War Strategy

[Mason Malmuth]

Hi Everyone:

Here's my take on the pause in the war strategy.

First, you need to understand that in the last few wars we have fought, the enemy was bombed into submission and then the ground troops, if needed were sent in to mop up. (Yes I know I'm over simplifying.)

But this Iraq conflict was different because of the WMD. We couldn't afford to slowly degrade thier defenses just by bombing since it might allow Iraq to get a shot off at either Kuwait or Israel. So we had to send the ground troops in immediately.

So what has happened is that the western part of Iraq is now held by the coalition. Thus the chemical shot that we were so afraid of is now very unlikely. But the Iraqi army is not completely degraded which an extensive bombing campaign might have done. So the purpose of the pause is to do that degrading and not risk our troops unnecessarily. So in my opinion, this does not mean a set back has taken place.

All comments welcome,

Mason

[Cyrus]

"In the last few wars we have fought, the enemy was bombed into submission and then the ground troops, if needed were sent in to mop up."

There is one more important difference and that is the disproportionate opposition, both in public opinion and in the stance of governments, to the action undertaken by the U.S. among historically both neutral and friendly countries. This opposition, which has its home-grown and very vocal expression as well, must have shaped the War Strategy into one that tries to put the best humanitarian face on it. This implies precision-bombing as opposed to Beograd-style, rather indiscriminate bombing, the latter being the kind that truly saps morale.

"This Iraq conflict was different because of the WMD."

Alright, this assumes that WMDs actually exist and can be used. Bu suppose they don't, what then? More importantly, if the American military and political command knows that they don't (and we have to assume that they base their strategies on cold hard reality and not on what they will say in public), then the War Strategy they followed shows that they had expected a rather quick collapse of the Iraqi regime. Hence, the "Decapitation" opening gambit.

The "Pause" button in this War has been pushed by the United States because, exactly like another conflict in Asia, many many years ago, the attitude of the local population has been vastly misjudged. More ground troops must be called in, once again, in order to persuade the locals to be liberated. But that's where most comparisons with Vietnam end, I'm afraid; things will not be allowed now to drag on, no matter what.

[brad]

your argument works without wmd also.

perhaps we simply didnt want all the iraqi oil wells to be ablaze for 6 months again, like last time.

[MMMMMM]

I don't think we severely miscalculated, although we may have miscalculated a little (which is to be expected in such imprecise sciences as politics and war). The pause, as Mason pointed out, allows further degrading of the Repulican Guard by air strikes. It also allows consolidation and resupply to take place, and it allows our forward ground troops to get a little rest after that lightning advance.

One reason we don't have as many ground troops as we would like in place yet is because Turkey decided against allowing land passage at a very late date--I think it was 2 days into the war. We have been rerouting that entire division through the Red Sea I believe (a relatively slow process).

Pausing for public opinion reasons would seem counterproductive, since it apears that the long pause leading up to the war was instrumental in the nurturing and flowering of so much worldwide opposition.

I get the impression that you may think there is a significant chance Iraq does not have WMD--even after recent developments. LOL. If so, that's the only severe mistake in judgment I can recall offhand seeing you make: IMO the chance that Iraq does not have some usable chemical shells or missiles is essentially nil.

[Parmenides]

What weapons of mass destrcution? The world still awaits any proof. The military is overextended. They don't have enough ground forces, and acknowledged this by ordering up another 100k. This war was a foolish endeavor. Bush looks more and more like Johnson everyday.

There is a good possibility that the USA could lose this war. If both the Syrians and Iranians would join the fight on the Iraqi's side immediately,then I think the Russians would intervene with the threat of nuclear annihilation to stop it.

[scalf]

/forums/images/icons/laugh.gif actually mason..your analysis more sophisticated than needed...lol

key strategy: have at least ten times fire-power and troops..pound, pound ,pound, them then attack with overwhelming advantage....

best poker analogy...only play aces on button...while opponent has nothing..push all in before flop...

gl /forums/images/icons/cool.gif /forums/images/icons/diamond.gif

[Jedi Poker]

I agree. The pause is not a setback at all. It's just a simple consolidation. In judo, one can't throw one's opponent until one has put that opponent off-balance. The heavy bombing that is meant to soften up the Republican Guard achieves this off-balancing step. The inevitable throw (massive ground attack) should be quick and decisive.

[Clarkmeister]

"But this Iraq conflict was different because of the WMD. We couldn't afford to slowly degrade thier defenses just by bombing since it might allow Iraq to get a shot off at either Kuwait or Israel. So we had to send the ground troops in immediately."

To me at least, this clearly isn't the case for two reasons. First, we rather easily captured the airfields in western Iraq in the first few days with nothing but special forces. And those fields are the only place close enough to Israel for Iraq to launch their missles. Second, it should have been obvious that even if Saddam has WMD, he wouldn't use them in the early stages of the war because that would instantly let Bush off the hook in the propaganda war when world opinion was so strongly against the invasion.

Our mistake early on was vastly overestimating the chances that the Iraqi soldiers would quit and the chances that the civilians would revolt.

Since neither of these has come to pass, we need more troops on the ground, because now it is a different type of war. Rumsfeld was told this prior to the war but he apparently insisted on only deploying 4 divisions rather than the entire 8 that Bush approved.

The delay is simply a byproduct of overconfidence and poor planning.

[Clarkmeister]

Its not a setback? How can you say that when you said this would be over in 7 days.

It may not be a setback in that we will still win eventually, but clearly its a huge setback in the PR battle.

[Cyrus]

"I don't think we severely miscalculated, although we may have miscalculated a little. One reason we don't have as many ground troops as we would like in place yet is because Turkey decided against allowing land passage at a very late date--I think it was 2 days into the war."

The U.S. had a plan that included passage through Turkey. Turkey forbid that passage. Then the U.S. went ahead with the rest of its plan anyway, without substantially changing it, if at all. Well, something just isn't right, obviously. A plan cannot be correct if, after an important factor changes, the plan remains the same. This is a severe miscalculation from the part of the planners, by definition.

"I get the impression that you may think there is a significant chance Iraq does not have WMD--even after recent developments."

I don't know what "developments" you are talking about, really. But, come to think of it, Mason might be right! The whole American strategy might be based on the solid conviction that the Iraqis do, in fact, possess WMDs. See, one way that I can be 100% certain that you have the seven of clubs in a card game is when I have given you that card myself.

[Clarkmeister]

"I don't think we severely miscalculated"

I don't know how you can make this claim. It is fairly obvious to me that we made the fatal flaw of believing our own hype and really thought this was going to be over in like 5 days with the help of a surrendering Iraqi military and popular uprisings against the regime.

"One reason we don't have as many ground troops as we would like in place yet is because Turkey decided against allowing land passage at a very late date--I think it was 2 days into the war. We have been rerouting that entire division through the Red Sea I believe (a relatively slow process). "

Exhibit A. Even though we knew we hadn't secured passage, and despite the fact that the Turks had already turned us down, we gambled and left that entire division up there sitting on their butts for nearly a week with essentially no backup plan. That is horrific planning and is quite frankly inexcusable. Note that even if they HAD been allowed to go through Turkey, we would still need massive reinforcements in the south of Iraq. In fact, had they gone through Turkey, you would see just how ill-prepared our leadership was by an even longer reinforcement delay in Southern Iraq than the present one.

"Pausing for public opinion reasons would seem counterproductive, since it apears that the long pause leading up to the war was instrumental in the nurturing and flowering of so much worldwide opposition. "

We can debate what caused worldwide opposition to the war all day. What isn't debatable is that this delay is clearly a PR nightmare for the administration. Which should be all the proof one needs when asking whether or not we severely miscalculated when making our initial plan. Its a PR nightmare, they know it, and they are still doing it. They had no choice.

The fact of the matter is that our initial plan was grossly overoptomistic. Now that we are faced with the reality of an enemy that is not only going to fight, but fight effectively, maybe our next phase will be more effective. I certainly hope so. But I doubt it. Yesterdays quote from a pentagon official that Baghdad is going to fall "from the inside out" seems to indicate that we have not adjusted to the realities of the situation at hand.

[Jimbo]

"Our mistake early on was vastly overestimating the chances that the Iraqi soldiers would quit and the chances that the civilians would revolt."

I believe this was a mistake of yours and of the medias but not of the administration.

"Our mistake early on was vastly overestimating the chances that the Iraqi soldiers would quit and the chances that the civilians would revolt."

Again yours not the theirs.

"The delay is simply a byproduct of overconfidence and poor planning."

Or perhaps simply not sharing all their plans with you personally.

[Clarkmeister]

Pssst, Jimbo, its OK to admit that our plan so far hasn't worked as well as we (and our leadership) had hoped. Its also OK to admit that our administration has been clearly caught off guard by both the ferocity and the type of resistance we have encountered. That doesn't make you a bad American. It makes you an objective observer.

PS. If all the better you can do is use the old catch-all "well, maybe you don't know everything the government knows" argument, I know for sure that I'm on solid ground.

[Jimbo]

Clarkmeister you may be too egotistical to believe they have not confided in you but I assure you it is true. How do you know the plan is not working? It totally amazes me that you expected this war to end in a week or two or without any minor changes or losses. JEES!!! Totally exasperating!

[Clarkmeister]

"How do you know the plan is not working?"

I wish I knew why you had such blind faith in the administration. To the point that you ignore what is patently obvious to the rest of the world. Claiming that the war is going to plan (as you imply) is like saying the sky is green.

"It totally amazes me that you expected this war to end in a week or two or without any minor changes or losses. "

I didn't expect anything. Show me one thing I have written that suggests I expected a quick painless war. Heck, I wish it would have been over in one day. But I didn't expect it to be.

Oh, and finally,

"Clarkmeister you may be too egotistical to believe they have not confided in you but I assure you it is true"

They may not have confided in me, but do you think maybe they clued Dick Cheney in?

"He [Cheney] predicted any war with Iraq would end "relatively quickly," defining that as "weeks, not months."

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,81291,00.html

[Jimbo]

Clarkmeister I am not displaying "blind faith" but I have participated in a war and understand enough to know that neither you nor I know the plans nor their contingencies.

"He [Cheney] predicted any war with Iraq would end "relatively quickly," defining that as "weeks, not months."

Thanks for the link, if the war lasts longer than 7 weeks and 6 days then I will agree you are correct. With one caveat, the interview was on March 17th, before the campaign began so the "plan" may have been adjusted. Keep in mind he is only the vice-president and although he obviously knows more than you or I it is highly likely Don Rumsfield knws much more about the detailed operational plans than Dick Cheney.

[IrishHand]

How do you know the plan is not working?
(a) US possesses vastly superior intelligence, technology, training and complete dominance of the skies.
(b) US spent several months building their forces up to the level they felt adequate to overwhelm the enemy and acheive their goals.
(c) US chose the time and place to begin the invasion.
(d) Unlike last time, the enemy is - gasp - actually defending their land.
(e) Unlike last time, the enemy figured out that when you're dominated in every area of the war, you need to resort to guerilla tactics and urban warfare.
(f) Unlike last time, we're losing men and equipment even though we haven't even encountered the vast majority of their military.
(g) Less than 2 weeks after the initiation of hostilities, the US decides to being their offensive to a near-halt and dramatically increase their troop commitment to Iraq (120,000 men and accompanying tanks, artillery, etc).

a, b, and c were part of the plan. The rest wasn't - if you can't see this, I assume you weren't listening to anything our political or military leaders were saying two weeks ago. However, none of this probably matters in the long run - as Moltke said long ago - "no plan survivies contact". This adage apparently holds true even in the case of a war between such insanely imbalanced militaries as this one.

[MMMMMM]

Feel free to correct me if I'm mistaken but I believe Turkey forbade the land passage of US troops after the war commenced.

One development that springs immediately to mind was the discovery of a tank and several thousand chemical warfare suits in that hospital in Iraq. The Iraqis know we aren't going to use chemical weapons so what do you suppose those suits were intended to be used for?

Hey I just thought of something: The less benefit of the doubt one gives to Saddam Hussein, the more likely one is to be right. Let's dub this the "Saddam Hussein Axiom".

[Jimbo]

a, b, and c were part of the plan. The rest wasn't -

Another forum poster with the skinny on National Security. Well I wasn't concerned about our success until now.

[MMMMMM]

I could be wrong but I believe Turkey had agreed to allow land passage for our troops (but no air bases) before we commenced the war. Two days later they reneged.

The war is going fine. After all it's only what, ten days yet?

We'll see how effectively the Iraqis fight after some further "degrading" and after our reinforcements arrive. Baghdad will eventually be locked down almost as tight as the IDF locked down Arafat's headquarters and surrounding area some months ago.

What I want to see is live video footage when we start exploring the tunnels and bunkers under Baghdad.

[Cyrus]

"Feel free to correct me if I'm mistaken but I believe Turkey forbade the land passage of US troops after the war commenced."

Without quibbling about chronology : either way, the American plan was flawed, and it is now being corrected. At least, that's what they're trying to do.

See, if Turkey forbade passage before the war begun, then the plan was based on something that wasn't there! (Imagine the Kuwaiti government forbidding passage of troops!) If Turkey forbade passage after the war begun, then the plan was flawed because it was executed without having secured one of its basic assumptions.

Denying that the plan was flawed (over-confidence, over-simplification, lack of understanding of basic human attributes such as the will to defend one's homeland, etcetera) is at the very least counter-productive.

Central Command has to give daily press briefings and, thus, conduct also a "press war". The Generals cannot admit the plan was flawed and so they find themselves in a lose/lose PR position. Daily briefings, like daily progress reports in a business, can be shortsighted, awkward affairs -- and I should know, I'm in the business.

[brad]

'The Iraqis know we aren't going to use chemical weapons so what do you '

chemical weapons were used by both sides in the iraq-iran war. casualties were very high.

[Chris Alger]

If there were a tangible WMD threat we could have pointed to it and bombed it. My prediction is that they'll "find" some cache of CBW's, but nothing capable of really interferring with the war. The fact is that these weapons don't work well against a large mobile force prepared for them.

I believe Rumsfeld, that there isn't so much a pause as an inability to move forward as quickly as the most optimistc scenarious, but that we're not seeing anything the US didn't plan for. I suspect, but obviously don't know, that the degree of resistance might be indicating that "liberation" isn't in the cards.

[Stu Pidasso]

In Afghanistan we went in with a bombing campaign and a small number of special forces. For sometime the media and the world were amazed at how well the Taliban stood up to this constant bombardment. The Taliban were executing opposition leaders sent in by the CIA. The media was remarking at how poorly the war was planned and how badly it was going. It was looking as if the Afghans would have us tied up as long as they did the Soviet Union.

Then Mazir El Sharif fell. A few days after that it was complete victory of over the Taliban. We all forgot how we were once all in doubt.

Now back to Iraq. People are remarking how badly this campaign is going. Yes there have been some setbacks, but were only 11 days into this and we effectively have the Iraqi forces pinned downed. We have fewer than 100 dead or missing(including the British). When I watch and read news reports I think the campaign is one big cluster f***. When I analyze it with my own mind, I realize that it is indeed a well thought out and flexible plan. Things may not have gone according to best case senarios, but so far the only opposition our military seems inept at countering, is the impatience of the world.

Stu

[MMMMMM]

What does that have to do with it?

[MMMMMM]

"I suspect, but obviously don't know, that the degree of resistance might be indicating that "liberation" isn't in the cards."


And I suspect, but obviously don't know, that if you were an average Iraqi you'd be resisting too if Saddam's Fedayeen were threatening to behead your mother or sister in front of your house if you didn't. Alternatively, they might just announce that they have come to your village to execute all able-bodied males who refuse to take up arms to resist the invaders.

[Cyrus]

"If you were an average Iraqi you'd be resisting too if Saddam's Fedayeen were threatening to behead your mother or sister in front of your house if you didn't. Alternatively, they might just announce that they have come to your village to execute all able-bodied males who refuse to take up arms to resist the invaders."

The claim that the average Iraqi is forced at gun-point to resist the American forces flies at the face of reality --- and the historical record. The reality is that Iraqis are resisting in a manner that indicates that it's not just Baath hard-liners or local thugs or whatever. You have average Iraqis taking pot shots with age old rifles! Then at the refugee centers at the borders of Iraq you have the incredible image of Iraqis going the wrong way, i.e. from outside the country towards the cities, in order "to fight off the invader".

History has also demonstrated quite emphatically that the people in a country will, usually, tend to resist an invader and to rally around their leadership, even when the invader presents better living or political conditions than their country's. This happened when Napoleon invaded the tyrannical regime of Spain; when the fascist regime of Greece was invaded by Italy in 1940, another fasist regime (instead of general indifference about the two regimes, the Greek people fought with astonishing vigor and self-sacrifice); when the Nazis invaded Stalin-tortured and famished Russia and the Ukraine; when the Vietnamese invaded war-torn and Khmer Rouge-infested Kampuchea. And so on. This is what you will also probably do even if the United States of America is ruled by a dictator.

American planning severely miscalculated the nationalist element in the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people they wanted to liberate. These folks are not all Saddam hard-liners, not by a long shot. Continue to deny reality at your peril.

[brad]

mason's theory is that US forces gained ground quickly to deny iraq the staging areas from which to launch wmd scuds and stuff, as they did in first gulf war.

i said that an alternate theory is that US forces gained ground quickly to secure the oilfields, and keep them from going up in smoke, as saddam implemented a scorched earth policy in first gulf war.

in both these scenarios, the pause in the ground war, after securing the objectives, is not indicative of any failure or misplanning, which i believe was masons point.

i was just addding to his theory, noting that it didnt necessarily rely on wmd. (obviously they can both be right; however, i was just saying that even if it later comes out that US knows that iraq has no usable wmd, he can still be right.)

[The_Baron]

The most recent UN inspectors documented unloaded, chemical artillery shells. This was even given face time on the BBC. (A delightful picture of one of the inspectors staring into a 152mm shell with a flashlight.) While these shells "could" be used for non-proscribed payloads, their basic design is such that this isn't a reasonable assumption. A projectile is designed from the ground up for a specific purpose. While some can be jury-rigged to other purposes, this degrades the design of the shell. This is even more critical in the G-4, G-5 series of artillery. Their superiority is profoundly affected by the design of the projectiles. This goes even to the point of a shell designed for delivery of VX having Lewisite substituted for its payload. The bursting charge, prefragmentation of the case, exterior configuration and base design are all based around the chemical properties of the agent for which they're designed. Yes, you can put mustard gas into a nerve agent shell, but don't expect it to hit your target and don't be overly surprised when instead of blasting the projo out of the muzzle, all you succede in doing is sending a geyser of shattered shell fragments and vaporized chemical agent out of the gun.
We also have to consider the budgetary constraints inherent in arming a military force. While they're comparitively inexpensiv e compared to precision guided munitions and electronic payloads, simple chemical projos are expensive. On the order of $75 to $300(US) each. This is without the payload. While this isn't a great amount, you have to factor in the total number of shells purchased which can literally range into the millions. You simply can't afford to purchase empty, VX configured artillery shells in the hopes that you can someday fill them. It's much the same as purchasing the chasis of a tank in the hopes of someday being able to build the complete vehicle. It's just too expensive. Troops have to be trained using either live or realistic simulated projectiles, firing tables have to be generated and published, handling and firing protocols have to be developed, published and trained. When you factor in all of the aspects of firing an artillery piece, the total cost runs into the thousands of dollars even if you amortize the expenditures.
While it's possible that Iraq deliberately purchased a limited number of empty projectiles with radically disparate lot numbers and manufacture dates, this would accrue significant expenses in and of itself as well as exposing the unusual purchase requirements to an unnecessary risk of exposure by the manufacturer or anywhere along the logistic train.
While it's "possible" the empty shells were all that was left, had been "forgotten" and not destroyed and weren't intended to be used, the odds are significantly against it. It's literally similar to expecting a king high straight flush to be beaten by an ace high straight flush playing stud. The odds are just against it happening. (Yes, I know it has and will continue to happen, that doesn't change the math.)
The empty chemical shells, the forward deployed chemical protective gear and chemical exposure treatment equipment, combined with the traditional lack of issue of those items in the current Iraqi Army, combined with the plethora of industrial facilities that are more suited to chemical weapon production than to their aledged non-military production, lead one to believe there are stockpiles of chemical weapons. Throw in the speed with which an empty chemical shell can be fully militarized and you've got an extremely valid concern for the presence of chemical weapons on the battlefield. (For whatever it's worth, having just spoken with an associate at the Dugway Proving Ground, the militarization time is roughly five minutes assuming the projectile is still sealed in its shipping container. It's literally a matter of removing the shipping plug, putting a funnel in the opening, pouring the agent into the case to the fill line and installing the burster and fuse... less time than it takes to fill a one gallon gasoline container.)
With the indicators of presence of the weapons, the forces can't afford to plan around anything but their presence and use on the battlefield. This doesn't even begin to discuss the political concerns inherent in the problem.
As for Bush looking like Johnson. Not really. The basic social factors of the various nations are radically different than they were in Vietnam. It's simply not the same. Of course there will always be people who want to find the similarity regardless of the rationality of that belief.
As for the US losing. Nope, won't happen. With the exception of some sort of divine intervention along the lines of comets striking the attacking forces but leaving the Iraqis unscathed, the Iraqis simply have no chance. They can't win. They don't have the logistic base. They don't have the level of military technology. Their forces don't have the skill and training. They simply have no way to win. An analogous situation would be a 12 year old, playground ruffian stepping into the ring with George Foreman at the height of his career. Yes, that kid could kick George in the shins and hurt him. Of course that kid could get a lucky punch in and scuff George's chin. But that kid is going to be crushed. He simply doesn't have the skill, strength, experience or even the body mass to win the fight.
As always, YMMV. But in this case, variance in that mileage is based on wishful thinking and deliberate avoidance of the realities of the modern battlefield. The allies haven't even fought at their full capacity. They're still fighting with one hand deliberately tied behind their backs and wearing blinders. An escalation of the allied tactics could literally leave nothing but smoldering ruin in the path of advancing forces. Fortunately for the Iraqis, the allied forces have agreed not to just crush their opponents. That can always change.

The Baron

[The_Baron]

There's a very real possibility that the deployment of the additional divisions was held back out of concern for the situation in North Korea and the risk of escalation in Afghanistan. While the public seems to have forgotten Afghanistan, it needs to be remembered that the Northern Alliance isn't our friend. Allies, perhaps but they still remain a threat to our forces. The availability of a number of readily deployable divisions is a significant deterrent to changes in their overall position relating to the US.
As far as North Korea goes. North Korea is a seven to ten division war after generation of air superiority. Those additional three to six divisions aren't currently extant but can be generated from reserve and National Guard components as well as IRR and former servicemen who are still under obligation. In addition, with the exception of immediate deployment of nuclear weapons by North Korea, combat in that theater can be developed much more slowly than in Iraq. It's a function of terrain and political boundaries. Once the current forces in South Korea are augmented and stabilized, the progression of battle into the north can be done incrementally allowing for use of massive air attacks and introduction of rapidly mobile forces such as Airborne and Air Mobile. Iraq "can" be fought out and finished by the tankers and cavalry. The Iraqi campaign doesn't "need" the 173rd, 82nd and 101st. They can be readily replaced by heavy infantry from reserve components and additional heavy armor if interdiction in North Korea becomes an issue. In addition, aggression by North Korea isn't likely to generate the international political disparities that have arisen from the Iraqi situation. Most nations understand that the Great Leader probably has nukes, probably has chemical weapons and he's crazy as a shithouse rat. In addition, Kim is a micromanager of near biblical proportion and a thoroughly ignorant amateur when it comes to military matters. In short, Kim is a thoroughly scarey individual to go to war with. The world community is at significantly more immediate and serious risk from North Korea's potential military action than they are from Iraq. The simple immediacy with which North Korea can deliver WMD by subterfuge into nations such as Japan, Taiwan and the rest of the Asian rim makes North Korea a danger that will be realized and met by a much wider coalition than in Iraq. Even the French are in a position to lose a lot of Frenchmen and a lot of French industry if Kim decides to go bug nuts.
While I'll agree that the delay is because of overconfidence, I can't agree that it's because of poor planning. Strategic pauses are part and parcel to any military plan. They're built in as contingencies because of the very real danger of unanticipated developments in the theater of war. Every leader from the fireteam to the DoD learns early on that you have to plan for times and situations that will make you sit back and wait. Even in the midst of a platoon level raid, pauses and "no-go" events are preplanned. If that platoon is halfway across the objective and the bad guys suddenly pop up with armor that wasn't in the initial intelligence, it's already planned how to egress the objective, pause the attack and invest heavier support for the attackers. It's basic, Corporal and Sergeant level tactical doctrine.

The Baron

[MMMMMM]

Of course the element you mention exists as well.

I left out mentioning it because Chris left out mentioning those terrorized and forced to fight by the Fedayeen;-)

[Chris Alger]

It’s not just the ferocious resistance, it’s the absence of any noticeably broad support among the “liberated” that shows that this is a war of naked imperial conquest. In response, you attribute Iraqi hostility and apathy toward the US solely to terror threats by Saddam’s Fedayeen.

It doesn’t wash. The US military estimates that there are between 5,000 and 25,000 of these agents in Iraq. Iraq’s population is about 23 million, with most families armed, and 40% of Iraq is under US control. So how can you use these guys to explain the absence of cheering crowds, indigenous resistence and collaboration, masses of surrendering troops? Just where is the Iraqi version of the French resistance, who took on nothing less than the Third Reich? Richard Perle told us that the widespread desire for “liberation” would lead to the regime’s collapsing at the “first whiff of gunpowder.” Hyperbole, perhaps, but the experience so far has been close to the opposite.

Can you honestly say that you expected to see as many reports like this one (by MSNBC), a link provided by Billy LTL above:

“Crowds started gathering wherever we stopped, and the mood was getting more and more ugly. People complained about the shootings, the lack of aid, even the shortage of water because electricity had been shut down and water pumps didn’t function. Arab journalists with us were accused of being Kuwaiti and threatened with death.”
http://www.msnbc.com/news/890712.asp?0cb=-h1l143917

They don’t even like our reporters, much less our troops. We are embarking on a hostile occupation of a foreign country marked by continuous urban guerilla warfare that will make the British experience in Northern Ireland (supported there by 2/3's of the public, and ultimately unsuccessful) look like a cakewalk.

[MMMMMM]

Chris you are presuming that I am attributing resistance only to the enforcement by Saddam's Fedayeen. My point in mentioning it as I did was primarily to draw attention to the fact that you neglected to mention it at all.

Of course there is other resistance which may be quite significant. However let's not forget that the crowds cannot afford to cheer too loudly or even at all as long as Saddam is still in power. Saddam has spies throughout the country and only fools or very brave souls would cheer prematurely for fear of horrific reprisals later on if Saddam somehow retains power and/or the coalition leaves.

I think a fairer assessment of the overall Iraqi attitude will be possible later, and I'm withholding final judgment on this until such time.

By the way what do you think of initial reports that a large terror training camp has been captured in Northern Iraq?

[Clarkmeister]

"I think a fairer assessment of the overall Iraqi attitude will be possible later, and I'm withholding final judgment on this until such time."

So if we lose the war and the Iraqi civillians say they are glad we lost that's proof they like Saddam? Because you seem to be implying that if we win and they say they are glad its proof they were in favor of the invasion.

To me, the ultimate test is whether they choose to defend or rebel with force of arms.

[MMMMMM]

"To me, the ultimate test is whether they choose to defend or rebel with force of arms."

Well then Clarkmeister, I don't think we are seeing a very significant percentage of the population defending against us with force of arms, and of those that are, most are Saddam's elite Republican Guards and conscripted regular army, and his Fedayeen. Of the civilians who are resisting (a small number relatively speaking) many have been pressed into service by the Fedayeen.

[Clarkmeister]

But they haven't had a chance to defend yet. We'll get a better picture when coalition forces actually enter cities. Its not like some store clerk is going to just stroll on out to the front lines. They have, however, had a chance to rebel and haven't taken it.

Anyways, my point is simply that its a self fulfilling prophecy to say "wait til we win, then see how happy the people are". Saddam could just as easily say "why are you invading on the pretext of liberation when my people are obviously content as evidenced by my 100% victory in the last election"

We've seen a small (1000 person?) uprsising in Basra, where the anti-Saddam sentiment is supposedly highest. We've seen several thousand expatriates return from Jordan to defend. And we've seen small pockets here and there. In all it certainly seems too early to tell.

Personally, I suspect that the vast majority of Iraqis hate Saddam, but also hate us invading their country and destroying their homeland. I think they'll be happiest when we get the F out of their country and take Saddam with us.

[Chris Alger]

I usually agree with you, so take this as a nuanced disagreement. /forums/images/icons/smile.gif

I take it as a given that the manufacturers and promoters of "hype" are not likely to take it seriously.[1] Overall, however, I think the individuals have a better understanding of what they're trying to accomplish.

How can the first week's conduct of the war be deemed rational? Deep oppostion to the war and shallow support for it places a premium on quick and cheap success. This dictates taking longshot gambles at the early stages. They started with a virtually impossible "decapitation" attempt to murder Saddam, then moved in ground forces in the hopes that Saddam's troops would surrender en masse, and only afterward started the bombing campaign that meant widespread civilian casualties. Even then, the bombing has been much more limited than what was originally threatened. The pattern is slow escalation to accomplish no more than the minimum that might lead to something that approximates success, similar to the pattern of escalation in Vietnam. This doesn't mean that the leaders actually expect success through these limited efforts. With this war, the political cost of a Powell-like massive use of force might have been seen as too high.

The downside is a sense of early failure, but with a complacent media and a general attitude of needing to "support the troops," damage like this can be controlled. And if the polls are correct, so far it has been.

The entire war is a hail mary. Who would have imagined, three years ago, that any sane leader would back an infantry land war in order to conquer a hostile Arab country that has neither attacked nor threatened to attack the US? Before 9/11, hardly anyone took Iraq seriously enough to favor invasion.

But 9/11 was too good an opportunity to pass up. Shortly after the attacks, The Economist quoted the newspaper Ma'ariv as noting that 9/11 was a public relations gift to Israel of unprecedented magnitude, a feeling that various Israeli leaders have echoed. You can imagine how 9/11 was welcomed in the US by the minority faction that wanted the US to take more turf, especially Iraq's. Indeed, within hours after personally surviving the Pentagon attack, CBS notes that Rummy was telling his staff to figure out a way to finger Iraq. His lack of success hasn't deterred him yet.

Rather than being driven by optimism, the leaders were presented with a rare opportunity to advance an otherwise dead-end agenda. They took it despite the long odds because capable people seize the day. Inherently, they occasionally overreach, but the rewards (to them) are worth the risks (mostly assumed by others).

[1] Some of them certainly take the hype seriously (Wolfowitz), because any regime that runs on heavy doses of misinformation is likely to be infected with a kind of institutional stupidity. Zealots often get promoted. In Vietnam, for example, there were probably US officials that believed the conflict was driven by a Red Chinese plot to conquer the world, and a few who believed this even after China invaded Vietnam in 1979 and lost, proving that the USSR wasn't much of a Vietnam ally either. In the early days of Carter's presidency, his people had to get rid of some military clown in high office who talked openly of a Soviet "time table" for world conquest. But these are the exceptions.

[Clarkmeister]

I'm not saying that the initial thrust/gamble wasn't rational or a reasonable plan. What seems obvious to me is that it was unreasonable to count on it to succeed. If we had looked upon it as a calculated risk, we should have had backup constantly arriving.

Instead, we took our shot, it didn't work, and *then* said 'OK, lets bring in the proper amount of troops'. A well thought out plan would have had the "backup" troops already arriving even as the cavalry was blitzing to Baghdad. If we ended up not needing the backup, no biggie. Better to send them home unused than to lose momentum and PR points by having to stop and reload.

[Parmenides]

I have no doubt that the USA can flatten Iraq. The way the USA could lose is if the objective is not met, and we withdraw. A sceanrio in which this could happen would involve Syria and and/or Iran entering the war on the Iraqi side, and the Russians intervening on their behalf after the USA counter-attacks. The Russian conventional forces are no threat. The Russian nuclear capability, however, cannot be ignored.

[Chris Alger]

"By the way what do you think of initial reports that a large terror training camp has been captured in Northern Iraq?"

I don't know of any camp that's been "captured," but the US working with the Kurds apparently destroyed the Ansar camp that Powell described to the UN.

There doesn't seem to be much to it. There isn't any known tie between the camp and the government of Iraq. It as created in a place where the Iraqi government has no control after the Taliban fell in Afghanistan (about 150 of the 700-800 fighters that operated there appear to be Afgahnis). It's occupants seemed to restrict their activities to fighting Iraqi Kurds. I'm not aware of any act of international terrorism that's been linked to it.

When it was first mentioned, the big question was why hasn't the US just bombed it? The obvious answer was that the US wanted to preserve it as a pretext for invasion. See LA Times, 2/7/3 ("Lawmakers who have attended classified briefings on the camp say that they have been stymied for months in their efforts to get an explanation for why the United States has not launched a military strike on the compound ... Absent an explanation from the White House, some officials suggested that the administration has refrained from striking the compound in part to preserve a key piece of its case against Iraq.")
http://www.google.com/url?sa=U&start=1&q=http://www.latimes.com/la-fg-intel7feb07,0,5391792.story&e=2436

Powell's allegations about the camp were so exaggerated that its owners opened it up to journalists for inspection. "Ansar allowed 20 journalists to pass through its front lines Saturday and enter the Victory Brigade compound. They found a wholly unimpressive place, a small and largely undeveloped cluster of buildings that appeared to lack substantia industrial capacity. For example, the structures did not have plumbing and had only the limited electricity supplied by a generator. Roughly half the buildings in the compound appeared to have recently been used as civilian homes, and one contained the sandals of a small child. The remaining buildings were in military or political use, serving as either fighters' barracks or as a television and radio station for the Islamic party. Two Ansar officials who escorted journalists through the compound's buildings spoke of its unmistakably crude condition and dismissed Powell's allegation as baseless. 'This place is an isolated place, and we have just our weapons,' said one of those in the camp, Ayub Khidir, adding that by weapons he meant rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and machine guns.'" Int'l Herald Tribune, 2/10/3
http://216.239.53.100/custom?q=cache:0mk9AU5v6RIC:www.iht.com/articles/86134.htm+ansar+training+camp&hl=en&start=3&ie=UTF-8

[Cyrus]

I understand that the U.S. doesn't expect in Iraq, as it did in Yugoslavia, to have the country's leadership resign from power through pressure applied by air bombings. No, the U.S. intends to conquer the cities of Iraq to the last. And bombing is used in its standard way, to break the opponent's will to resist and to destroy some worthy targets in the bargain. This implies that most of the cities will have to be taken by fights conducted inside them, ground soldiers facing ground soldiers. In other words, street fighting, like what we see in Nassiryah.

Bombing however creates ruins and ruins are a defending street fighter's best friend! The longer the bombings last and the stronger they are, the more ruins will be there. With enough bombs, most cities can be turned into something resembling late Stalingrad.

Is there nothing wrong with this picture?

[Cyrus]

. . . to need a gun and not have it."

"True Romance", Donald Rumsfeld's favorite family movie.

[brad]

'Even then, the bombing has been much more limited than what was originally threatened. '

yeah i was wondering about this. your explanation seems pretty good.

[The_Baron]

While the entry of Syria and/or Iran would complicate things to an incredible degree in terms of the current deployment of forces. In some ways, it would simplify things as it would open up two new locations from which the theater could be accessed. Also, Syria entering the melee would very likely push Jordan into active support on our side. Abudullah is not fond of the idea of fighting fellow Muslim nations but the unbelievable risk of having his frontiers exposed to an active aggressor would most likely put him in a position where he had to act. He's a Special Forces officer with real world experience before his coronation, he, of all of the mid-east leaders, truly does understand the overall strategic concerns.
Iran is a bit dicier. They've got a fairly large but thoroughly incompetent military. There's essentially no way to limit casualties should they join in. Their basic tactics would lead to political and social concerns about what would be described as a, "massacre."
The Russian factor is a concern. They've made no bones about the fact they're willing to support Iran. But I sincerely doubt they're willing to commit to a nuclear intervention. Not only would that effectively remove them from any consideration towards international advancement or trade, the unfortunate fact is that their technology is likely degraded to the point that they can't afford to deploy it.
The Russian people have a tremendous stake in maintaining their appearance of being a global power. To fire off an SS-20 and have one or more of the warheads fail to generate full yield, fizzle or fail completely would be a psychological blow that I don't think they're willing to risk. I can picture them deploying entire battalions of Spetznazniki to assist but those soldiers are deniable. A nuke that duds at deplolyment is a big piece of malfunctioning technology sitting in a crater in the desert. It simply can't be denied.
This is not to say that I don't think there's a possibility of Kazakhstan pitching a nuke over the Tamils and trying to take out a US Brigade. Fortunately, the state of maintenance and ongoing support in Kazakhstan is even worse than in Russia.
I'm not discounting it by any means. But I also understand that the existing active stockpile of nuclear systems in the US is able to match all of the existing weapons in all of the CIS nations as well as China, Korea and Pakistan if they flip out.
Of course, the Pakistani weapons aren't what you'd honestly call, "state of the art." They claimed 35kt yield on one shot and seismological data indicated somewhere between four and nine actual kt. Their bombs aren't very good.
Given the centralization of governmental and religious leadership functions in Iran and the Syrian insistence on following 60s and 70s Soviet doctrine for combat, they're basically toast if the war went nuclear. Damascus is a city almost perfectly designed to be nuked. Tehran was actually one of the cities used as a notional target when developing the modern, "Near Simultaneous, Blast Limit Overlap MIRV deployment." Take a pair of MIRV equipped missiles, target them so as to drop in a grid over the target in such a way that all of the 5-PSI zones overlap. It's not actually simultaneous because of neutron flux considerations. It actually takes on the order of 25 to 45 minutes to deploy and detonate the entire MIRV payload of a pair of D5 Tridents or Minuteman-III missiles.
I honestly don't think any of the CIS nations would risk going nuclear. The repercussions are simply too horrific. They don't have the economic stability to survive the loss of the majority, if not the entirety, of their industrial and military support base.