pressure resulting from Arafat's isolation in Ramallah is also beginning to pay off.