Fundamental Question in the Philosophy of Religion

[bohemian]

Reading the debates on this forum, it becomes clear that the fundamental question is usually missed. I realize that not everyone has a grad degree in philosophy, but I hope this post will orient some of you in new directions.

Question: Suppose our belief system consists of a set of propositions. For every proposition P in this set, do we need a reason or evidence for believing that it is true?
Obviously, implications in the philosophy of religion will be huge depending on how we answer ("God exists" and "God does not exist" are examples of such propositions in this set).
This is a classical debate between Clifford (evidentialist) and James (pragmatist). Clifford states that "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." James refutes that. Among other things, it is easy to see that this is in fact impossible:
What is my evidence/reason for belief A? B.
What is my evidence/reason for belief B? C.
What is my evidence/reason for belief C? D.
etc.
In other words, the evidentialist requirement can never be met. We'd need an infinite sequence of reasons. It appears that there must be some sub-set of beliefs which are foundational (i.e. can/must be believed without appeal to any other beliefs or reasons, which provide a foundation/ground for all the other beliefs).
Question: Does (dis)belief in God belong in this set? Still open question in contemporary philosophy of religion. But it is hard to see how it would not.

Contrary to popular conceptions of philosophy, theism made a huge comeback in recent years (mostly thanks to reformed epistemology such as that of Alvin Plantinga). If you think otherwise, you are still living in the 70s. The days of Flew and Mackie are gone.

[maurile]

[ QUOTE ]
It appears that there must be some sub-set of beliefs which are foundational (i.e. can/must be believed without appeal to any other beliefs or reasons, which provide a foundation/ground for all the other beliefs).

[/ QUOTE ]
True.

[ QUOTE ]
Question: Does (dis)belief in God belong in this set?

[/ QUOTE ]
Of course not. Foundational beliefs are stuff like that solipsism is false, inductive reasoning is somewhat reliable, our senses somewhat accurately convey to us information about the real world, the world is more than five minutes old, etc.

Whether or not some particular object exists, even if that object is some god or another, is not foundational in the sense that more ordinary reasoning depends on it. "God exists" (or "doesn't exist") is no better candidate for belief without evidence than "Julius Caesar's father owned a male dog" or "The atom on the left will decay before the atom on the right."

[BZ_Zorro]

Using just logic to examine imprecise premises is like trying to rebuild an engine with a just pair of pliers. Plenty of clanging and cursing but you won't actually get anwhere.

The problem here is that no one has defined what god is. Does Oghnoidsf exist? Which set should it be in? A defintion is needed before this becomes meaningful. However , you can't define God because by definition it is indefinable. God is super natural, if it wasn't it wouldn't be God. Super natural entities exist outside of the realm of rational, logical and evidence based thinking.

That said, belief in any entity not readily observed by empirical experience or easily inferred should be in the set of things that require evidence. This is just common sense.

[drudman]

[ QUOTE ]
Reading the debates on this forum, it becomes clear that the fundamental question is usually missed. I realize that not everyone has a grad degree in philosophy, but I hope this post will orient some of you in new directions.

Question: Suppose our belief system consists of a set of propositions. For every proposition P in this set, do we need a reason or evidence for believing that it is true?
Obviously, implications in the philosophy of religion will be huge depending on how we answer ("God exists" and "God does not exist" are examples of such propositions in this set).
This is a classical debate between Clifford (evidentialist) and James (pragmatist). Clifford states that "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." James refutes that. Among other things, it is easy to see that this is in fact impossible:
What is my evidence/reason for belief A? B.
What is my evidence/reason for belief B? C.
What is my evidence/reason for belief C? D.
etc.
In other words, the evidentialist requirement can never be met. We'd need an infinite sequence of reasons. It appears that there must be some sub-set of beliefs which are foundational (i.e. can/must be believed without appeal to any other beliefs or reasons, which provide a foundation/ground for all the other beliefs).
Question: Does (dis)belief in God belong in this set? Still open question in contemporary philosophy of religion. But it is hard to see how it would not.

Contrary to popular conceptions of philosophy, theism made a huge comeback in recent years (mostly thanks to reformed epistemology such as that of Alvin Plantinga). If you think otherwise, you are still living in the 70s. The days of Flew and Mackie are gone.

[/ QUOTE ]

All propositions are either analytic or synthetic. Period.

"God exists"/"God does not exist" are not propositions at all.

[Bodhi]

I don't have a graduate degree in philosophy, but I disagree strongly with your conclusion:
[ QUOTE ]
In other words, the evidentialist requirement can never be met. We'd need an infinite sequence of reasons. It appears that there must be some sub-set of beliefs which are foundational (i.e. can/must be believed without appeal to any other beliefs or reasons, which provide a foundation/ground for all the other beliefs).

[/ QUOTE ]

But go ahead and tell me what these foundational beliefs are supposed to be, and how they stand alone without justification from a further chain of beliefs.

[Bodhi]

[ QUOTE ]
Quote:
It appears that there must be some sub-set of beliefs which are foundational (i.e. can/must be believed without appeal to any other beliefs or reasons, which provide a foundation/ground for all the other beliefs).


True.

[/ QUOTE ]
/images/graemlins/confused.gif
Please explain your side of it.

[maurile]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Quote:
It appears that there must be some sub-set of beliefs which are foundational (i.e. can/must be believed without appeal to any other beliefs or reasons, which provide a foundation/ground for all the other beliefs).


True.

[/ QUOTE ]
/images/graemlins/confused.gif
Please explain your side of it.

[/ QUOTE ]
Take the belief that the world didn't just pop into existence two and a half seconds ago, dinosaur fossils and all, with all your previous memories intact (faked, like the dinosaur fossils).

There's no evidence against the two-and-a-half-second-year-old-world idea.

But we take its falsity as a foundational belief. A sort of first principle.

Likewise, the idea that inductive reasoning can be relied on -- which is the foundation of all of science -- is in the same category. You can't deductively prove that induction works. You can only show it inductively, which makes any argument for it circular. So we don't accept it because of an argument; we just accept it as a first principle.

[Bodhi]

[ QUOTE ]
Take the belief that the world didn't just pop into existence two and a half seconds ago, dinosaur fossils and all, with all your previous memories intact (faked, like the dinosaur fossils).

[/ QUOTE ]

You don't mean to say that avoiding radical skepticism is the main reason to suppose that there must be foundational beliefs, do you?

As I see it, my belief that the world is not fake, not created two seconds ago, is justified by other beliefs, e.g. that I'm not hallucinating; it's daylight out (standard observing conditions), I can see just fine, and I haven't noticed any objects popping in and out of existence, etc. In turn, these beliefs should be justified by other beliefs, with no end to the chain.

The idea of foundational beliefs may make sense working backwards philosophically, but for the story cognition and language I find it very problematic.

[maurile]

[ QUOTE ]
As I see it, my belief that the world is not fake, not created two seconds ago, is justified by other beliefs, e.g. that I'm not hallucinating; it's daylight out (standard observing conditions), I can see just fine, and I haven't noticed any objects popping in and out of existence, etc.

[/ QUOTE ]
All of those things are consistent with the two-second conjecture. Every observation you can possibly make is consistent with the two-second conjecture, which means there's no evidence against it. So your rejection of it is not justified by other (justified) beliefs.

[Bodhi]

This kind of radical skepticism is literal nonsense.

[maurile]

What radical skepticism?

I didn't say we shouldn't believe that the two-second idea is false. I believe it is false. The point, though, is that there's no evidence that it's false. So, as the original poster said, there are some beliefs that we hold despite the lack of any evidence for them. There's nothing wrong with that.

[chezlaw]

Even more fundemental (I believe) when attempting to discuss belief systems is what it is to believe something.

If you believe a set of propositions P1, P2, ... then should that require that you have a strong idea what P1, P2, ... mean, at least in as far as they interact with each other. If so then many people who think they believe in god simply dont.

Or should it require some commitment to the 'belief'. People don't commit adultary in full view of the spouse but some people who 'believe' in an all-seeing god who damns adultary do commit the act - is that possible if they really believed in their god.

The question why do so many people believe in god keeps coming up but I wonder how many actually do believe in god by any serious criteria for believing in something.

chez

[bohemian]

Interesting how every single reply missed the point.

[BZ_Zorro]

Except (imho) this one:
[ QUOTE ]
All propositions are either analytic or synthetic. Period.

"God exists"/"God does not exist" are not propositions at all.

[/ QUOTE ]

[jthegreat]

[ QUOTE ]
In other words, the evidentialist requirement can never be met. We'd need an infinite sequence of reasons. It appears that there must be some sub-set of beliefs which are foundational (i.e. can/must be believed without appeal to any other beliefs or reasons, which provide a foundation/ground for all the other beliefs).

[/ QUOTE ]

Yep. Those are called axioms or axiomatic beliefs. They're self-evident.

[ QUOTE ]
Question: Does (dis)belief in God belong in this set?

[/ QUOTE ]

No, although some people definitely do treat it as axiomatic that a god exists. They stretch "self-evident" a bit far.

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
Clifford states that "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence."

[/ QUOTE ]

How much evidence would Clifford require to hold a non-wrong belief of this statement? and did he have it?

James' argument against clifford doesn't quite demolish clifford. It sound like clifford had a very high standard for something to qualify as a belief. It could be that by Clifford's criteria all beliefs are wrong. Presumably that could still match reality by accident. Its similar to a skeptics view of knowledge.

I have litle familiarity with James but as I understand it James' pragmatism has the reverse problem that correct beliefs are easy to come by but they can turn out not to match realty. Doesn't he resolve this by abandoning reality?

chez

[drudman]

[ QUOTE ]
Except (imho) this one:
[ QUOTE ]
All propositions are either analytic or synthetic. Period.

"God exists"/"God does not exist" are not propositions at all.

[/ QUOTE ]

[/ QUOTE ]

Thanks for pointing this out Zorro.

[bohemian]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
In other words, the evidentialist requirement can never be met. We'd need an infinite sequence of reasons. It appears that there must be some sub-set of beliefs which are foundational (i.e. can/must be believed without appeal to any other beliefs or reasons, which provide a foundation/ground for all the other beliefs).

[/ QUOTE ]

Yep. Those are called axioms or axiomatic beliefs. They're self-evident.

[ QUOTE ]
Question: Does (dis)belief in God belong in this set?

[/ QUOTE ]

No, although some people definitely do treat it as axiomatic that a god exists. They stretch "self-evident" a bit far.

[/ QUOTE ]

Foundational does not mean self-evident.

Exactly, what criteria should we use in order to determine if any proposition P can be a member of the foundational set of beliefs?

[Bodhi]

I'm pretty unwilling to accept the idea of "foundational beliefs."

As things stand, then is it because we believe the two second hypothesis is false despite evidence that we call it a foundational belief? How does that make it foundational? Is it more that a world-view would come crashing down were the 2 second hypothesis to be accepted?

I'm entertaining the idea for the sake of argument. I still believe that it's nonsense because it's one of those untestable, useless, brain-in-a-vat scenarios that borrows language in a way that has no connection to normal use. Moreover, because (according to you) nothing justifies not believing the 2 second theory, it seems like we're treating beliefs as building blocks instead of a group to be tested together against experience.

[Bodhi]

[ QUOTE ]
Exactly, what criteria should we use in order to determine if any proposition P can be a member of the foundational set of beliefs?

[/ QUOTE ]

Or more precisely, why ought we believe that there is a foundational set of beliefs?

[Darryl_P]

You guys are good! This has got to be the most intelligent forum I've ever come across. I particularly like:

[ QUOTE ]
Among other things, it is easy to see that this is in fact impossible:
What is my evidence/reason for belief A? B.
What is my evidence/reason for belief B? C.
What is my evidence/reason for belief C? D.
etc.
In other words, the evidentialist requirement can never be met.

[/ QUOTE ]

100% agree here. Seems obvious to me since the evidentialist requirement by necessity must be fuzzy ie. the evidence needs to SUGGEST something, but it can never PROVE it. So just how strongly does it need to suggest something? Where is the cutoff? 75%, 90%, 95%, 99%, 99.9999%, ??? And even if a certain cutoff is agreed, how can we ever prove the probability of anything in the real world? Even a perfect coin and a perfect 6-sided die are theoretical constructs. Real-world coins and dice are not perfect so they will not produce the theoretical probabilities exactly. And we can never know the exact probabilities since it is impossible to conduct an experiment with an infinite number of repetitions.

So even probabilities of poker hands and the laws of physics like the law of gravity, say, are based on beliefs that the evidence suggests are 99.9999999999% likely to be true, but you need belief to turn it into 100%.

Some use the above as an excuse to not use logic or to not bother to use it properly, but this is wrong IMO. Once you have established your axioms via belief, logic is extremely useful, so much so that I'd say it's the number one tool which decides success or failure in life (according to my own belief system of course).

The thing that irks me, though, is that many logical thinkers are so arrogant as to believe that their views on life are correct and can be arrived at by logic ALONE. This of course is simply not true. They have a belief system and a set of axioms (even if they can't articulate it exactly) which, combined with strong logical abilities, has lead to success so far. It would be nice if they used their keen logical faculties to recognize this inherent limitation of logic.

[jthegreat]

^^^

And as a corollary, how could a belief be considered foundational if it's not axiomatic?

[drudman]

The criterion of verifiability determines what propositions are meaningful and which are not. Clearly (but sometimes not), no synthetic proposition can be verified 100%. This is okay, so long as we are prepared to alter our hypothesis if it is shown to be false. That is to say, it is not unreasonable to have and use synthetic propositions as foundational beliefs, again, so long as we are willing to part with them if they are shown to be false. Belief that these propositions are true does not (or at least should not) delude the believer to think that they are 100% true.

[bohemian]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Exactly, what criteria should we use in order to determine if any proposition P can be a member of the foundational set of beliefs?

[/ QUOTE ]

Or more precisely, why ought we believe that there is a foundational set of beliefs?

[/ QUOTE ]

God you're slow. See the first post.

[bohemian]

[ QUOTE ]
The criterion of verifiability determines what propositions are meaningful and which are not. Clearly (but sometimes not), no synthetic proposition can be verified 100%. This is okay, so long as we are prepared to alter our hypothesis if it is shown to be false. That is to say, it is not unreasonable to have and use synthetic propositions as foundational beliefs, again, so long as we are willing to part with them if they are shown to be false. Belief that these propositions are true does not (or at least should not) delude the believer to think that they are 100% true.

[/ QUOTE ]

What exactly verifies the "criterion of verifiability"? (for the sake of forum, state it)

[Bodhi]

God you're dense. See my reply.

[Bodhi]

pfff, you won't answer my questions. Why should he answer yours?

[bohemian]

[ QUOTE ]
pfff, you won't answer my questions. Why should he answer yours?

[/ QUOTE ]

I started the thread by defining the key question. Your inability to grasp it (or altenatively, your disinterest to engage it) is of no interest of me.

[Bodhi]

Your foundationalism is so out of step with contemporary epistemology that you made me choke when I read your first post.

[bohemian]

[ QUOTE ]
God you're dense. See my reply.

[/ QUOTE ]

See my reply.

[Bodhi]

Nope, you never replied to my original reply to your OP.

[bohemian]

[ QUOTE ]
Your foundationalism is so out of step with contemporary epistemology that you made me choke when I read your first post.

[/ QUOTE ]

Quite the opposite actually.

You remind me of those undergraduates who always argue without ever engaging or understanding the issue ("sir, how come I got C minus? It's NOT fair!").

[Bodhi]

Do you even have a graduate degree in philosophy? Where from? I took a grad seminar in epistemology with Hanna Ginsburg here at Cal and it sounds like you have no clue about the contemporary issues at hand here.

[bohemian]

[ QUOTE ]
I'm pretty unwilling to accept the idea of "foundational beliefs."

As things stand, then is it because we believe the two second hypothesis is false despite evidence that we call it a foundational belief? How does that make it foundational? Is it more that a world-view would come crashing down were the 2 second hypothesis to be accepted?

I'm entertaining the idea for the sake of argument. I still believe that it's nonsense because it's one of those untestable, useless, brain-in-a-vat scenarios that borrows language in a way that has no connection to normal use. Moreover, because (according to you) nothing justifies not believing the 2 second theory, it seems like we're treating beliefs as building blocks instead of a group to be tested together against experience.

[/ QUOTE ]

Simplistic and untenable.
How do you test beliefs "together against" experience if they emerge as a result of it in the first place.

[bohemian]

[ QUOTE ]
Do you even have a graduate degree in philosophy? Where from? I took a grad seminar in epistemology with Hanna Ginsburg here at Cal and it sounds like you have no clue about the contemporary issues at hand here.

[/ QUOTE ]

"Hanna Ginsburg"? lol Is that supposed to be a huge name in religious epistemology?

University of Toronto, the biggest and one of the best philosophy departments in north america.

You obviously have no clue about contemporary epistemology in the philosophy of religion.

[bohemian]

[ QUOTE ]
I don't have a graduate degree in philosophy,

[/ QUOTE ]

Figures.

[bohemian]

[ QUOTE ]
Nope, you never replied to my original reply to your OP.

[/ QUOTE ]

Sure did.

[Bodhi]

To be clear, I see very little argument in your OP, that's why I'm being hard on you. The moves I see you make look like this:

Do we need to have evidence for every belief?
Suppose yes. Every belief's justification is another belief, therefore there would be an infinite chain of justifying beliefs, and that can't be right.

Therefore, we don't need evidence for every belief which is to say that some of them are foundational.

So why can't it be right that there's an infinite chain of justifying beliefs? So far I so no independent argument on this point, except for some vague attempt to flatter our intuition or common sense.

I have my own ideas about epistemology, but you haven't given a satisfactory explanation of your OP, and you've simply lowered yourself with your claptrap about how great a graduate degree is and how undergrads whine. Perhaps it appeared like I was being unfair or ignoring the content in the first place, but if you look over the history of this thread you will see that you ingored my original reply and never bothered to answer. Then, when I brough it up later, you dismissed me. F u, and I mean that in the nicest way possible. /images/graemlins/cool.gif

If we both like philosophy then I think we can come to some understanding here.

[bohemian]

[ QUOTE ]
So why can't it be right that there's an infinite chain of justifying beliefs?

[/ QUOTE ]

Glad that you're finally engaging the argument.

So I'd like you to pick a position on the question "Does God exist?". State it. And then please, post an infinite chain of justifying beliefs.

[Bodhi]

Now you really have me confused. What do you test your beliefs against besides experience?

[Bodhi]

After the fact dumbass. /images/graemlins/cool.gif

[Bodhi]

Well, except reading some William James, I am no doubt not as well versed as you. I am really surprised that your field is so divorced from other areas of epistemology, specifically the last 50 years in the philosophy of language. Surely the two sides would benefit from some exchange of ideas?

I don't think Ginsburg has written anything, nor does she have an interest in, the philosophy of religion. She is simply a Phd here at Cal who had done seminars on epistemology.

[Bodhi]

Well, except reading some William James, I am no doubt not as well versed as you. I am really surprised that your field is so divorced from other areas of epistemology, specifically the last 50 years in the philosophy of language. Surely the two sides would benefit from some exchange of ideas?

I don't think Ginsburg has written anything, nor does she have an interest in, the philosophy of religion. She is simply a Phd here at Cal who has done seminars on epistemology.

[bohemian]

[ QUOTE ]
After the fact dumbass. /images/graemlins/cool.gif

[/ QUOTE ]

In the firs post, dumbass. /images/graemlins/cool.gif

[bohemian]

[ QUOTE ]
Well, except reading some William James, I am no doubt not as well versed as you. I am really surprised that your field is so divorced from other areas of epistemology, specifically the last 50 years in the philosophy of language. Surely the two sides would benefit from some exchange of ideas?

I don't think Ginsburg has written anything, nor does she have an interest in, the philosophy of religion. She is simply a Phd here at Cal who has done seminars on epistemology.

[/ QUOTE ]

Have you done any readings in reformed epistemology? (Plantinga and gang?)

[Bodhi]

Bad example, because I'm an agnostic. /images/graemlins/cool.gif

I take it that your request to post an infinite chain of justifying beliefs is rhetorical?

Still, that is how I think belief works regarding the day of the week, the color of the sky, and what happens if you drop an egg on the pavement. For example, "the sky is blue," is justified by my beliefs, it is daylight out, I don't have tinted glasses on, every one else calls this 'blue,' etc. You could then ask for justification for those beliefs, and I would again tell you another story about my beliefs that are consistent with the first. That we never come to a stopping point where no further questions are possible is not an objection.

That belief in God or disbelief in God lacks justifiability is to me an objection against both. On the other hand, I suppose an avid believer or atheist would be willing to take up the challenge and might maintain that there's justification for belief or disbelief.

[Bodhi]

Never heard of them. /images/graemlins/blush.gif Our seminar read Sellars, McDowell, Davidson, Brandom, Stroud, Evans and Peacocke.

[bohemian]

[ QUOTE ]
Bad example, because I'm an agnostic. /images/graemlins/cool.gif

I take it that your request to post an infinite chain of justifying beliefs is rhetorical?

Still, that is how I think belief works regarding the day of the week, the color of the sky, and what happens if you drop an egg on the pavement. For example, "the sky is blue," is justified by my beliefs, it is daylight out, I don't have tinted glasses on, every one else calls this 'blue,' etc. You could then ask for justification for those beliefs, and I would again tell you another story about my beliefs that are consistent with the first. That we never come to a stopping point where no further questions are possible is not an objection.

That belief in God or disbelief in God lacks justifiability is to me an objection against both. On the other hand, I suppose an avid believer or atheist would be willing to take up the challenge and might maintain that there's justification for belief or disbelief.

[/ QUOTE ]

How are you justified in "telling stories" as you describe? You have a set of beliefs that you use as the foundation/ground for each other's plausibility. This is no different than foundationalism. You have a set of beliefs that justify your story. How do these beliefs get into your set of accepted beliefs? They had to be accepted at some point in time. How did that happen? Moreover, the apparent consistency of your set (i.e. ability to create explantions) says nothing about their truth/falsehood.

Your view is equally unjustifiable.

[maurile]

[ QUOTE ]
I'm pretty unwilling to accept the idea of "foundational beliefs."

[/ QUOTE ]
Well, I'm not exactly sure what "foundational" means in this context and I don't want this to get bogged down in semantics anyway.

Let's phrase it like this.

There are certain beliefs that we all accept that are justified neither by evidence nor by non-circular logic, nor by any combination of the two.

That the world is more than two seconds old is one such belief, but there are others. That inductive reasoning will continue to work in the future, for example.

[ QUOTE ]
I still believe that it's nonsense because it's one of those untestable, useless, brain-in-a-vat scenarios that borrows language in a way that has no connection to normal use.

[/ QUOTE ]
Actually, although I think pure solipsism amounts to language abuse, I think there are brain-in-a-vat scenarios that are good examples of stuff we disbelieve without evidence.

[ QUOTE ]
Moreover, because (according to you) nothing justifies not believing the 2 second theory, it seems like we're treating beliefs as building blocks instead of a group to be tested together against experience.

[/ QUOTE ]
Substitute "disbelieving" for "not believing," and substitute "No evidence or non-circular logic" for "nothing." Other than that, you've got the right idea.

Most ideas are testable, or can at least be evaluated in accordance with our general experience. Did giant fire-breathing spiders exist on any of the planets orbiting the star SR719015 before it became a white dwarf? Strictly speaking, it's not testable -- but we have enough information about the universe in general to set an extremely low probability for it. So there's no reason to be agnostic on that one.

Some ideas are not testable, and it's appropriate to remain agnostic about them -- which is another way of saying that based on everything we do know, we'd set the probability somewhere close to 50%. For example, assuming Julius Caesar's father owned exactly one dog, was it a male or a female?

Still other ideas, like the two-second-old-world idea, we have absolutely no information about and can't even set any kind of reasonable probability for them. I guess we could choose to be agnostic about all such ideas (the sort of "extreme skepticism" you criticized earlier in the thread) -- but I prefer to reject the two-second-old-world idea on faith. Same with the brain-in-a-vat idea. There are other ideas that I accept on faith, like that inductive reasoning will continue to work tomorrow.

I figured these are the kinds of things the original poster meant by "foundational beliefs," but maybe not. In any event, I don't think "God exists" or "God doesn't exist" are beliefs that anyone should accept or reject on pure faith. I think they are propositions (once the term "God" is sufficiently defined) whose probability can be roughly evaluated in light of our general knowledge of the universe even if, strictly speaking, they are untestable. Like giant fire-breathing spiders.

[maurile]

[ QUOTE ]
So I'd like you to pick a position on the question "Does God exist?".

[/ QUOTE ]
That's not a well-formed question until a definition of "God" is provided. Ask ten people what they think "God" is and you'll get ten different answers.

Let's say I come across some super-powerful being who can move mountains with his pinky. How am I supposed to evaluate whether he qualifies as a God?

[bohemian]

[ QUOTE ]
Never heard of them. /images/graemlins/blush.gif Our seminar read Sellars, McDowell, Davidson, Brandom, Stroud, Evans and Peacocke.

[/ QUOTE ]

<gasp> Dude, we need to seriously change that. Plantinga has been the leading thinker in the philosophy of religion for about 15-20 years now. Check out Plantinga's collection of online papers (http://www.homestead.com/philofreligion/Papersbyplantinga.html). Particularly, see Theism, Atheism, and Rationality (http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth02.html). The paper deals with rationality of belief without evidential support. A classic, whether you will agree with it or not.

[bohemian]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
So I'd like you to pick a position on the question "Does God exist?".

[/ QUOTE ]
That's not a well-formed question until a definition of "God" is provided. Ask ten people what they think "God" is and you'll get ten different answers.

Let's say I come across some super-powerful being who can move mountains with his pinky. How am I supposed to evaluate whether he qualifies as a God?

[/ QUOTE ]

The linguistic problem is not the one I care about (use the one in webster's if you wish). What is in question here is the possibility of having an infinite chain of causes as an explanation.

[maurile]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
So I'd like you to pick a position on the question "Does God exist?".

[/ QUOTE ]
That's not a well-formed question until a definition of "God" is provided. Ask ten people what they think "God" is and you'll get ten different answers.

Let's say I come across some super-powerful being who can move mountains with his pinky. How am I supposed to evaluate whether he qualifies as a God?

[/ QUOTE ]

The linguistic problem is not the one I care about (use the one in webster's if you wish).

[/ QUOTE ]
I'll use the definition that I think makes the most sense: A god is an entity that merits our worship.

Under that definition, I believe that no gods exist. To worship another being means to say to it, "Not my will, but thy will be done," no matter what it's will is. If it wants me to throw acid in a child's face, I should do it. If it wants Abraham to murder Isaac, he should do it.

I believe that worship is morally irresponsible, and therefore that no entity merits our worship. I have a duty to use my own best judgment and do what I think is right -- not to just blindly follow orders from some priest or some book or some god.

Since no entity merits our worship, no gods exist. QED.

[jthegreat]

Bohemian,

This will probaby end up going over my head, or at least will get into detail that I've never studied, but my last question got lost in the shuffle.

Any valid chain of reasoning has to start with first principles, i.e. - axioms. If it doesn't then the conclusions are arbitrary and ultimately meaningless. I'm not sure I understand why you would discuss "foundational beliefs" if those aren't meant to be axiomatic.

[drudman]

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So I'd like you to pick a position on the question "Does God exist?".

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That's not a well-formed question until a definition of "God" is provided. Ask ten people what they think "God" is and you'll get ten different answers.

Let's say I come across some super-powerful being who can move mountains with his pinky. How am I supposed to evaluate whether he qualifies as a God?

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The linguistic problem is not the one I care about (use the one in webster's if you wish).

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I'll use the definition that I think makes the most sense: A god is an entity that merits our worship.

Under that definition, I believe that no gods exist. To worship another being means to say to it, "Not my will, but thy will be done," no matter what it's will is. If it wants me to throw acid in a child's face, I should do it. If it wants Abraham to murder Isaac, he should do it.

I believe that worship is morally irresponsible, and therefore that no entity merits our worship. I have a duty to use my own best judgment and do what I think is right -- not to just blindly follow orders from some priest or some book or some god.

Since no entity merits our worship, no gods exist. QED.

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Your argument is analytic, and says nothing. You define God in such a way that it is contradictory to an opinion you have, which you then put forth as a premise. Both the premise and the definition are very easily assailed.

Keep in mind that any arguments or propositions that deal with metaphysical entities are literally meaningless. But no one will discuss sensible things on this forum.

[bohemian]

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But no one will discuss sensible things on this forum.

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It appears that way. You included.

Should have known before posting to zoo.

[bohemian]

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Bohemian,

This will probaby end up going over my head, or at least will get into detail that I've never studied, but my last question got lost in the shuffle.

Any valid chain of reasoning has to start with first principles, i.e. - axioms. If it doesn't then the conclusions are arbitrary and ultimately meaningless. I'm not sure I understand why you would discuss "foundational beliefs" if those aren't meant to be axiomatic.

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Foundational beliefs are not principles. They are beliefs.

[drudman]

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But no one will discuss sensible things on this forum.

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It appears that way. You included.

Should have known before posting to zoo.

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If I'm not mistaken, I didn't post to the Zoo. This is the SMP forum, not the Internet Gambling forum.

[jthegreat]

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Foundational beliefs are not principles. They are beliefs.

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I'll read that paper you linked. I don't understand why we'd even care about arbitrary foundational beliefs.

[LargeCents]

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But no one will discuss sensible things on this forum.

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It appears that way. You included.

Should have known before posting to zoo.

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If I'm not mistaken, I didn't post to the Zoo. This is the SMP forum, not the Internet Gambling forum.

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Zoo birds don't know where they are posting half the time. I think we lose half of the potenial zoo posts to GOP blogs throughout the internet. It's a growing problem.

[lastchance]

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Still other ideas, like the two-second-old-world idea, we have absolutely no information about and can't even set any kind of reasonable probability for them. I guess we could choose to be agnostic about all such ideas (the sort of "extreme skepticism" you criticized earlier in the thread) -- but I prefer to reject the two-second-old-world idea on faith. Same with the brain-in-a-vat idea. There are other ideas that I accept on faith, like that inductive reasoning will continue to work tomorrow.

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I now understand why people believe in God. With that, I go to sleep.

[drudman]

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Still other ideas, like the two-second-old-world idea, we have absolutely no information about and can't even set any kind of reasonable probability for them. I guess we could choose to be agnostic about all such ideas (the sort of "extreme skepticism" you criticized earlier in the thread) -- but I prefer to reject the two-second-old-world idea on faith. Same with the brain-in-a-vat idea. There are other ideas that I accept on faith, like that inductive reasoning will continue to work tomorrow.

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I now understand why people believe in God. With that, I go to sleep.

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Using inductive reasoning is not irrational so long as one is able to alter their hypotheses when they are confronted by damning evidence. By contrast, believing in brain-in-a-vat, two-second universe, or God in the face of no evidence at all is irrational.

[David Sklansky]

"By contrast, believing in brain-in-a-vat, two-second universe, or God in the face of no evidence at all is irrational."

There is evidence for God. It is not the human eyeball, not Not Ready's "just look around you", nor the beauty of the mountains (that last is accounted for perfectly by Mandelbrot's fractals). The evidence is quantum weirdness (double slit experimnt etc.), the big bang, and human consciousness. None of this evidence is strong and may become weaker still in the future, but it is evidence. Likewise the experience of thousands of Jewish people in the desert supposedly being spoken to at once by God. Almost certainly a lie or a trick, but again it is evidence.

Of course the evidence against God is much stonger. But when Atheists say there is no evidence at all for God they make themselves look foolish.

[Bodhi]

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Of course the evidence against God is much stonger. But when Atheists say there is no evidence at all for God they make themselves look foolish.

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What do you mean by evidence? A naturalistic stance is not foolish and denies the very possibility of evidence for or against a deity.

[drudman]

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"By contrast, believing in brain-in-a-vat, two-second universe, or God in the face of no evidence at all is irrational."

There is evidence for God. It is not the human eyeball, not Not Ready's "just look around you", nor the beauty of the mountains (that last is accounted for perfectly by Mandelbrot's fractals). The evidence is quantum weirdness (double slit experimnt etc.), the big bang, and human consciousness. None of this evidence is strong and may become weaker still in the future, but it is evidence. Likewise the experience of thousands of Jewish people in the desert supposedly being spoken to at once by God. Almost certainly a lie or a trick, but again it is evidence.

Of course the evidence against God is much stonger. But when Atheists say there is no evidence at all for God they make themselves look foolish.

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I'm not sure why you think that as-of-yet unexplainable phenomena are exvidence in favor of God, or human consciousness. It seems highly unorthodox of you to say that they are David, if it were anyone else who made this post I would have coldy and resoundly rejected it, but given that you've probably made me thousands of dollars, I'll hear you out first.

To go from "there are things that seemingly have no explanation" to "there is a God that causes these things" is a quantum (no pun intended) leap, and I can't think of a way to logically reconcile it.

Additionally, I don't know why you think there is evidence against God either. Any sentence that purports to make a proposition about metaphysical entities is not an actual proposition. This type of sentence is akin to fairy-tales.

[Bodhi]

A lot depends on what counts as a metaphysical entity. Care to fill me in?

[drudman]

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A lot depends on what counts as a metaphysical entity. Care to fill me in?

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Anything that does not belong to the phenomenal world.

[Cyrus]

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There is evidence for God. ... quantum weirdness, the big bang, and human consciousness ... the experience of thousands of Jewish people in the desert supposedly being spoken to at once by God.

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How can you possibly stuff in the same package objectively determined evidence, such as scientifically observed phaenomena, with the testimony of a person speaking on behalf of many persons on a matter of faith?

Do you perhaps think that we have separate and equally valid testimonies by enough individual persons to whom God spoke to, out of those "thousands of Jews"? We don't.

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Almost certainly a lie or a trick, but again it is evidence.

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I see. So if, out of a newly opened and honest deck of cards held in my hands, I mexican-overturn 52 Queens of Hearts, which is trivially accomplished, you will deduce that this is almost certainly a trick but that it is evidence that the deck contains 52 Queens of Hearts.

You are faltering.

[Bodhi]

Subatomic particles, then? Or howabout the hole a moth left in your favorite suit?

I'm fairly skeptical about the possibility of a general theory of genuine propositions vs. pseudo-propositions.

[drudman]

Addressing the problem that subatomic particles and similar phenomena seemingly present is difficult to do concisely. Basically, there are phenomena that we call subatomic particles. We just call them that. If you make propositions about those phenomena, that is a real proposition. If you infer the existence of something further that cannot be observed phenomenally and call that thing "subatomic particles" (which is commonly done) and make a proposition about that, you are no longer making a genuine proposition.

[David Sklansky]

You guys are getting too technical. Maybe I am not be rigorous in my use of the word "evidence". Everybody else knows what I mean though. Namely that there are things going on that science is not yet close to explaining, but would be explained easily if there was God.

[drudman]

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Namely that there are things going on that science is not yet close to explaining, but would be explained easily if there was God.

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Huge difference between this and "There is evidence for God."

[David Sklansky]

I don't distinguish beteween "there is evidence for" and "there is reason to think that".

[drudman]

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I don't distinguish beteween "there is evidence for" and "there is reason to think that".

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Okay, fine, but unexplained phenomena do not give reason to think that there is a metaphysical being that causes it.

[Bodhi]

I agree with drudman that replacing evidence with "reason to believe" is not going to solve any of the difficulties with the possibility of evidence for a deity.

[maurile]

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You guys are getting too technical. Maybe I am not be rigorous in my use of the word "evidence". Everybody else knows what I mean though. Namely that there are things going on that science is not yet close to explaining, but would be explained easily if there was God.

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They wouldn't be explained, unless you consider "Goddidit" an explanation -- which it isn't, any more than "it just happened" is an explanation.

An explanation requires specifying how God does it. What's the mechanism? "He snaps his fingers and then, poof!" is not an explanation.

Why are humans conscious? "God snapped his fingers, so we're conscious." "The universe has particles and fields and stuff in it, so we're conscious." Both statements have equal merit as explanations -- which is to say none, since neither one gives a mechanism.

[David Sklansky]

Keep in mind that my god is not necessarily omnipotent. As I said before, he could be a six year old boy, living in the eighth dimension, playing with his chemistry set.

Anyway your high falootin answers are just wrong. Here's the proof: Suppose that every Sunday at noon, the sun turned green and reformed itself into the shape of an ostrich for 43 minutes. Would you dare say that the fact that scientists couldn't explain it, still is no evidence for God?

[Prevaricator]

who created the boy in the 8th dimension? This line of thought just leads to the problem of infinite causation.

Of course a claim like this is always possible as it can never be disproven. The universe could be some experiment in somebody's basement. But this solves nothing, and complicates the situation infinitely.

[drudman]

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Keep in mind that my god is not necessarily omnipotent. As I said before, he could be a six year old boy, living in the eighth dimension, playing with his chemistry set.

Anyway your high falootin answers are just wrong. Here's the proof: Suppose that every Sunday at noon, the sun turned green and reformed itself into the shape of an ostrich for 43 minutes. Would you dare say that the fact that scientists couldn't explain it, still is no evidence for God?

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I am shocked that you think that it would be evidence for God.

[maurile]

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Keep in mind that my god is not necessarily omnipotent. As I said before, he could be a six year old boy, living in the eighth dimension, playing with his chemistry set.

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In what way would he be a god? Suppose we find out that an eight-dimensional boy turns the sun green every week. In terms of the power required, that's laughably out of proportion to creating the universe. To believe someone could create the universe because he turned the sun green is no different from believing he could create a star because he turned some red pentane solution green (using a chemistry set from Wal-Mart).

Even if he does produce evidence that he created the universe, does that mean we should worship him?
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Anyway your high falootin answers are just wrong. Here's the proof: Suppose that every Sunday at noon, the sun turned green and reformed itself into the shape of an ostrich for 43 minutes. Would you dare say that the fact that scientists couldn't explain it, still is no evidence for God?

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It would no more be evidence of a six-year-old with a chemistry set than it would be evidence of a man in blue tights from the planet Crypton.

All it's really evidence for is that the sun does some gnarly stuff. If you want to start drawing inferences about what is causing the gnarly stuff, you need separate evidence for each inference. If the sun really becomes shaped like an unmistakable ostrich, I would grant that there's probably a conscious will behind it. Explanations involving a conscious will would seem less far-fetched than explanations involving coincidence.

Do you think human consciousness or the other examples you mentioned are like an ostrich-shaped sun in that respect?

[Bodhi]

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I am shocked that you think that it would be evidence for God.

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[Cyrus]

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Here's the proof: Suppose that every Sunday at noon, the sun turned green and reformed itself into the shape of an ostrich for 43 minutes. Would you dare say that the fact that scientists couldn't explain it, still is no evidence for God?

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You are saying that, until we humans understand and explain away every "strange thing" about the world, we must accept that status as containing the evidence of the existence of a god ?

This is using god as the passe partout answer to our questions.

[David Sklansky]

"If the sun really becomes shaped like an unmistakable ostrich, I would grant that there's probably a conscious will behind it. Explanations involving a conscious will would seem less far-fetched than explanations involving coincidence.

Do you think human consciousness or the other examples you mentioned are like an ostrich-shaped sun in that respect?"

No. Perhaps the problem here is that you don't realize that the things I'm talking about simply raise the probability of "intelligent design" (which was what I meant by God, nothing more) from what it would be otherwise. I never said it comes close to 50%. The ostrich would do that though, as you yourself admit.