Tommy Angelo
01-23-2005, 11:42 AM
It went limp, limp, raise, call, fold, fold, call by me on the button with 86s, fold by the small blind, call by the big blind, and both limpers called. Sixway pot. Profile on the raiser is he could not have J-8. Profile on the limpers is they could.
The flop was 9-7-5 rainbow. It went check, check, check, bet by the raiser, call by the next guy, call by me, followed by two folds and a call. Four players remained. First was the limper who was about to be the guy who Called Two Cold (CTC). Next with a big ace or overpair was the Preflop Raiser (PFR). After him was the guy who was about to fold on the turn. Then me last.
The turn card was the deuce of rainbow. It went check by CTC, bet by PFR, call by the next guy, and I raised. CTC called two cold (like who didn’t know that!), PFR called the raise, and the straggler folded. Three players now: CTC, PFR, me. It was time. Time to divert all power to the forward shields.
Profile and read on PFR was that it was most unlikely that he had bet the turn here without an overpair or a set. And the way he called my turn raise said that he had did not have a set, which meant he was drawing dead (or maybe to tie). No worries there. On to CTC.
If the river had been a blank, I would have shifted all power toward maximum extraction during the final betting round. But that's not what happened. If the river had paired the board, I would have compared CTC’s activity to what he would do with a fullhouse. But that’s not what happened either. The river was a 10.
I like to conserve energy by not wasting it on predictably irrelevant contingencies, a device I learned formally from Rubber Bridge, a game of trumps and tricks and thirteens. You are Declarer. Your contract is Four Hearts. This means you must take at least 10 of the 13 tricks or you will go down. You have 8 of the 13 trumps, leaving five trumps somewhere in the hands of the two defenders. As you peruse the dummy and craft your line, you quickly notice that if the outstanding trumps are split 4-1 between the defenders, your contract is doomed. But if trumps are split 3-2, then your contract has a chance. In this instance, a 4-1 trump split is an irrelevant contingency. The right thing to do then is to plan your play of the hand as if the trumps are split 3-2. In other words, on this bridge hand, it would be incorrect to spend any energy on planning a line of play based on a 4-1 trump split, just as it would have been incorrect for me to try to get a read on CTC for any hand other than J-8.
I watched CTC and I asked the first great question. The first great question is not: "Does my opponent look like a man who just made the nuts on the river?" Oh no. Not yet. That. That is the second great question. The second great question is only asked when the answer to the first great question is “no.”
The first great question is: "Does my opponent look like a man who did NOT just hit the nuts?" This process of elimination, this long way around, is a shortcut. If the answer had been “yes,” as it so often plainly is, then no more energy would be spent on knowing CTC’s cards, and all power would be pointed at coaxing him to call my river bet (using pheromones and mind melds).
Back to the river action. I was looking at CTC when the 10 came, and right away I determined that the answer to the first great question was definitely "No," and just as I was moving on to the second great question, here he came out betting, in two scoops. I was being answered. His first four chips spiraled out after a roundhouse delivery, then came a little pump action before he shot the second four chips out in a line before retracting his wrist and then fingers. All of it done like a man who got there late. I was pretty sure he had it. Partly because of how he bet and partly because he had. It was all of it all together. PFR scoffed and looked at me for pity and called.
What got me writing about this hand in the first place was the peculiar range of options I faced as last to act on the river. I could choose to put in no bets, or one bet, or two bets, or three. I could put in no bets by folding, one bet by calling, two bets by raising and then folding, or three bets by raising and then calling.
It was my turn on the river and there was nothing left to do with all my power but the same thing I always do when I am about to call or fold as last action. I ask the great and final question. Which is:
Based on everything in the universe and whatever else, could his hand be worse than mine?
If the answer to the great and final question is "No," then I fold.
If the answer is "Maybe," as it was on this hand, then I do a review of the bidding. It went like this.
Could he have a set?
Based on my perception of CTC, might he limp before the flop with 55, 77 or 99? Yes he might. Might he flop a set and then checkcall the flop, planning to checkraise the turn, especially since he has a preflop raiser immediately behind him who looks like he will probably follow through and fire on the turn if checked to? Yes he might. Might he then, on the turn, after I raise by surprise in front of him, merely call? Yes he might. Might he then, on the river, having not made a single move the whole hand with his restrained set, up and decide to fire a bet out there on the river because why the heck not? Yes, he might.
But I still thought he had J-8 based on how the whole hand felt and went down and the way he bet that river. But there was doubt.
Could we be tied?
Might he limp preflop with 8-6? Yes he was a flop-seer. Might he check-call the flop with the nut straight, planning to checkraise the turn, and then, after I raise in front of him on the turn, might he decide to NOT make it three bets, while thinking this to himself: Somebody must have a set, so I'll wait and see if a pair comes on the river, and if one doesn’t, that’s when I’ll make my big move, otherwise, if the river pairs, I’ll just call down (in the same way a small flush on the turn might wait to see if the fourth flush card comes on the river, and if it doesn't, bet). Yes, he might.
But I still thought he had J-8.
And then there were the long shots, the field horses. Maybe he had pocket aces? Maybe he missed with 6-4 and popped a stone bluff out there on the river into two entrenched opponents? Maybe he misread his hand and he merely thought he had J-8 when actually he had Q8?
At the moment of sleuth, I was not quite sure enough to boldly fold where no man has folded before, but I was plenty sure enough to not raise, so I called, and he had it.
(This is not really how my thoughts went by at the table. I left some stuff out.)
Tommy
The flop was 9-7-5 rainbow. It went check, check, check, bet by the raiser, call by the next guy, call by me, followed by two folds and a call. Four players remained. First was the limper who was about to be the guy who Called Two Cold (CTC). Next with a big ace or overpair was the Preflop Raiser (PFR). After him was the guy who was about to fold on the turn. Then me last.
The turn card was the deuce of rainbow. It went check by CTC, bet by PFR, call by the next guy, and I raised. CTC called two cold (like who didn’t know that!), PFR called the raise, and the straggler folded. Three players now: CTC, PFR, me. It was time. Time to divert all power to the forward shields.
Profile and read on PFR was that it was most unlikely that he had bet the turn here without an overpair or a set. And the way he called my turn raise said that he had did not have a set, which meant he was drawing dead (or maybe to tie). No worries there. On to CTC.
If the river had been a blank, I would have shifted all power toward maximum extraction during the final betting round. But that's not what happened. If the river had paired the board, I would have compared CTC’s activity to what he would do with a fullhouse. But that’s not what happened either. The river was a 10.
I like to conserve energy by not wasting it on predictably irrelevant contingencies, a device I learned formally from Rubber Bridge, a game of trumps and tricks and thirteens. You are Declarer. Your contract is Four Hearts. This means you must take at least 10 of the 13 tricks or you will go down. You have 8 of the 13 trumps, leaving five trumps somewhere in the hands of the two defenders. As you peruse the dummy and craft your line, you quickly notice that if the outstanding trumps are split 4-1 between the defenders, your contract is doomed. But if trumps are split 3-2, then your contract has a chance. In this instance, a 4-1 trump split is an irrelevant contingency. The right thing to do then is to plan your play of the hand as if the trumps are split 3-2. In other words, on this bridge hand, it would be incorrect to spend any energy on planning a line of play based on a 4-1 trump split, just as it would have been incorrect for me to try to get a read on CTC for any hand other than J-8.
I watched CTC and I asked the first great question. The first great question is not: "Does my opponent look like a man who just made the nuts on the river?" Oh no. Not yet. That. That is the second great question. The second great question is only asked when the answer to the first great question is “no.”
The first great question is: "Does my opponent look like a man who did NOT just hit the nuts?" This process of elimination, this long way around, is a shortcut. If the answer had been “yes,” as it so often plainly is, then no more energy would be spent on knowing CTC’s cards, and all power would be pointed at coaxing him to call my river bet (using pheromones and mind melds).
Back to the river action. I was looking at CTC when the 10 came, and right away I determined that the answer to the first great question was definitely "No," and just as I was moving on to the second great question, here he came out betting, in two scoops. I was being answered. His first four chips spiraled out after a roundhouse delivery, then came a little pump action before he shot the second four chips out in a line before retracting his wrist and then fingers. All of it done like a man who got there late. I was pretty sure he had it. Partly because of how he bet and partly because he had. It was all of it all together. PFR scoffed and looked at me for pity and called.
What got me writing about this hand in the first place was the peculiar range of options I faced as last to act on the river. I could choose to put in no bets, or one bet, or two bets, or three. I could put in no bets by folding, one bet by calling, two bets by raising and then folding, or three bets by raising and then calling.
It was my turn on the river and there was nothing left to do with all my power but the same thing I always do when I am about to call or fold as last action. I ask the great and final question. Which is:
Based on everything in the universe and whatever else, could his hand be worse than mine?
If the answer to the great and final question is "No," then I fold.
If the answer is "Maybe," as it was on this hand, then I do a review of the bidding. It went like this.
Could he have a set?
Based on my perception of CTC, might he limp before the flop with 55, 77 or 99? Yes he might. Might he flop a set and then checkcall the flop, planning to checkraise the turn, especially since he has a preflop raiser immediately behind him who looks like he will probably follow through and fire on the turn if checked to? Yes he might. Might he then, on the turn, after I raise by surprise in front of him, merely call? Yes he might. Might he then, on the river, having not made a single move the whole hand with his restrained set, up and decide to fire a bet out there on the river because why the heck not? Yes, he might.
But I still thought he had J-8 based on how the whole hand felt and went down and the way he bet that river. But there was doubt.
Could we be tied?
Might he limp preflop with 8-6? Yes he was a flop-seer. Might he check-call the flop with the nut straight, planning to checkraise the turn, and then, after I raise in front of him on the turn, might he decide to NOT make it three bets, while thinking this to himself: Somebody must have a set, so I'll wait and see if a pair comes on the river, and if one doesn’t, that’s when I’ll make my big move, otherwise, if the river pairs, I’ll just call down (in the same way a small flush on the turn might wait to see if the fourth flush card comes on the river, and if it doesn't, bet). Yes, he might.
But I still thought he had J-8.
And then there were the long shots, the field horses. Maybe he had pocket aces? Maybe he missed with 6-4 and popped a stone bluff out there on the river into two entrenched opponents? Maybe he misread his hand and he merely thought he had J-8 when actually he had Q8?
At the moment of sleuth, I was not quite sure enough to boldly fold where no man has folded before, but I was plenty sure enough to not raise, so I called, and he had it.
(This is not really how my thoughts went by at the table. I left some stuff out.)
Tommy