FreakDaddy
08-03-2005, 04:30 AM
The concepts of immortality and soul have copiously been regulated by most of society to the realm of belief, superstition or irrational predicates. The idea that one can pursue a rational and logical approach to understanding the concept of the immorality of the soul is not given consideration by many in society today. The goal of this post is to present a rational and intelligible argument, through the use of Platonic text, for the necessity of the immortality of the psyche (or soul).
Soul
So, what is meant by the idea of soul? In Plato’s Phaedo, Socrates’ main pursuit is not to prove, in the scientific sense of the word, the existence of the soul, but to demonstrate through dialectical exploration that something exists which brings life and vitality to the body and that something(soul) is imperishable. Plato makes reference to previous discussions which have been made about the idea of soul and that a kind of a priori knowledge lends credence to the concept that something exists and has knowledge before the existence of a body . Plato argues that ‘our learning is simply recollection’ and because our learning is recollection we must have learned it at some former time. This would be impossible unless our soul existed somewhere before it was born into human shape.
The argument of recollection is simple. Socrates offers an example by stating that ‘knowledge of a man and knowledge of a lyre are different’ . When a person sees a lyre through the senses, that person not only knows the lyre, but also will conceive in their mind the person who owns the lyre. That conception is recollection. The person identifying the lyre not only knows the lyre, but must have had some previous knowledge of its owner, thus the recognition of the lyre also brings with it, recollection of its owner.
Socrates then proceeds to ask, “When you see a horse or lyre in a picture, is it possible to remember a man? And when you see Simmias in a picture to remember Cebes? Or when you see Simmias in a picture, to remember Simmias?” Simmias agrees with Socrates’ questions. Socrates concludes that when seeing one thing from sight, you may think of another thing, whether like the thing seen or unlike it. Socrates is now laying the ground work for the idea that when we see equal things, we recognize that they are not equal things, but we have never seen perfect equality, therefore we must have known perfect equality before we came into the body in order to make such judgments.
“Consider then,” says Socrates, “there is such a thing as equal, not a stick equal to a stick, or a stone to a stone, but something independent which is alongside all of them, the equal itself, equality.” The idea of equality, Socrates asserts, must be independent of the things which are being compared. Socrates continues, “When one sees a thing, and thinks, ‘This which I now see wants to be like something else-like one of the things that are, but falls short and is unable to be such as that is, it is inferior,’ it is necessary, I suppose, that he who thinks thus has previous knowledge of that which he thinks it resembles but falls short of.” The idea of likeness, in relation to equality, demonstrates that while we may perceive through the senses some likeness to the thing in question, the thing falls short of perceptual perfect equality. Socrates concludes, “Then before we began to see and hear and use our other senses, we must have got knowledge somewhere of what the equal is, if we were going to compare with it the things judged equal by the senses and see that all things are eager to be such as that equal is, but are inferior to it.”
Socrates is begging the question, from where do we get this knowledge and what is it that maintains this knowledge? Since we have the capacity to judge inequality, Socrates asserts that we had the knowledge of equality and everything that we seal with the name of ‘that which is’ before birth. Thus, this thing which maintains this body of knowledge, we will call soul.
The Souls Kinship
To continue the refinement of our idea of soul, we should ask, ‘what is the soul like?’ Is the soul composite, which is by nature compounded and thus in a constant state of change or is it more like an uncompounded thing, which by nature keeps the same state? Socrates offers the following argument to these questions, “Does the idea of equal itself and everything that exists by itself, ‘that which is’- does it admit of changes? Or is it true that each thing that exists, being of one form and itself alone, is always in the same state and never admits of any change?” Based on our earlier reasoning, when comparing two things, the idea of equality is a separate ‘thing’ apart from the two things being compared. The idea of equality must remain in the same state in order for us to have knowledge of it and apply it to anything that we wish to compare. If the idea was in a state of constant change, we would not be able to behold, or grasp it and apply the idea to the comparison of two things.
Next, in relation to things we perceive such as dresses, horses, men or anything else which can be grasped by the senses, do these things stay in the same state, or do they constantly change in and of themselves and in relation to one another? If these things never stay in the same state, then we can make a distinction between things that can be touched, seen or perceived by the senses. That which can be perceived by the senses is in a constant state of change, but that which remains in the same state can only be grasped by intellectual reasoning and thus are invisible and unseen.
Now within ourselves we have what we call a body, which is visible, and based on our earlier reasoning, something which we are calling soul, which is unseen. Since the body is visible and is thus likened to that which is in constant change, the soul is likened to the unseen and does not change but remains constant. Therefore the soul is more akin to ‘that which is’ and the unchanging ideals such as equality.
Argument of Opposites
What do we mean when we talk of diametrically opposed opposites? When we say something is big and small, beautiful and ugly, just and unjust, how do these pairs of opposites come into being? Does the idea of small exist only because it’s opposite exists? Does one opposite cause generation for the other? Socrates offers the following to Cebes, “Let us enquire whether everything that has an opposite must come from it’s opposite and from nowhere else. For example, when anything becomes bigger, it must, I suppose, become bigger from being smaller before.” Socrates begins to introduce a class of opposites that we will distinguish as ‘er’. Socrates states that weaker was once stronger and vice versa and the same with slower and quicker. The distinction being made here is that all classes of things that contain an ‘er’, such as weaker and stronger, these sets of opposites must go through a process. They continually increase or diminish from one thing (weaker) to its opposite (stronger). A conclusion is reached that opposites come into being from each other and that there is a becoming from one to the other.
Socrates then asks, “Is there something opposite to being alive, as sleeping is opposite to being awake?” Cebes replies that there is and the answer is being dead. Socrates concludes, “Then from the dead, Cebes, come living things and living men?”
If the opposite of one thing did not return back to replace it’s opposite in a cyclical fashion, then in the end all things would get the same form and go through the same process and becomings would cease. Socrates offers the following example, “If there was falling asleep, but waking up did not return back in its place, coming into being from the sleeping, then everything would be in the same state, asleep.” Therefore there must be a continual returning of one opposite to its opposite, otherwise all things would remain constant in only one state.
Next Socrates reintroduces the idea of a things essence by stating that things are beautiful because they participate in beauty. Socrates continues, “that what makes it beautiful is only that beauty, whether its presence or a share in it or however it may be with the thing.” Socrates wishes to assert that a thing is not beautiful because of its shape or color, but because its essence participates with the ideal of beauty. Socrates asks Cebes, “And by greatness the great things are great, and the greater greater, and by smallness small things are small?” The overriding question being, that whatever that thing is, it only exhibits those qualities because it participates most directly with an ideal. A thing is great because it essence is akin to greatness. To the degree in which a thing participates with the ideal, is to the degree it will exhibit a likeness to that ideal.
Now we shall explore the idea of opposites from a different class that we will distinguish as ‘ness’. The next class of opposites that Socrates offers are distinct from the previous class of opposites because this class is in the subject which posses them. Socrates asks, “When you say Simmias is bigger than Socrates and smaller than Phadion, you say that both are in Simmias, both bigness and smallness?” Thus Socrates concludes, “Simmias has the title of being both small and great, being between both.” Socrates continues, “For it appears to me that bigness itself never consents to be big and small at the same time, and not only that, even the bigness in us never accepts smallness and will not be surpassed; but one of two things, it must either depart and retreat whenever its opposite, smallness comes near, or else must perish at its approach; it does not consent to submit and receive the smallness, and so to become other that what it is.” . While both smallness and bigness are in the subject, neither is destroyed by its opposite. Therefore the opposite does not become other then what it is, its opposite, but maintains its own integrity.
Immortality of the Soul
Now we have two classes of opposites, that which admits of a process (er) and that which is in the subject that posses it (ness). Socrates offers the following argument to expand this concept. Socrates asks Cebes whether hot and cold is the same as fire and snow. Cebes replies, “not at all.” Socrates continues on, “Well, I suppose you agree that snow receiving fire will never be what it was, snow, and also be hot, but when the hot approaches it will either retreat from it or be destroyed. Fire also, when the cold approaches, will either go away from it or be destroyed, but it will never endure to receive the coldness and still be what it was, fire, and cold too.” We now have the following model:
Hot : Cold <---- Ideas (ness)
Fire : Snow <---- Compounded (er)
The idea of hot will never destroy the idea of cold, but when fire approaches snow, the coldness which is in the snow will yield to the hotness which is in the fire. The snow will go through a process of change and become water and then vapor, but the snow will never become fire, or the essence of fire, which is hot. As Socrates states, “If you distinguish thus, not only the opposite does not receive the opposite, but that also which brings anything opposite to whatever it approaches never receives the opposite to that which it brings.”
If the soul brings vitality and life to the body, then whatever the soul occupies, it comes to it bringing life. If the opposite of life is death, then the soul will never receive the opposite to that which it brings. Therefore if that which does not receive death is immortal, and the soul does not receive death, then the soul is a thing immortal.
Conclusion
We can now assign the concept of body to the compounded or visible realm, and the soul to ideas or the realm of the unseen. The following can be used to complete the model.
Hot : Cold <--- Ideas (ness) <--- Soul
Fire : Snow <--- Compounded (er) <--- Body
Socrates concludes, “If the not-hot were necessarily imperishable, when someone brought a hot thing to snow, the snow would retire safe and unmelted? For it would not be destroyed, nor would it remain and receive the heat.” Just as the idea of cold is imperishable, the snow itself will never receive the opposite of that which it brings. Thus the snow will not receive fire, but will remain imperishable as well. So, if the immortal is imperishable and the soul is immortal, then it is impossible for the soul to be destroyed, since it will never receive its opposite, death. Therefore, the soul is imperishable and immortal.
Soul
So, what is meant by the idea of soul? In Plato’s Phaedo, Socrates’ main pursuit is not to prove, in the scientific sense of the word, the existence of the soul, but to demonstrate through dialectical exploration that something exists which brings life and vitality to the body and that something(soul) is imperishable. Plato makes reference to previous discussions which have been made about the idea of soul and that a kind of a priori knowledge lends credence to the concept that something exists and has knowledge before the existence of a body . Plato argues that ‘our learning is simply recollection’ and because our learning is recollection we must have learned it at some former time. This would be impossible unless our soul existed somewhere before it was born into human shape.
The argument of recollection is simple. Socrates offers an example by stating that ‘knowledge of a man and knowledge of a lyre are different’ . When a person sees a lyre through the senses, that person not only knows the lyre, but also will conceive in their mind the person who owns the lyre. That conception is recollection. The person identifying the lyre not only knows the lyre, but must have had some previous knowledge of its owner, thus the recognition of the lyre also brings with it, recollection of its owner.
Socrates then proceeds to ask, “When you see a horse or lyre in a picture, is it possible to remember a man? And when you see Simmias in a picture to remember Cebes? Or when you see Simmias in a picture, to remember Simmias?” Simmias agrees with Socrates’ questions. Socrates concludes that when seeing one thing from sight, you may think of another thing, whether like the thing seen or unlike it. Socrates is now laying the ground work for the idea that when we see equal things, we recognize that they are not equal things, but we have never seen perfect equality, therefore we must have known perfect equality before we came into the body in order to make such judgments.
“Consider then,” says Socrates, “there is such a thing as equal, not a stick equal to a stick, or a stone to a stone, but something independent which is alongside all of them, the equal itself, equality.” The idea of equality, Socrates asserts, must be independent of the things which are being compared. Socrates continues, “When one sees a thing, and thinks, ‘This which I now see wants to be like something else-like one of the things that are, but falls short and is unable to be such as that is, it is inferior,’ it is necessary, I suppose, that he who thinks thus has previous knowledge of that which he thinks it resembles but falls short of.” The idea of likeness, in relation to equality, demonstrates that while we may perceive through the senses some likeness to the thing in question, the thing falls short of perceptual perfect equality. Socrates concludes, “Then before we began to see and hear and use our other senses, we must have got knowledge somewhere of what the equal is, if we were going to compare with it the things judged equal by the senses and see that all things are eager to be such as that equal is, but are inferior to it.”
Socrates is begging the question, from where do we get this knowledge and what is it that maintains this knowledge? Since we have the capacity to judge inequality, Socrates asserts that we had the knowledge of equality and everything that we seal with the name of ‘that which is’ before birth. Thus, this thing which maintains this body of knowledge, we will call soul.
The Souls Kinship
To continue the refinement of our idea of soul, we should ask, ‘what is the soul like?’ Is the soul composite, which is by nature compounded and thus in a constant state of change or is it more like an uncompounded thing, which by nature keeps the same state? Socrates offers the following argument to these questions, “Does the idea of equal itself and everything that exists by itself, ‘that which is’- does it admit of changes? Or is it true that each thing that exists, being of one form and itself alone, is always in the same state and never admits of any change?” Based on our earlier reasoning, when comparing two things, the idea of equality is a separate ‘thing’ apart from the two things being compared. The idea of equality must remain in the same state in order for us to have knowledge of it and apply it to anything that we wish to compare. If the idea was in a state of constant change, we would not be able to behold, or grasp it and apply the idea to the comparison of two things.
Next, in relation to things we perceive such as dresses, horses, men or anything else which can be grasped by the senses, do these things stay in the same state, or do they constantly change in and of themselves and in relation to one another? If these things never stay in the same state, then we can make a distinction between things that can be touched, seen or perceived by the senses. That which can be perceived by the senses is in a constant state of change, but that which remains in the same state can only be grasped by intellectual reasoning and thus are invisible and unseen.
Now within ourselves we have what we call a body, which is visible, and based on our earlier reasoning, something which we are calling soul, which is unseen. Since the body is visible and is thus likened to that which is in constant change, the soul is likened to the unseen and does not change but remains constant. Therefore the soul is more akin to ‘that which is’ and the unchanging ideals such as equality.
Argument of Opposites
What do we mean when we talk of diametrically opposed opposites? When we say something is big and small, beautiful and ugly, just and unjust, how do these pairs of opposites come into being? Does the idea of small exist only because it’s opposite exists? Does one opposite cause generation for the other? Socrates offers the following to Cebes, “Let us enquire whether everything that has an opposite must come from it’s opposite and from nowhere else. For example, when anything becomes bigger, it must, I suppose, become bigger from being smaller before.” Socrates begins to introduce a class of opposites that we will distinguish as ‘er’. Socrates states that weaker was once stronger and vice versa and the same with slower and quicker. The distinction being made here is that all classes of things that contain an ‘er’, such as weaker and stronger, these sets of opposites must go through a process. They continually increase or diminish from one thing (weaker) to its opposite (stronger). A conclusion is reached that opposites come into being from each other and that there is a becoming from one to the other.
Socrates then asks, “Is there something opposite to being alive, as sleeping is opposite to being awake?” Cebes replies that there is and the answer is being dead. Socrates concludes, “Then from the dead, Cebes, come living things and living men?”
If the opposite of one thing did not return back to replace it’s opposite in a cyclical fashion, then in the end all things would get the same form and go through the same process and becomings would cease. Socrates offers the following example, “If there was falling asleep, but waking up did not return back in its place, coming into being from the sleeping, then everything would be in the same state, asleep.” Therefore there must be a continual returning of one opposite to its opposite, otherwise all things would remain constant in only one state.
Next Socrates reintroduces the idea of a things essence by stating that things are beautiful because they participate in beauty. Socrates continues, “that what makes it beautiful is only that beauty, whether its presence or a share in it or however it may be with the thing.” Socrates wishes to assert that a thing is not beautiful because of its shape or color, but because its essence participates with the ideal of beauty. Socrates asks Cebes, “And by greatness the great things are great, and the greater greater, and by smallness small things are small?” The overriding question being, that whatever that thing is, it only exhibits those qualities because it participates most directly with an ideal. A thing is great because it essence is akin to greatness. To the degree in which a thing participates with the ideal, is to the degree it will exhibit a likeness to that ideal.
Now we shall explore the idea of opposites from a different class that we will distinguish as ‘ness’. The next class of opposites that Socrates offers are distinct from the previous class of opposites because this class is in the subject which posses them. Socrates asks, “When you say Simmias is bigger than Socrates and smaller than Phadion, you say that both are in Simmias, both bigness and smallness?” Thus Socrates concludes, “Simmias has the title of being both small and great, being between both.” Socrates continues, “For it appears to me that bigness itself never consents to be big and small at the same time, and not only that, even the bigness in us never accepts smallness and will not be surpassed; but one of two things, it must either depart and retreat whenever its opposite, smallness comes near, or else must perish at its approach; it does not consent to submit and receive the smallness, and so to become other that what it is.” . While both smallness and bigness are in the subject, neither is destroyed by its opposite. Therefore the opposite does not become other then what it is, its opposite, but maintains its own integrity.
Immortality of the Soul
Now we have two classes of opposites, that which admits of a process (er) and that which is in the subject that posses it (ness). Socrates offers the following argument to expand this concept. Socrates asks Cebes whether hot and cold is the same as fire and snow. Cebes replies, “not at all.” Socrates continues on, “Well, I suppose you agree that snow receiving fire will never be what it was, snow, and also be hot, but when the hot approaches it will either retreat from it or be destroyed. Fire also, when the cold approaches, will either go away from it or be destroyed, but it will never endure to receive the coldness and still be what it was, fire, and cold too.” We now have the following model:
Hot : Cold <---- Ideas (ness)
Fire : Snow <---- Compounded (er)
The idea of hot will never destroy the idea of cold, but when fire approaches snow, the coldness which is in the snow will yield to the hotness which is in the fire. The snow will go through a process of change and become water and then vapor, but the snow will never become fire, or the essence of fire, which is hot. As Socrates states, “If you distinguish thus, not only the opposite does not receive the opposite, but that also which brings anything opposite to whatever it approaches never receives the opposite to that which it brings.”
If the soul brings vitality and life to the body, then whatever the soul occupies, it comes to it bringing life. If the opposite of life is death, then the soul will never receive the opposite to that which it brings. Therefore if that which does not receive death is immortal, and the soul does not receive death, then the soul is a thing immortal.
Conclusion
We can now assign the concept of body to the compounded or visible realm, and the soul to ideas or the realm of the unseen. The following can be used to complete the model.
Hot : Cold <--- Ideas (ness) <--- Soul
Fire : Snow <--- Compounded (er) <--- Body
Socrates concludes, “If the not-hot were necessarily imperishable, when someone brought a hot thing to snow, the snow would retire safe and unmelted? For it would not be destroyed, nor would it remain and receive the heat.” Just as the idea of cold is imperishable, the snow itself will never receive the opposite of that which it brings. Thus the snow will not receive fire, but will remain imperishable as well. So, if the immortal is imperishable and the soul is immortal, then it is impossible for the soul to be destroyed, since it will never receive its opposite, death. Therefore, the soul is imperishable and immortal.