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adios
07-15-2004, 12:04 PM
Attractive bond yields like this perk my interest. First of all similarly rated corporate bonds have much lower yields than this new breed of MBS. Second of all in a strong economy where credit risk may be declining and short term interest rates rising (these things pay over and above short term LIBOR rates) these would seem ideal to me. MBS market is bigger than the treasury market btw. Here's the article:

Bank of America's Mortgage Twist

Lender's Structured Bonds
Reduce Exposure to Risk
Of Defaulting Homeowners
By CHRISTINE RICHARD
DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
July 15, 2004; Page C6

NEW YORK -- Mortgages are big business at Bank of America Corp., but the bank's exposure to mortgage risks isn't as big as some may think.

In a series of credit-market transactions, one rated within the past few weeks, the Charlotte, N.C.-based banking behemoth has reduced its credit exposure on at least $70 billion in conforming and jumbo mortgages.

Through the sale of structured bonds called real-estate synthetic investment securities, Bank of America has passed along to investors the risk of hundreds of millions of dollars of potential credit losses on a portfolio of billions of dollars of mortgages.

"It's a way of shifting exposure off their books," said Michael Gerity, senior director at Fitch Ratings in New York, which has rated several of the transactions.


These structured bonds, which carry ratings from midinvestment grade to midspeculative grade and are issued by RESI Finance Limited Partnership, are a new twist on mortgage-backed securities. While mortgage-backed securities pass along the payments homeowners make on their mortgages to investors, these synthetic securities pass along losses on a portfolio of mortgages.

In other words, when a homeowner defaults on a mortgage and the sale of the home results in a loss, that loss is borne by the securities holders, starting with those furthest down the ratings scale.

The most recently rated RESI deal included $164 million in securities, broken into eight portions with ratings ranging from single-A-2 to single-B-3 by Moody's Investors Service. The deal was based on a portfolio of $14 billion in jumbo mortgages purchased from various originators.

Brian Vonderhorst, an analyst at Standard & Poor's Ratings Group, said the structure used in the RESI transactions has been employed almost exclusively by Bank of America, though other financial institutions have shown interest in it.

While mortgages have performed well in recent years, analysts are becoming increasingly concerned how consumers will shoulder debt payments in a rising-rate environment. There is also concern that home prices, which have been boosted by falling interest rates, could decline as mortgage rates rise.

In supplementary financial data published yesterday with its second-quarter results, Bank of America reported its average balance of residential mortgages had increased to $157 billion for the first half of 2004 against an average balance of $117 billion during the first half of 2003.

For investors, taking on some of Bank of America's mortgage risk provides an above-market return.


On a recent RESI deal, the single-B-rated part maturing in 2036 paid an interest rate of 13.95 percentage points over the one-month London interbank offered rate, according to a Standard & Poor's report on the transaction. That is a 15.35% yield in an environment where investors are demanding only about 8% to lend to single-B-rated companies in the high-yield bond market.

Why the superhigh yield? "It's a new concept for a lot of investors, and it takes time to understand," said Fitch's Mr. Gerity.

It appears investors may be getting more comfortable with the structure. A single-B-rated bond issued by RESI Finance in March offered a much higher yield of 11.7 percentage points over one-month Libor. One sold at the end of last year offered 20.2 percentage points over one-month Libor, according to S&P.

Some top holders of debt issued by RESI, including nonrated and private-placement transactions, are Aegon USA Investment Management Inc., AIG Global Investment Group and Fidelity Management & Research Co., according to New York-based market-data provider Lipper.

Bank of America wasn't available to comment on the RESI transactions.

Earlier this year, the company completed a similar deal to unload some exposure on a portfolio of more than $5 billion in consumer auto loans. In a research report, Bank of America called the auto deal a first of its kind, but declined to answer questions on the transaction.

Ray Zee
07-15-2004, 07:04 PM
i dont get it all yet, but you can be dam sure that the bank passing on the risk means they will not be as dilgent in making the loans so you are setting up the investors for big losses in the event of a crash in prices. think s&l scandal all over again.

adios
07-16-2004, 12:48 AM
Remember the bonds have been rated by the agencies. A corporate with the identical rating should have the same default risk. My understanding is that basically the agency ratings on MBS are generally more reliable than on corporates. I think this is generally true due to the fact that the characteristics of real estate borrowers are easier to analyze and predict than corporate earnings. Just my thoughts.

Not sure how this whole deal works. I'm familiar with Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs) where mortgage money is pooled and bonds are issued against that pool which are subsequently rated by the agencies based on many criteria such as FICO scores and Loan-To-Value ratios to name a couple. CMOs utilize over collateralization to help defer credit risk i.e. money is pooled such that say 106% funds 100% as a hypothetical example. For example say 106 million dollars of mortgages were pooled, then only 100 million dollars worth of bonds would be issued. The extra 6 million would cover the max in anticipated defaults. The extra 6% is called excess spread and unrated speculative bonds with the potential for huge coupon rates but high risk of default are issued. This deal sounds something like that where mortgage money is pooled but I'm not sure how they're structuring the deal to transfer the mortage default risk in this way.

This forum is a nice place to hang out.

J_V
07-16-2004, 12:58 AM
Man, adios, you're on top of everything. That noodle of yours sure works overtime.

adios
07-16-2004, 01:01 AM
.....

GeorgeF
07-16-2004, 09:43 AM
1) The article does not explain why BAC does not want to sit back and collect the 20%+Libor themselves. Hint, it's not because they like you and want you to have an easier life. My theory: Talk of putting limits on FNMA and FMAC will mean that the market will be flooded with mortgage backed securities that would have been bought by FNMA and FMAC.

2) If you feel the need to invest in mortgages invest in a mortgage REIT such as NLY or a mutual fund.

3) To get the 20% + Libor you are either buying the poorest risks or you are getting the payments most likely to diappear if there is another wave of refinancing.

adios
07-16-2004, 11:06 AM
[ QUOTE ]
1) The article does not explain why BAC does not want to sit back and collect the 20%+Libor themselves. Hint, it's not because they like you and want you to have an easier life. My theory: Talk of putting limits on FNMA and FMAC will mean that the market will be flooded with mortgage backed securities that would have been bought by FNMA and FMAC.

[/ QUOTE ]

That's not my take. My take is that BAC is deferring credit risk on perhaps their riskiest loans. That's my take. Again the agencies are rating the bonds.

[ QUOTE ]
2) If you feel the need to invest in mortgages invest in a mortgage REIT such as NLY or a mutual fund.

[/ QUOTE ]

Awhile back I recommended long positions on NFI, RWT, and AMC. NFI and RWT are mortgage REITs and are by far my largest positions in the market. Ironically I would not buy NLY in fact I think it's a sell.

[ QUOTE ]
3) To get the 20% + Libor you are either buying the poorest risks or you are getting the payments most likely to diappear if there is another wave of refinancing.

[/ QUOTE ]

Since the agencies are rating the bonds it's quite reasonable to assume IMO that the default risk is the same as an identically rated corporate.

sfer
07-16-2004, 03:50 PM
[ QUOTE ]
This deal sounds something like that where mortgage money is pooled but I'm not sure how they're structuring the deal to transfer the mortage default risk in this way.

[/ QUOTE ]

It's probably done using credit default swaps, which are an increasingly common way to synthetically transfer default risks from one investor to another. A spread is paid to the purchaser of the credit risk and in exchange the seller of credit risk is made whole by the purchaser in the event of default over a pre-specified term. The likely structure is that the proceeds of the bonds that investors buy to invest the structure are used to buy treasuries and BofA engages in a series of credit default swaps on the individual mortages with the structure. BofA pays the structure a spread, the structure assumes the risk of the mortgages. Then the structure has a maximum return in the zero default state (i.e. the sum of the spreads on the CDS contracts + the cumulative yields of the treasuries) that pay the bondholders. As defaults accumulate the structure has to sell treasuries to make up the defaulted shortfall to BofA, and the principal of the structure (and the structure's bondholders, from the junior parts of the capital structure up to the senior pieces) correspondingly decreases.

But I haven't seen this deal so this could be totally wrong. Just my $0.02 after seeing similar deals.

Also, those spreads are gigantic wide even in comparison to other asset backed structures. It might because the deal is large and fairly novel, which usually results in first investors being able to demand more in return for getting exposed first. Or it could be that investors actually perceive the risk of these notes to be substantially higher than similarly rated papers. It's hard to know ex ante.

GeorgeF
07-16-2004, 05:26 PM
"Since the agencies are rating the bonds it's quite reasonable to assume IMO that the default risk is the same as an identically rated corporate. "

I would not assume that. There is a difference between a third party 'rating' and a third party 'insuring' a bond.

There is a reason why this sells at 20% above LIBOR or apprx 22%. The long bond TLT yields 5.21%. Why is BAC giving up the 15%.

"My take is that BAC is deferring credit risk on perhaps their riskiest loans."

Good luck being deferred upon by BAC.